Product Type
Condition
Binding
Collectible Attributes
Free Shipping
Seller Location
Seller Rating
Published by VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2011
ISBN 10: 3639371747ISBN 13: 9783639371741
Seller: Hawking Books, Edgewood, TX, U.S.A.
Book
Condition: Very Good. Very Good Condition. Tight and Neat. Five star seller - Buy with confidence!.
Published by EDUCatt Università Cattolica, 2024
Seller: libreriauniversitaria.it, Occhiobello, RO, Italy
Book
Condition: NEW.
Published by VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2011
ISBN 10: 3639371747ISBN 13: 9783639371741
Seller: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, U.S.A.
Book
Condition: New.
Published by VDM Verlag, 2011
ISBN 10: 3639371747ISBN 13: 9783639371741
Seller: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, United Kingdom
Book Print on Demand
Condition: New. PRINT ON DEMAND Book; New; Fast Shipping from the UK. No. book.
Published by VDM Verlag 2011-08, 2011
ISBN 10: 3639371747ISBN 13: 9783639371741
Seller: Chiron Media, Wallingford, United Kingdom
Book
PF. Condition: New.
Published by VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2011
ISBN 10: 3639371747ISBN 13: 9783639371741
Seller: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, U.S.A.
Book Print on Demand
PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.
Published by VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2011
ISBN 10: 3639371747ISBN 13: 9783639371741
Seller: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Germany
Book Print on Demand
Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Moral hazard is a key issue in principal-agent literature. Examples lie in several aspects of real life, such as the worker's lack of effort when his/her conduct cannot be directly observed by the employer, and the principal's consequent need to motivate the agent to work as much as possible in his/her best interests. Another example is the relationship between voters and politicians, where elections serve as a disciplining mechanism to prevent rent-seeking behavior by unobserved public administrators. In this work we analyze such problems in a continuous-time setting with a model specification that draws from the classical consumption/investment à la Merton. Agents differ in competence, which is incompletely (but symmetrically) known by all players and learned over time by observing agent's performance. From a mathematical point of view, the analysis uses classical filtering techniques to re-formulate the problem within a complete information setting; then, relying on the dynamic programming principle and by using a guess-and-verify approach, explicit (at least to some extent) solutions are provided. 64 pp. Englisch.
Published by VDM Verlag Dr. Mueller Aktiengesellschaft & Co. KG, 2011
ISBN 10: 3639371747ISBN 13: 9783639371741
Seller: Books Puddle, New York, NY, U.S.A.
Book
Condition: New. pp. 64.
Published by VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2011
ISBN 10: 3639371747ISBN 13: 9783639371741
Seller: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, United Kingdom
Book Print on Demand
PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.
Published by VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2011
ISBN 10: 3639371747ISBN 13: 9783639371741
Seller: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Germany
Book Print on Demand
Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Moral hazard is a key issue in principal-agent literature. Examples lie in several aspects of real life, such as the worker's lack of effort when his/her conduct cannot be directly observed by the employer, and the principal's consequent need to motivate the agent to work as much as possible in his/her best interests. Another example is the relationship between voters and politicians, where elections serve as a disciplining mechanism to prevent rent-seeking behavior by unobserved public administrators. In this work we analyze such problems in a continuous-time setting with a model specification that draws from the classical consumption/investment à la Merton. Agents differ in competence, which is incompletely (but symmetrically) known by all players and learned over time by observing agent's performance. From a mathematical point of view, the analysis uses classical filtering techniques to re-formulate the problem within a complete information setting; then, relying on the dynamic programming principle and by using a guess-and-verify approach, explicit (at least to some extent) solutions are provided.
Published by VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2011
ISBN 10: 3639371747ISBN 13: 9783639371741
Seller: moluna, Greven, Germany
Book
Kartoniert / Broschiert. Condition: New.
Published by VDM Verlag Dr. Mueller Aktiengesellschaft & Co. KG, 2011
ISBN 10: 3639371747ISBN 13: 9783639371741
Seller: Majestic Books, Hounslow, United Kingdom
Book Print on Demand
Condition: New. Print on Demand pp. 64 2:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on Creme w/Gloss Lam.