9780198294245
Incentives and Political Economy
Jean-Jacques Laffont
ISBN 13: 9780198294245
Publisher: Oxford Univ Pr
Publication Date: 2000
Binding: Hardcover
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Incentives and Political Economy (ISBN: 0198294247 / 0-19-829424-7) Laffont, Jean-Jacques Quantity Available: 1
Book Description: Oxford University Press. Hardcover. Book Condition: New. Dispatched from UK Warehouse If Not Available in the UK Warehouse it will Dispatched from Our UAE (Dubai) Warehouse or Iran Warehouse , without any changes in Shipping Rates. Bookseller Inventory # 0198294247--16 Bookseller & Payment Information | More Books from this Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question |
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Incentives and Political Economy (ISBN: 9780198294245) Laffont, Jean-Jacques Quantity Available: 5
Book Description: Oxford University Press. Hardback. Book Condition: new. BRAND NEW PRINT ON DEMAND., Incentives and Political Economy, Jean-Jacques Laffont, 'Incentives and Political Economy' constructs a normative approach to constitutional design using recent developments in contract theory. It treats political economy as the study of the incentive problems created by the delegation of economic policy to self-interested politicians. Bookseller Inventory # B9780198294245 Bookseller & Payment Information | More Books from this Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question |
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Incentives and Political Economy (ISBN: 0198294247 / 0-19-829424-7) Laffont, Jean-Jacques Quantity Available: 1
Book Description: Oxford University Press, 2000. Hardback. Book Condition: New. 216x138 mm. (272) THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND, PLEASE ALLOW UP TO 10 DAYs EXTRA FOR DELIVERY. Incentives and Political Economy constructs a normative approach to constitutional design using recent developments in contract theory. It treats political economy as the study of the incentive problems created by the delegation of economic policy to self-interested politicians. Politicians are treated successively as informed supervisors or residual decision-makers. The optimal constitutional responses to the activities of interest groups are characterized in various circumstances, as well as the optimal trade-off between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas when the incompleteness of the constitutional contract is recognized. (Hardback). Bookseller Inventory # AQ0198294247 Bookseller & Payment Information | More Books from this Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question |
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