9780199248681

Book Description: Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2001. Paperback. Book Condition: New. 216 x 138 mm. Brand New Book with Free Worldwide Delivery ***** Print on Demand *****. Mainstream economics has only recently recognized the need to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. "Incentives and Political Economy" uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach to constitutional design in economic environments. It is written by one of Europe's leading theorists. The first part of the book remains in the tradition of benevolent constitutional design with complete contracting. It treats politicians as informed supervisors and studies how the Constitution should control them, in particular to avoid capture by interest groups. Incentive theories for the separation of powers or systems of checks and balances are developed. The second part of the book recognizes the incompleteness of the constitutional contract which leaves a lot of discretion to the politicians selected by the electoral process. Asymmetric information associates information rents with economic policies and the political game becomes a game of costly redistribution of those rents.Professor Laffont investigates the trade-offs between an inflexible constitution which leaves little discretion to politicians but sacrifices ex post efficiency and a constitution weighted towards ex post efficiency but also giving considerable discretion to politicians to pursue private agendas. The final part of the book reconsiders the modeling of collusion given asymmetric information. It proposes a new approach to characterizing incentives constraints for group behaviour when asymmetric information is non-verifiable. This provides a methodology to characterize the optimal constitutional response to activities of interest groups and to study the design of any institutions in which group behavior is important. Bookseller Inventory # AAV9780199248681

Bookseller & Payment Information | More Books from this Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Book Description: OXFORD UNIV PR 01/05/2012, 2012. Paperback. Book Condition: New. Brand new print-on-demand book. Shipped from UK. This item is printed on demand. Bookseller Inventory # LQ-9780199248681

Bookseller & Payment Information | More Books from this Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Book Description: Oxford University Press. Paperback. Book Condition: new. BRAND NEW PRINT ON DEMAND., Incentives and Political Economy, Jean-Jacques Laffont, 'Incentives and Political Economy' constructs a normative approach to constitutional design using developments in contract theory. It treats political economy as the study of the incentive problems created by the delegation of Politicians are treated successively as informed supervisors or residual decision-makers. Bookseller Inventory # B9780199248681

Bookseller & Payment Information | More Books from this Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Book Description: Oxford University Press. Book Condition: New. pp. 270. Bookseller Inventory # 7660463

Bookseller & Payment Information | More Books from this Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Book Description: OXFORD UNIV PR, 2001. Paperback. Book Condition: New. New print on demand book. Shipped from US. Bookseller Inventory # IH-9780199248681

Bookseller & Payment Information | More Books from this Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Book Description: Oxford University Press, 2001. Paperback. Book Condition: New. 216x138 mm. (272) THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND, PLEASE ALLOW UP TO 10 DAYs EXTRA FOR DELIVERY. Incentives and Political Economy constructs a normative approach to constitutional design using recent developments in contract theory. It treats political economy as the study of the incentive problems created by the delegation of economic policy to self-interested politicians. Politicians are treated successively as informed supervisors or residual decision-makers. The optimal constitutional responses to the activities of interest groups are characterized in various circumstances, as well as the optimal trade-off between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas when the incompleteness of the constitutional contract is recognized. (Paperback). Bookseller Inventory # AQ0199248680

Bookseller & Payment Information | More Books from this Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Book Description: OXFORD UNIV PR 01/05/2012, 2012. Paperback. Book Condition: New. New print on demand book. Shipped from US. This item is printed on demand. Bookseller Inventory # IP-9780199248681

Bookseller & Payment Information | More Books from this Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Book Description: OUP Oxford, 2001. Paperback. Book Condition: New. New and in stock. Book. Bookseller Inventory # 0199248680

Bookseller & Payment Information | More Books from this Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Book Description: Oxford University Press, 2012. Paperback. Book Condition: New. 8.5 by 5 inches. (00272 pages) This item is printed on demand. Please allow up to 10 days extra for printing & delivery. {Publisher's Publication Date = 2001-12-01 00:00:00} [ships from USA takes 8-14 days to Europe] illustrated Lang=English accessory:NO ACCESSORY (Paperback ). Bookseller Inventory # AF0199248680

Bookseller & Payment Information | More Books from this Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Book Description: OUP Oxford, 2001. Paperback. Book Condition: Brand New. 272 pages. 8.50x5.25x0.50 inches. In Stock. Bookseller Inventory # zk0199248680

Bookseller & Payment Information | More Books from this Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question