The rise in power of the German Navy before 1914 is a story of complex operational planning, of the allocation of priorities for defense, of involvement in foreign policy and international relations. Based on extensive archival research, this book is the first fully documented discussion of naval strategy and planning from 1862-1914 against France, Russia, Great Britain, the United States and Japan. Professor Lambi relates operational planning to the long term building plans of the German navy, which led to serious friction when current operations and future plans were in the hands of different agencies. He describes the involved co-ordination of strategy and planning of the navy and the army, and places the operational planning of both in the context of international relations. War plans are shown to have been prepared for their own sake on certain occasions, whereas at other periods they corresponded to a large extent to diplomatic realities, or at least to the way in which those realities were perceived by the German leadership. The poor co-ordination of the Prusso-German political, naval and military leadership is fully documented. This is the most complete study of the relationship of the navy to Prusso-German power politics yet undertaken both in terms of the complexity of the problems discussed and in the length of the period covered. Professor Lambi has made full use of West German archival material, particularly from the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, as well as citing numerous secondary sources. It will be invaluable for students of naval and military history, strategy and diplomacy, whether in universities, colleges or naval and military academies. --- Ivo Nikolai Lambi is Professor of History at the University of Saskatchewan. He is the author of a pioneering study on free trade and protection in Germany, 1868-1879.
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Book Description Allen & Unwin, 1984. Hardcover. Book Condition: New. Bookseller Inventory # P110049430351