This is an analysis of Kant's account of human understanding--of our capacity to form concepts of, and to be conscious of, things in the world. Schwyzer argues that the conditions which Kant sets forth for understanding--conditions about the autonomy of thought, and about the relation of concepts to objects and of language to experience--cannot be satisfied within his overall picture of understanding as representing something to oneself. If Kant's conditions are to be satisfied, Schwyzer argues, understanding must be seen not as a capacity for mental representation, but as a capacity for action.
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Book Description Book Condition: New. Clarendon Press, 1990. 184p. Hardback. Condition: New Print on Demand. Printed on Demand. Bookseller Inventory # 37305
Book Description Oxford University Press, USA, 1990. Hardcover. Book Condition: New. First Edition. Bookseller Inventory # DADAX0198248296