Moral Uncertainty - Hardcover

MacAskill, William; Bykvist, Krister; Ord, Toby

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0198722273 ISBN 13: 9780198722274

Publisher: Oxford University Press, 2020

Synopsis

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

Very often we are uncertain about what we ought, morally, to do. We do not know how to weigh the interests of animals against humans, how strong our duties are to improve the lives of distant strangers, or how to think about the ethics of bringing new people into existence. But we still need to act. So how should we make decisions in the face of such uncertainty? 

Though economists and philosophers have extensively studied the issue of decision-making in the face of uncertainty about matters of fact, the question of decision-making given fundamental moral uncertainty has been neglected. In Moral Uncertainty, philosophers William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, and Toby Ord try to fill this gap. They argue that there are distinctive norms that govern how one ought to make decisions and defend an information-sensitive account of how to make such decisions. They do so by developing an analogy between moral uncertainty and social choice, noting that different moral views provide different amounts of information regarding our reasons for action, and arguing that the correct account of decision-making under moral uncertainty must be sensitive to that. Moral Uncertainty also tackles the problem of how to make intertheoretic comparisons, and addresses the implications of their view for metaethics and practical ethics. 

About this title

About the Author

William MacAskill is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford. He is the author of the bestselling book Doing Good Better (Avery 2015), and has published in philosophy journals such as Mind, Ethics, and The Journal of Philosophy. He cofounded the international non-profits Centre for Effective Altruism, 80,000 Hours, and Giving What We Can. 

Krister Bykvist is a Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University and a Research Fellow at the Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm. His articles have appeared in Economics and Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, and Mind. His research concerns questions about our responsibility for future generations, the foundations of consequentialism, evaluative uncertainty, and the relationship between preferences, value, and welfare. He is currently co-leading an interdisciplinary project on climate ethics. 

Toby Ord is a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute. He is the author of The Precipice (Bloomsbury 2020), which argues that safeguarding humanity's longterm potential is a central moral priority of our time. His earlier research focused on the ethics of global health and global poverty. He is the cofounder of Giving What We Can, an international society focusing on pledging part of our income to the most effective charities, and of the Effective Altruism movement. 

From the Back Cover

Very often we are uncertain about what we ought, morally, to do. We do not know how to weigh the interests of animals against humans, how strong our duties are to improve the lives of distant strangers, or how to think about the ethics of bringing new people into existence. But we still need to act. So how should we make decisions in the face of such uncertainty?

Though economists and philosophers have extensively studied the issue of decision-making in the face of uncertainty about matters of fact, the question of decision-making given fundamental moral uncertainty has been neglected. In Moral Uncertainty, philosophers William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, and Toby Ord try to fill this gap. They argue that there are distinctive norms that govern how one ought to make decisions and defend an information-sensitive account of how to make such decisions. They do so by developing an analogy between moral uncertainty and social choice, noting that different moral views provide different amounts of information regarding our reasons for action, and arguing that the correct account of decision-making under moral uncertainty must be sensitive to that. Moral Uncertainty also tackles the problem of how to make intertheoretic comparisons, and addresses the implications of their view for metaethics and practical ethics.

Edition details

• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Publication date: 2020
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0198722273
• ISBN 13: 9780198722274
• Binding: Hardcover
• Number of pages: 238