Twenty years ago, most banking courses focused on either management or monetary aspects of banking, with no connecting. Since then, a microeconomic theory of banking has developed, mainly through a switch of emphasis from the modeling of risk to the modeling of imperfect information. This asymmetric information model is based on the assumption that different economic agents possess different pieces of information on relevant economic variables, and that they will use the information for their own profit. The model has been extremely useful in explaining the role of banks in the economy. It has also been useful in pointing out structural weaknesses of the banking sector that may justify government intervention--for example, exposure to runs and panics, the persistence of rationing in the credit market, and solvency problems.Microeconomics of Banking provides a guide to the new theory. Topics include why financial intermediaries exist, the industrial organization approach to banking, optimal contracting between lenders and borrowers, the equilibrium of the credit market, macroeconomic consequences of financial imperfections, individual bank runs and systemic risk, risk management inside the banking firm, and bank regulation. Each chapter ends with a detailed problem set and solutions.
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Xavier Freixas is Dean of the Undergraduate School of Economics and Business Administration and Professor at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona.Review:
"The authors have provided an extremely thorough and up-to-date survey ofmicroeconomic theories of financial intermediation. This work manages to beboth rigorous and pleasant to read. Such a book was long overdue and shouldbe required reading for anybody interested in the economics of banking andfinance." Mathias Dewatripont , Professor of Economics, ECARE, Université Libre deBruxelles
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Book Description The MIT Press, 1997. Hardcover. Book Condition: New. Never used!. Bookseller Inventory # P110262061937
Book Description The MIT Press. Hardcover. Book Condition: New. 0262061937 New Condition. Bookseller Inventory # NEW7.1000096