Drawing on scores of declassified documents, revealing interviews, and hearings held by the U.S. Congress, Professor Bruce Jentleson provides a richly detailed and insightful account of the politics, processes, and consequences of the U.S. policy toward I
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Bruce Jentleson is professor of public policy and political science at Duke University, where he served from 2000 to 2005 as director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy. He has served as a senior advisor to the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Director; as a foreign policy aide in the U.S. Senate; and as foreign policy advisor to Al Gore during his 2000 presidential campaign. In addition to numerous articles, he is the co-author of The End of Arrogance: America in the Global Competition of Ideas, with Steven Weber.From Kirkus Reviews:
A solid but dry academic analysis of how and why the US wrongheadedly tilted toward Iraq and leader Saddam Hussein until the Gulf War. In 1982, notes Jentleson (Political Science/Univ. of California, Davis), the Reagan administration removed Iraq from a list of state sponsors of terrorism. The main reason: leverage against Iran, Iraq's opponent in war. Iraq gained trade credits, military aid, and, in 1984, restoration of diplomatic relations. But, as Jentleson persuasively argues, the ``enemy of my enemy'' is not necessarily a friend. Hussein did not moderate his behavior, but flagrantly violated human rights, pursued construction of an atom bomb, and continued to support terrorism. The author suggests that trade considerations and a wishful State Department outweighed the outrage of Congress. In 1989, President Bush signed a strategic directive pointing toward normalization of relations between the two countries; once again, political and trade considerations outweighed the well-founded doubts of those concerned with human rights and nonproliferation. Jentleson also criticizes the inept accommodation US officials offered as Hussein prepared for his invasion of Kuwait. The author follows his case study with a prescription for appropriate strategy in such ``enemy-enemy- friend'' cases: Policy makers should ensure reciprocity (a rough equivalence in mutual benefits) and proportionality (the support offered should not allow the ``friend'' to be too powerful); they should also maintain deterrent credibility (a willingness to leave the alliance). He also criticizes Bush administration ``groupthink'' and federal agencies' failure to cooperate. Jentleson relies mainly on secondary sources where a journalist might have pinned down some of the faulty policy makers in interviews. He also could have offered more context on such issues as the Republican posture toward human rights policy and the importance of Israeli-Arab peace talks. Finally, Jentleson, who has served as an advisor to President Clinton's State Department, avoids commenting on the current US posture toward Iraq. For students, scholars, and policy types. -- Copyright ©1994, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.
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Book Description WW Norton Publishers. Book Condition: New. Brand New. Bookseller Inventory # 0393967123
Book Description W. W. Norton Co, 1994. Paperback. Book Condition: New. Never used!. Bookseller Inventory # P110393967123
Book Description W. W. Norton Co. PAPERBACK. Book Condition: New. 0393967123 New Condition. Bookseller Inventory # NEW7.1066257