Honesty in voting is not always the best policy. This is a book for mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers who want to understand how it is impossible to devise a reasonable voting system in which voters can never gain by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The book requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments.

*"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.*

Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. This is a book for mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers who want to understand the sense in which it is impossible to devise a reasonable voting system in which voters can never gain by submitting a disingenuous ballot. With the exception of the last chapter, the book is completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments.

"...until recently there has been a problem facing mathematicians who are interested in learning about [the mathematics of elections]...I am pleased to say that this is no longer the case, as Alan D. Taylor's recently released Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation fits this bill perfectly."

MAA Reviews, Darren Glass

"[T]his book is a little gem. It will be especially prized by those who need to understand voting systems and how they can be manipulated by individual voters."

Mathematics Today

"Taylor's book gives an excellent overview of many results stemming from Gibbard's and Satterthwaite's original analysis...The general organization of the book is excellent. This is truly a wonderful book and it can be recommended to mathematicians looking for applications in the social sciences" - Marice Salles

*"About this title" may belong to another edition of this title.*

Published by
Cambridge University Press
(2005)

ISBN 10: 0521008832
ISBN 13: 9780521008839

New
Softcover
First Edition
Quantity Available: > 20

Seller:

Rating

**Book Description **Cambridge University Press, 2005. Softcover. Book Condition: New. First edition. Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; voters will always have an opportunity to benefit by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The ensuing decades produced a number of theorems of striking mathematical naturality that dealt with the manipulability of voting systems. This book presents many of these results from the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially the contributions of economists and philosophers, from a mathematical point of view, with many new proofs. The presentation is almost completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments. Mathematics students, as well as mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers will learn why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system. Contents 1. Introduction 2. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 3. Additional results for single-valued elections 4. The Duggan-Schwartz theorem 5. Additional results for multi-valued elections 6. Ballots that rank sets 7. Elections with outcomes that are lotteries 8. Elections with variable agendas References Index. Printed Pages: 187. Bookseller Inventory # 11835

More Information About This Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Published by
Cambridge University Press
(2005)

ISBN 10: 0521008832
ISBN 13: 9780521008839

New
Softcover
First Edition
Quantity Available: > 20

Seller:

Rating

**Book Description **Cambridge University Press, 2005. Softcover. Book Condition: New. First edition. Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; voters will always have an opportunity to benefit by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The ensuing decades produced a number of theorems of striking mathematical naturality that dealt with the manipulability of voting systems. This book presents many of these results from the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially the contributions of economists and philosophers, from a mathematical point of view, with many new proofs. The presentation is almost completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments. Mathematics students, as well as mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers will learn why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system. Contents 1. Introduction 2. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 3. Additional results for single-valued elections 4. The Duggan-Schwartz theorem 5. Additional results for multi-valued elections 6. Ballots that rank sets 7. Elections with outcomes that are lotteries 8. Elections with variable agendas References Index. Printed Pages: 187. Bookseller Inventory # 11835

More Information About This Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

ISBN 10: 0521008832
ISBN 13: 9780521008839

New
Paperback
Quantity Available: 5

Seller:

Rating

**Book Description **Paperback. Book Condition: New. Softcover Book, New Condition, Fast Shipping. Ready in Stock. 1st Edition. [Please Read Carefully Before Buying], This Is An International Edition. Printed In Black and White. , Book Cover And ISBN No May Be Different From US Edition. Restricted Sales Disclaimer Wordings Not For Sales In USA And Canada May Be Printed On The Cover Of The Book. Standard Shipping 7-14 Business Days. Expedited Shiping 4-8 Business Days. ***WE DO NOT ENTERTAIN BULK ORDERS.*** The Books May Be Ship From Overseas For Inventory Purpose. Bookseller Inventory # 280633

More Information About This Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

ISBN 10: 0521008832
ISBN 13: 9780521008839

New
Paperback
Quantity Available: 1

Seller:

Rating

**Book Description **Paperback. Book Condition: New. New, Softcover International Edition, Printed in Black and White, Different ISBN, Same Content As US edition, Book Cover may be Different, in English Language. Bookseller Inventory # 576

More Information About This Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Published by
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, United Kingdom
(2005)

ISBN 10: 0521008832
ISBN 13: 9780521008839

New
Paperback
Quantity Available: 10

Seller:

Rating

**Book Description **CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, United Kingdom, 2005. Paperback. Book Condition: New. Language: English . Brand New Book ***** Print on Demand *****. Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; voters will always have an opportunity to benefit by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The ensuing decades produced a number of theorems of striking mathematical naturality that dealt with the manipulability of voting systems. This 2005 book presents many of these results from the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially the contributions of economists and philosophers, from a mathematical point of view, with many new proofs. The presentation is almost completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments. Mathematics students, as well as mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers will learn why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system. Bookseller Inventory # AAV9780521008839

More Information About This Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Published by
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, United Kingdom
(2005)

ISBN 10: 0521008832
ISBN 13: 9780521008839

New
Paperback
Quantity Available: 10

Seller:

Rating

**Book Description **CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, United Kingdom, 2005. Paperback. Book Condition: New. Language: English . Brand New Book ***** Print on Demand *****.Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; voters will always have an opportunity to benefit by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The ensuing decades produced a number of theorems of striking mathematical naturality that dealt with the manipulability of voting systems. This 2005 book presents many of these results from the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially the contributions of economists and philosophers, from a mathematical point of view, with many new proofs. The presentation is almost completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments. Mathematics students, as well as mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers will learn why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system. Bookseller Inventory # AAV9780521008839

More Information About This Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Published by
Cambridge University Press
(2005)

ISBN 10: 0521008832
ISBN 13: 9780521008839

New
Quantity Available: > 20

Seller:

Rating

**Book Description **Cambridge University Press, 2005. PAP. Book Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from US within 10 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. Bookseller Inventory # IQ-9780521008839

More Information About This Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Published by
Cambridge University Press
(2016)

ISBN 10: 0521008832
ISBN 13: 9780521008839

New
Paperback
Quantity Available: 1

Seller:

Rating

**Book Description **Cambridge University Press, 2016. Paperback. Book Condition: New. PRINT ON DEMAND Book; New; Publication Year 2016; Not Signed; Fast Shipping from the UK. No. book. Bookseller Inventory # ria9780521008839_lsuk

More Information About This Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Published by
The Mathematical Association o
(2017)

ISBN 10: 0521008832
ISBN 13: 9780521008839

New
Paperback
Quantity Available: > 20

Seller:

Rating

**Book Description **The Mathematical Association o, 2017. Paperback. Book Condition: New. Never used! This item is printed on demand. Bookseller Inventory # 0521008832

More Information About This Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question

Published by
Cambridge University Press
(2005)

ISBN 10: 0521008832
ISBN 13: 9780521008839

New
Quantity Available: > 20

Seller:

Rating

**Book Description **Cambridge University Press, 2005. PAP. Book Condition: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 3 to 5 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. Bookseller Inventory # LQ-9780521008839

More Information About This Seller | Ask Bookseller a Question