Running Scared: Why America's Politicians Campaign Too Much and Govern Too Little - Hardcover

King, Anthony

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0684827301 ISBN 13: 9780684827308

Publisher: Free Pr, 1997

Synopsis

A British political expert discusses why American politicians spend so much time campaigning and explains how politicians' vulnerability has led to problems

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Reviews

Do members of Congress skew their political activities toward self-advertisement, credit-claiming and often meretricious position-taking? According to British political scientist King, U.S. politicians continuously worry about getting reelected, thanks to America's combination of short terms, prodigiously high campaign costs, direct primaries (no other democracy has them) and candidate-centered elections with weak party support. The result, King charges, is that America's elected officials live in constant insecurity, wasting time and scarce resources on nonstop campaigning and fund-raising. This state of affairs, he suggests, helps explain the American system's paralysis, its inability, for example, to tackle budget deficits and crime. King's prescription: lengthen representatives' two-year terms to four years, extend senators' to eight years, and hold these elections concurrently with presidential elections; select candidates by state and local conventions and caucuses instead of primaries; allow political parties to contribute more funds to their candidates' campaigns. Written with acid wit, this is an eye-opening comparative look at American democracy in action, and inaction.
Copyright 1996 Reed Business Information, Inc.

In a novel but weakly supported premise, British political scientist and BBC elections analyst King argues that the American infatuation with holding government leaders accountable renders them much more vulnerable to the whims of the electorate than their counterparts abroad. King argues that, compared with electoral systems in Germany and England, for example, America's short terms, weak parties, open primaries, and the enormous expense of campaigns force American politicians to continuously elevate electoral imperatives over good government. His solution includes lengthening congressional terms of office and strengthening the role of party officials in selecting candidates (as opposed to primaries), and stronger adherence by elected officials to their party's line. Unfortunately, he moves much too casually from premise to solution. Consider: King offers no analysis that could suggest advantages associated with the US's relatively high levels of accountability as compared with other countries. Further, the inability of senators to enjoy the benefits of lengthy terms is dismissed in a single paragraph by referring to the pervasiveness of ``America's electioneering atmosphere.'' Although obviously relevant for assessing the probable effects of lengthening congressional terms, this ``atmosphere'' then disappears from King's book along with the Senate. It is possible that lengthening congressional terms would, for example, reduce the pressure on officeholders to constantly engage in fundraising despite the contrary evidence provided by the Senate. This sort of sloppy argumentation reflects King's assumption of the superiority of limited democracy and, equally, his assumption that government failures in the US are due primarily to officials' electoral vulnerability. This book does raise important questions about the tradeoffs, if any, between electoral vulnerability and political accountability, but noverall, this work is not up to the author's usual standards. -- Copyright ©1996, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

British political scientist King diagnoses the infirmities of the American electoral process as the symptoms of an excess of democracy. Disputing complaints that politicians are out of touch, he argues that they are hypersensitive to popular opinion and hence run scared of it. The cause is the scheduling of elections, held more frequently here than in any other country. No sooner have congressional candidates won than they must attend to the next primary contest 12 to 18 months in the future, which leads to constant fund-raising and a proclivity to "vote the district," not the party. King identifies further ill effects of the constant campaign: the rise of symbolic politics (e.g., the "war" on crime) and short-term thinking that evolves into a systematic inability to confront urgent problems, such as chronic deficits. This is sensible analysis for politically aware readers, and King's scrupulously nonpartisan tone might prepare them for the wisdom of his proposed reforms: to give U.S. representatives four-year terms, and to curtail nominating (primary) elections. Gilbert Taylor

King (government, Univ. of Essex) argues that the major reason for the political paralysis of the U.S. government is the electoral vulnerability of Congress. Unlike European politicians who are up for reelection infrequently, are not subject to primary elections, and are not required to spend large sums in their campaigns, members of the House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate are up for reelection every two years. King believes that this forces congressional representatives to spend more time analyzing poll results and dealing with local constituent concerns than acting on many issues that require governing. After giving a historical review of the U.S. electoral system from the Progressives who initiated the primary system to campaign reformers today, King provides two case studies, one on the budget deficit and the other on crime issues, to show that politicians, fearing the wrath of the electorate, are unwilling to make the politically unpopular decisions needed to effect real legislative reform. There are two problems with King's analysis: first, he assumes that incumbency is a good thing and does not admit that perhaps some of the paralysis is due to the lack of new ideas that could provide new legislators. Second, while addressing term limits, he claims that few would be willing to work for a short period of time. He fails to point out that the salary?$120,000 a year?would make the job very attractive to some, as would the many perks that many ex-legislators seem to have. Still, this book offers an interesting commentary for undergraduate political science classes.?Patricia Hatch, Insurance Inst. for Property Loss Reduction, Boston
Copyright 1996 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Edition details

• Publisher: Free Pr
• Publication date: 1997
• ISBN 10: 0684827301
• ISBN 13: 9780684827308
• Binding: Hardcover
• Language: English
• Edition number: 1
• Number of pages: 244