Deals with the philosophical problems of perception and with the status of color properties. In making the case for the 'color skepticism', this title discusses and rejects historically influential accounts of the nature of secondary qualities such as those of Locke, Reid, Galileo, and Hobbes as well as the work of Kripke and Grice.
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Defending a view called color skepticism—distinct from radical skepticisms—about the external worldFrom the Inside Flap:
"Landesman’s discussion is lucid, competent, and in many spots original. This metaphysical topic is hot just now, and of recurring historical concern, and of genuine philosophical interest; those three features do not often coincide."
—William G. Lycan, University of North Carolina
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Book Description Temple University Press, 1989. Hardcover. Book Condition: New. Never used!. Bookseller Inventory # P110877226164