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It has long been thought that the failure of Germany to defeat Russia in 1941 was due primarily to interference in the plans and operations of the German armed forces by Adolf Hitler, and ultimately, that it was Field Marshal "Winter" and General "Mud" that stopped Army Group Center at the gates of Moscow. Certainly, the STAVKA (Soviet High Command) and the Red Army had little or nothing to do with it. But to Dr. Bryan Fugate, this view is too simplistic. A renowned expert on Soviet and German military history - he speaks both German and Russian - Fugate has long understood the great significance of the strategy developed by Soviet Generals Zhukov and Timoshenko that inflicted the devastating casualties on the advancing Nazis, making German victory impossible. This was the foundation of Fugate's previous book, the critically acclaimed and controversial Operation Barbarossa, a landmark study that brought the conventional historians out of their ivory towers into battle. Taking advantage of the new spirit of openness in the former Soviet Union, Fugate visited Russia to investigate precisely how the Soviets were able to outfox both Hitler and his acclaimed generals. In doing so, he teamed up with the eminent Soviet historian Lev Dvoretsky, using the most up-to-date research in formerly secret Soviet military and political archives. The result of this collaboration is Thunder on the Dnepr, a definitive work providing conclusive evidence that despite serious mistakes made by the Germans, the primary reason the Red Army was to prevail was due to war games conducted by Zhukov and Timoshenko in late 1940 and early 1941. The results of these exercises convinced Stalin that the Germans could bedefeated before they reached Moscow, but that existing plans for the Red Army to counterattack immediately when the Germans launched their invasion were futile. Instead, a defense in depth anchored along the Dnepr River on the southern flank of German Army Group Center would slow
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Bryan Fugate is a well-known authority on the Eastern Front and author of Operation Barbarossa. Lev Dvoretsky is a retired Russian colonel and expert on Russian military history.Review:
The book disproves the myths that Stalin was unprepared, didn't expect a war, was useless, etc. How could anyone defeat a blitzkrieg launched by the largest invasion force in history? This book shows how it was done. If you want to know, read the book! --By A Custome
This book has caused me to re-evaluate my views of the 1941 part of the Great Patriotic War and my approach to creating a simulation of this campaign. The defense of the upper Dnepr has been documented in other books, but, that this defense was pre-conceived and not just spur-of-the-moment or last-ditch scrambling has never been made clear before now. I'm not sold on everything the author(s) contend. (E.g., rather than believe Pavlov was set up for failure, I'm more inclined to believe that Stalin allowed Zhukov and Timoshenko to start preparing a defense in depth in case Pavlov was wrong, which possibility showed up from the wargames, and/or in case the Germans struck while the Red Army was still being re-organized.) I perceive there were a number of reasons why the blitzkrieg failed in the Soviet Union. It is evident from the information in this book, that Soviet strategy for a defense in depth was a contributor. Overall I'm very pleased with the presentation of information in this book. The fresh perspective is both interesting and rewarding. --By A Customer
The authors have reconstructed, from circumstantial evidence, a revisionist interpretation of Red Army prewar planning and early war strategy. This is an excellent attempt to look at "the other side of the hill" (95% of what's out there being narrated from the German point of view. The authors know their material well, but the specifics of their case (a Soviet master plan based on February 1941 wargames kept secret from all but a handful of generals) hinges on only a few collateral documents. They can document a general similarity of Soviet operations with what they believe was the outcome of the wargame, but cannot conclusively link the two, except by arguing that Zhukov and Timoshenko were at the wargame and conducted grand strategy--ergo they must have employed the strategy from the game. This is dangerous ground upon which to rest your entire thesis. Nonetheless, this book is valuable for approaching the first weeks and months of the war from a Soviet perspective, and makes the point quite strongly that the Red Army had already thrown German operations off their timetable within the first month of the war. --By A Customer
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Book Description Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1997. Hardcover. Condition: New. Maps, 32 B/W Photos (illustrator). First Edition. (full book description) Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1997. 1st Edition NEW, Hard Cover, w/Dust Jacket. Size=6"x9", 415pgs(Index). Maps, 32 B/W Photos. New. Clean, bright and very tight. No ink names, tears, chips, foxing, etc. Price unclipped. ISBN 0891415297 20% OFF our regular catalogue price. SELLING WORLDWIDE since 1987. 99% OF OUR BOOKS ARE SHIPPED IN CUSTOM BOXES, WE ALWAYS PACK WITH GREAT CARE!. Book. Seller Inventory # CONROY242745I
Book Description Presidio Press, 1997. Condition: New. book. Seller Inventory # M0891415297
Book Description Presidio Press, 1997. Hardcover. Condition: New. Seller Inventory # DADAX0891415297
Book Description Presidio Press, U.S.A., 1997. Hardcover. Condition: New. Dust Jacket Condition: New. 1st Edition. new 1st edition in new jacket. Seller Inventory # 030690
Book Description Presidio Press, 1997. Hardcover. Condition: New. Never used!. Seller Inventory # P110891415297