Relieved of Command - Softcover

Persons, Benjamin S.

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0897452046 ISBN 13: 9780897452045

Publisher: Sunflower Univ Pr, 1996

Synopsis

Relieved of Command speaks of little conflicts, not of grand strategy. The men who are written about were dedicated, loyal, brave, and well-trained. They simply did not achieve what was expected of them. Chance played a great part in their undoing -- history will give them but a footnote -- yet chance favored others.

In this monograph, the author has attempted to tell of several who were "relieved of command" -- both a routine rostering change or, as more commonly thought, a pejorative action. With some, the results could have been foreseen; with others, the relief was unexpected.

This fragmentary listing of combat-command general officers who were relieved while commanding brigades, combat commands, divisions, or corps will serve to illustrate that relief of a subordinate, though not commonplace, did happen.

About this title

About the Author

Benjamin S. Persons is a consulting civil engineer and geologist in Atlanta, Georgia. An ROTC student from the Georgia Military Academy and Georgia Institute of Technology, he was commissioned second lieutenant on infantry at 19. During World War II he served through activation and training as an anti-tank platoon leader in the 42nd Infantry (Rainbow) Division. Before the Division departed for France, Persons transferred to the Division Engineers. He led a 2nd Battalion, 232nd Infantry, engineer platoon in combat in France, Germany, and Austria, and was awarded the Bronze and Silver Stars.

Returning to the Georgia Institute of Technology, Persons received his degree in civil engineering and entered practice with Dames & Moore in California. He later worked in Illinois and established the firm's engineering practice in the Southeast, then managed the firm's offices in Australia and the Pacific.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Chapter One: The ostensible intent of a military mission is to further the stated or implied goal of the entity that sent the mission out. Soldiers take to the field to do what they believe the king wants of them.

After receiving the grand commission, the newly appointed Commander sets about recruiting a force, making arrangements to clothe, feed, arm, and train the new muster, stocking the finance officer with sufficient coin to pay the troops, and generally preparing for that day when in the early morning mist the enemy is first sighted. Meanwhile, somewhere in the world, the Commander has a counterpart, an adversary whom he will someday meet in battle. Their missions, interestingly, are not dissimilar.

Communications are almost always from the top down ("You do this") and from the bottom up ("This is what I have done"). It is seldom that the one issuing orders will tolerate being told what the subordinate believes to have heard his orders to be. In battle, carrying out orders is measured by success. If you do not take the hill that I have commanded you to take, then you have not carried out my orders and, perhaps, you have even disobeyed me. I may choose to excuse your failure and give you other orders to carry out, or I may simply tell you again to take the hill. If those who give me orders are critical of my accomplishments, I may relieve you of your command and try to find someone who can and will take the hill. But then "less than success, but worthy effort" is often judged by how many men you have lost in the trying. Nineteenth-century Field Marshal Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke is reputed to have said that a general officer is never really seasoned until he has lost a whole division. But it is not this simple. Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston was sacked on July 17, 1864, for not fighting the Yankees and keeping his army; his successor, Lieutenant General John Bell Hood, was sacked for fighting and losing his army.

The significant ingredient is success. Neither Johnson nor Hood were successful. On the other hand, General Robert E. Lee was, and history has treated him kindly. As the adage goes, "Success begets success."

Perhaps more important is public image. Few knew this better than Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D. Eisenhower, who operated their very lives under the council of publicity and image and had staffs who saw to it that the great leaders were always pictured in the most flattering light. Because it is hardly popular to sack one who is immensely admired, safety comes in keeping up the public image. During the midst of the Yaul River crisis in 1950, which finally cost MacArthur his corncob pipe, most Americans sided with MacArthur and thought we should bomb past the Yaul, even up to and including attacking Peking with the atomic bomb. Fortunately, President Harry S. Truman sensed the peril of a ground war with China and avoided this by affirming the policy of protecting South Korea and Formosa and no more.

Of equal importance with success is the Commander's willingness to accept a pragmatic shift in stated purpose/policy, which may not result in coincidence with the policy of the Commander. Neither MacArthur, Truman, nor the United Nations had a clear idea of what was to be done in Korea more than forcing the North Koreans to give up what they had taken. As circumstances began to favor the United Nations and the United States, MacArthur began thinking of punishing the North Koreans and, maybe, slightly punishing the Chinese for helping the North Koreans. Truman, who had declined the offer of Chinese Nationalist troops, began to sense, as the North Koreans were being driven back from whence they came, that if we pushed too far, we would find ourselves in a shooting war with China. Hence, our stated policy was subtly changed to "recover the land we lost, but don't provoke the Chinese to war." MacArthur began saying, "There is no substitute for victory." Truman thought that peace was worth substituting. And that's all it took.

It is probably safe to assert, though rather cynically, that the Commander expects of the subordinate what his mind tells him to expect at the moment, regardless of whether or not the subordinate knows what is expected of him. Here reality or fantasy become important. The successful beleaguered Commander recognizes his assets and liabilities and operates within the limitations these impose. The Commander who fantasizes of being rescued by mythical armies, as Hitler did in the last days in Berlin in 1945, is -- to quote 19th-century German military theorist Karl von Clausewitz -- "a fool." Contrast the fool with one who orders a rescue effort to be made by a force about which the orderer knows everything: location, strength, fighting ability. Reality diminishes impossible odds. Remember the besieged 12th-century crusade force that, having eaten the last rat in the encircled Turkish city, marched out to meet the enemy, who outnumbered them three to one, and handily whipped the hell out of them. The outcome was at best unlikely, nigh on to impossible, but the action began from reality.

Let us, therefore, put a few of these sacked Commanders under the scrutiny of the hand lens. What follows is a fragmentary listing of combat command officers who were relieved while commanding brigades, combat commands, divisions, or corps. These will serve to illustrate that relief of a subordinate, though not commonplace, did happen.

Edition details

• Publisher: Sunflower Univ Pr
• Publication date: 1996
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0897452046
• ISBN 13: 9780897452045
• Binding: Paperback
• Number of pages: 190