This Element introduces the replicator dynamics for symmetric and asymmetric games where the strategy sets are metric spaces. Under this hypothesis the replicator dynamics evolves in a Banach space of finite signed measures. The authors provide a general framework to study the stability of the replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in this Banach space. This allows them to establish a relation between Nash equilibria and the stability of the replicator for normal a form games applicable to oligopoly models, theory of international trade, public good models, the tragedy of commons, and War of attrition game among others. They also provide conditions to approximate the replicator dynamics on a space of measures by means of a finite-dimensional dynamical system and a sequence of measure-valued Markov processes.
"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.
US$ 2.64 shipping within U.S.A.
Destination, rates & speedsSeller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition. Seller Inventory # 47611931
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # 47611931-n
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: Grand Eagle Retail, Fairfield, OH, U.S.A.
Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. This Element introduces the replicator dynamics for symmetric and asymmetric games where the strategy sets are metric spaces. Under this hypothesis the replicator dynamics evolves in a Banach space of finite signed measures. The authors provide a general framework to study the stability of the replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in this Banach space. This allows them to establish a relation between Nash equilibria and the stability of the replicator for normal a form games applicable to oligopoly models, theory of international trade, public good models, the tragedy of commons, and War of attrition game among others. They also provide conditions to approximate the replicator dynamics on a space of measures by means of a finite-dimensional dynamical system and a sequence of measure-valued Markov processes. This Element introduces the replicator dynamics for symmetric and asymmetric games where the strategy sets are metric spaces. The authors provide conditions to approximate the replicator dynamics on a space of measures by means of a finite-dimensional dynamical system and a sequence of measure-valued Markov processes. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9781009472302
Quantity: 1 available
Seller: Revaluation Books, Exeter, United Kingdom
Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 100 pages. 6.00x0.31x9.00 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand. Seller Inventory # __1009472305
Quantity: 1 available
Seller: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, United Kingdom
Condition: New. In. Seller Inventory # ria9781009472302_new
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, United Kingdom
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # 47611931-n
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, United Kingdom
Hardback. Condition: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days 284. Seller Inventory # C9781009472302
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, United Kingdom
Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition. Seller Inventory # 47611931
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: CitiRetail, Stevenage, United Kingdom
Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. This Element introduces the replicator dynamics for symmetric and asymmetric games where the strategy sets are metric spaces. Under this hypothesis the replicator dynamics evolves in a Banach space of finite signed measures. The authors provide a general framework to study the stability of the replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in this Banach space. This allows them to establish a relation between Nash equilibria and the stability of the replicator for normal a form games applicable to oligopoly models, theory of international trade, public good models, the tragedy of commons, and War of attrition game among others. They also provide conditions to approximate the replicator dynamics on a space of measures by means of a finite-dimensional dynamical system and a sequence of measure-valued Markov processes. This Element introduces the replicator dynamics for symmetric and asymmetric games where the strategy sets are metric spaces. The authors provide conditions to approximate the replicator dynamics on a space of measures by means of a finite-dimensional dynamical system and a sequence of measure-valued Markov processes. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9781009472302
Quantity: 1 available
Seller: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Germany
Buch. Condition: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This Element introduces the replicator dynamics for symmetric and asymmetric games where the strategy sets are metric spaces. The authors provide conditions to approximate the replicator dynamics on a space of measures by means of a finite-dimensional dynamical system and a sequence of measure-valued Markov processes. Seller Inventory # 9781009472302
Quantity: 1 available