Germany's 1940 defeat of the Armée de l'air, perhaps the world's preeminent air force at the close of World War I, is commonly attributed to incompetent French leadership. Drawing on primary French sources not previously available to historians, Cain argues that in the 1930s the French Air Force was intellectually and operationally constrained, owing to an insufficient interest in and understanding of aviation by the Army and Navy high commands and the French government. But there was certainly no shortage of qualified officers who understood the capabilities of a modern air force in warfare.
Through this groundbreaking and innovative analysis, Cain brings a measure of balance to European interwar history.
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Lt. Col. Anthony Christopher Cain, USAF, was recognized by the Air Education and Training Command as Educator of the Year in 1995. He is a veteran B-52 radar navigator with more than 3,000 flying hours, and he earned the Distinguished Flying Cross while flying twenty-six combat missions during Operation Desert Storm.
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Book Description Smithsonian Inst Scholarly Pr, 2002. Hardcover. Book Condition: Brand New. 1st edition edition. 214 pages. 9.00x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock. Bookseller Inventory # zk1588340104
Book Description Smithsonian Institution Schola, 2002. Hardcover. Book Condition: New. Never used!. Bookseller Inventory # P111588340104
Book Description 2002. Hardcover. Book Condition: New. Hardcover. Germany's 1940 defeat of the Armee de l'Air, perhaps the world's pre-eminent air force at the close of World War I, is commonly attributed to incompetent French leadership. Dr.Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. 214 pages. 0.449. Bookseller Inventory # 9781588340108