Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria

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9783540171010: Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria
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This book discusses the main shortcomings of the classical solution concept from noncooperative game theory (that of Nash equilibria) and provides a comprehensive study of the more refined concepts (such as sequential, perfect, proper and stable equilibria) that have been introduced to overcome these drawbacks. The plausibility of the assumptions underlying each such concept are discussed, desirable properties as well as deficiencies are illustrated, characterizations are derived and the relationships between the various concepts are studied. The first six chapters provide an informal discussion with many examples as well as a comprehensive overview for normal form games. The remaining chapters are devoted to specific applications, illustrating the strength (resp. weakness) of the various concepts.

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Damme, Eric van:
Published by Springer (1987)
ISBN 10: 3540171010 ISBN 13: 9783540171010
Used Gebundene Ausgabe; Quantity Available: 1
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Petra Gros
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Book Description Springer, 1987. Gebundene Ausgabe; Condition: Gut. XVII, 318 S. Das hier angebotene Buch stammt aus einer teilaufgelösten wissenschaftlichen Bibliothek und trägt die entsprechenden Kennzeichnungen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.). Der Buchzustand ist ansonsten ordentlich und dem Alter entsprechend gut; ENGLISCH! The book offered here comes from a partially resolved scientific library and transmits the appropriate markings (spine label, institute stamp .). The book condition is otherwise properly and according to age well; ENGLISH! Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Informal Description of Games and Game Theory 1 1.2 Dynamic Programming 3 1.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibria 6 1.4 Sequential Equilibria and Perfect Equilibria 8 1.5 Perfect, Proper and Persistent Equilibria 13 1.6 Essential Equilibria and Regular Equilibria 17 2 Games in Normal Form 21 2.1 Preliminaries 21 2.2 Perfect Equilibria 25 2.3 Proper Equilibria 28 2.4 Essential Equilibria 34 2.5 Regular Equilibria 37 2.6 An "Almost all" Theorem 41 3 Matrix and Bimatrix Games 45 3.1 Preliminaries 45 3.2 Perfect Equilibria 48 3.3 Regular Equilibria 50 3.4 Characterizations of Regular Equilibria 53 3.5 Matrix Games 56 4 Control Costs 62 4.1 Introduction 63 4.2 Games with Control Costs 65 4.3 Approachable Equilibria 68 4.4 Proper Equilibria 71 4.5 Perfect Equilibria 73 4.6 Regular Equilibria . . 76 5 Incomplete Information 78 5.1 Introduction 79 5.2 Disturbed Games 81 5.3 Firm Equilibria 83 5.4 Perfect Equilibria 85 /871434008XVI Contents 5.5 Weakly Proper Equilibria 88 5.6 Strictly Proper Equilibria and Regular Equilibria 91 5.7 Proofs of the Theorems of Sect. 5.5 94 6 Extensive Form Games 99 6.1 Definitions 100 6.2 Equilibria and Subgame Perfectness 104 6.3 Sequential Equilibria 106 6.4 Perfect Equilibria Ill 6.5 Proper Equilibria 115 6.6 Control Costs 120 6.7 Incomplete Information 122 7 Bargaining and Fair Division 127 7.1 Introduction 127 7.2 Divide and Choose 130 7.3 Auction Methods 133 7.4 Bargaining Problems and Bargaining Solutions 138 7.5 The Nash Negotiation Game 142 7.6 The Rubinstein/Binmore Model 147 7.7 The Crawford/Moulin Model 153 7.8 Bargaining Games with Variable Threat Point 156 8 Repeated Games 162 8.1 Introduction 163 8.2 Preliminaries 167 8.3 Infinitely Repeated Games Without Discounting 171 8.4 Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting: Nash Equilibria . . .177 8.5 Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting: Subgame Perfect Equilibria 183 8.6 Finitely Repeated Games: Nash Equilibria 191 8.7 Finitely Repeated Games: Subgame Perfect Equilibria 194 8.8 Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria 203 9 Evolutionary Game Theory 208 9.1 Introduction 209 9.2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies 212 9.3 Strategic Stability of ESS 216 9.4 Population Dynamics 220 9.5 Asymmetric Contests: Examples and the Model 228 9.6 Asymmetric Contests: Results 234 9.7 Contests in Extensive Form: Definitions 240 9.8 Contests in Extensive Form: Results 245 Contents XVII 10 Strategic Stability and Applications 252 10.1 Equivalence of Games 252 10.2 Requirements for Strategic Stability 259 10.3 Stable Equilibria 264 10.4 Signalling Games: Introduction . 269 10.5 Signalling Games: Dominance, Intuitive Arguments and Stability . . 275 10.6 Spence's Job Market Signalling Model 289 10.7 The Chain Store Paradox 293 10.8 Repeated Games 300 References 305 Survey Diagrams 314 Subject Index 317 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 700. Seller Inventory # 930430

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2.

Damme, Eric van:
Published by Springer Verlag; (1987)
ISBN 10: 3540171010 ISBN 13: 9783540171010
Used Quantity Available: 1
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Petra Gros
(Koblenz, Germany)
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Book Description Springer Verlag;, 1987. gebundene Ausgabe. Condition: Gut. 318 Seiten Der Erhaltungszustand des hier angebotenen Werks ist trotz seiner Bibliotheksnutzung sehr sauber. Es befindet sich lediglich ein Bibliotheksstempel im Buch; ordnungsgemäß entwidmet. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 670. Seller Inventory # 1455044

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Eric van Damme
Published by Springer
ISBN 10: 3540171010 ISBN 13: 9783540171010
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Book Description Springer. Hardcover. Condition: GOOD. Spine creases, wear to binding and pages from reading. May contain limited notes, underlining or highlighting that does affect the text. Possible ex library copy, that’ll have the markings and stickers associated from the library. Accessories such as CD, codes, toys, may not be included. Seller Inventory # 2808685997

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