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Game theory is central to modern understandings of how people deal with problems of coordination and cooperation. Yet, ironically, it cannot give a straightforward explanation of some of the simplest forms of human coordination and cooperation--most famously, that people can use the apparently arbitrary features of "focal points" to solve coordination problems, and that people sometimes cooperate in "prisoner's dilemmas." Addressing a wide readership of economists, sociologists, psychologists, and philosophers, Michael Bacharach here proposes a revision of game theory that resolves these long-standing problems.
In the classical tradition of game theory, Bacharach models human beings as rational actors, but he revises the standard definition of rationality to incorporate two major new ideas. He enlarges the model of a game so that it includes the ways agents describe to themselves (or "frame") their decision problems. And he allows the possibility that people reason as members of groups (or "teams"), each taking herself to have reason to perform her component of the combination of actions that best achieves the group's common goal. Bacharach shows that certain tendencies for individuals to engage in team reasoning are consistent with recent findings in social psychology and evolutionary biology.
As the culmination of Bacharach's long-standing program of pathbreaking work on the foundations of game theory, this book has been eagerly awaited. Following Bacharach's premature death, Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden edited the unfinished work and added two substantial chapters that allow the book to be read as a coherent whole.
About the Author: Michael Bacharach (1936-2002) was Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford, where he was also Director of the Bounded Rationality in Economic Behavior Research Unit. His books included the present work, which he was completing at the time of his death, and Economics and the Theory of Games. Natalie Gold is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Philosophy, Probability, and Modeling Group at the University of Konstanz. Robert Sugden, Professor of Economics at the University of East Anglia, Norwich, is the author of The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare and the co-author of The Principles of Practical Cost-Benefit Analysis and The Theory of Choice.
Title: Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames ...
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Publication Date: 2006
Binding: Hardcover
Condition: Very Good
Dust Jacket Condition: Very Good
Book Type: Book
Seller: Moe's Books, Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.
hardcover. Condition: very good. Dust Jacket Condition: very good. Jacket slightly scuffed. Seller Inventory # 1137609
Seller: Ammareal, Morangis, France
Hardcover. Condition: Bon. Edition 2006. Ammareal reverse jusqu'à 15% du prix net de cet article à des organisations caritatives. ENGLISH DESCRIPTION Book Condition: Used, Good. Edition 2006. Ammareal gives back up to 15% of this item's net price to charity organizations. Seller Inventory # F-991-614
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Seller: Labyrinth Books, Princeton, NJ, U.S.A.
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Seller: Anybook.com, Lincoln, United Kingdom
Condition: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. In good all round condition. Dust jacket in good condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,600grams, ISBN:9780691120058. Seller Inventory # 4146588
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Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # 2576095-n
Seller: Rarewaves USA, OSWEGO, IL, U.S.A.
Hardback. Condition: New. Game theory is central to modern understandings of how people deal with problems of coordination and cooperation. Yet, ironically, it cannot give a straightforward explanation of some of the simplest forms of human coordination and cooperation--most famously, that people can use the apparently arbitrary features of "focal points" to solve coordination problems, and that people sometimes cooperate in "prisoner's dilemmas." Addressing a wide readership of economists, sociologists, psychologists, and philosophers, Michael Bacharach here proposes a revision of game theory that resolves these long-standing problems. In the classical tradition of game theory, Bacharach models human beings as rational actors, but he revises the standard definition of rationality to incorporate two major new ideas. He enlarges the model of a game so that it includes the ways agents describe to themselves (or "frame") their decision problems. And he allows the possibility that people reason as members of groups (or "teams"), each taking herself to have reason to perform her component of the combination of actions that best achieves the group's common goal.Bacharach shows that certain tendencies for individuals to engage in team reasoning are consistent with recent findings in social psychology and evolutionary biology. As the culmination of Bacharach's long-standing program of pathbreaking work on the foundations of game theory, this book has been eagerly awaited. Following Bacharach's premature death, Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden edited the unfinished work and added two substantial chapters that allow the book to be read as a coherent whole. Seller Inventory # LU-9780691120058
Seller: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, United Kingdom
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # 2576095-n
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Seller: Rarewaves USA United, OSWEGO, IL, U.S.A.
Hardback. Condition: New. Game theory is central to modern understandings of how people deal with problems of coordination and cooperation. Yet, ironically, it cannot give a straightforward explanation of some of the simplest forms of human coordination and cooperation--most famously, that people can use the apparently arbitrary features of "focal points" to solve coordination problems, and that people sometimes cooperate in "prisoner's dilemmas." Addressing a wide readership of economists, sociologists, psychologists, and philosophers, Michael Bacharach here proposes a revision of game theory that resolves these long-standing problems. In the classical tradition of game theory, Bacharach models human beings as rational actors, but he revises the standard definition of rationality to incorporate two major new ideas. He enlarges the model of a game so that it includes the ways agents describe to themselves (or "frame") their decision problems. And he allows the possibility that people reason as members of groups (or "teams"), each taking herself to have reason to perform her component of the combination of actions that best achieves the group's common goal.Bacharach shows that certain tendencies for individuals to engage in team reasoning are consistent with recent findings in social psychology and evolutionary biology. As the culmination of Bacharach's long-standing program of pathbreaking work on the foundations of game theory, this book has been eagerly awaited. Following Bacharach's premature death, Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden edited the unfinished work and added two substantial chapters that allow the book to be read as a coherent whole. Seller Inventory # LU-9780691120058
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition. Seller Inventory # 2576095
Seller: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, Ireland
Condition: New. Game theory is central to modern understandings of how people deal with problems of coordination and cooperation. Yet, ironically, it cannot give a straightforward explanation of some of the simplest forms of human coordination and cooperation. This book proposes a revision of game theory that resolves these problems. Editor(s): Gold, Natalie; Sugden, Robert. Num Pages: 248 pages, 4 halftones. 3 line illus. 32 tables. BIC Classification: KCA. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 241 x 166 x 20. Weight in Grams: 478. . 2006. Hardcover. . . . . Seller Inventory # V9780691120058
Quantity: 1 available