The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making, and Deterrence Failure (Praeger Security International)

John H. Maurer

ISBN 10: 0275949982 / ISBN 13: 9780275949983

Published by Praeger (UK), 1995

About this Item

This study examines what led the leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany to launch major military offensives at the beginning of the First World War. The focus is on understanding why these two countries adopted high-risk offensive strategies rather than a defensive military stance. Series: Praeger Security International. Num Pages: 168 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: 1DFA; 1DFG; 1DVH; HBJD; HBWN; JWK. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 234 x 156 x 11. Weight in Grams: 418. . 1995. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Seller Inventory # V9780275949983

Bibliographic Details

• Title: The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making, and Deterrence Failure (Praeger Security International)
• Publisher: Praeger (UK)
• Publication Date: 1995
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0275949982
• ISBN 13: 9780275949983
• Binding: Hardcover
• Edition: 3rd Edition
• Condition: New

About this title

Synopsis

This study examines what led the leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany to launch major military offensives at the beginning of the First World War. The focus is on understanding why these two countries adopted high-risk offensive strategies during an international confrontation rather than a defensive military stance. The decision to attack or defend did not occur in a political vacuum. The leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany adopted offensive strategies as a way to achieve their political ambitions. The offensives undertaken by Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1914 thus reflected their political goals as well as the strategic doctrines of war planners. The concluding chapter of this study explores why deterrence failed in 1914.

About the Author

JOHN H. MAURER is Associate Professor in the Strategy Department of the U.S. Naval War College where he lectures on naval history and strategy, international history, and strategic studies. He is also the assistant editor of the journal Diplomacy and Statecraft.