Some historians argue that the Civil War, with its use of rifled muskets and artillery, was the first great "modern" war; others argue that it was a sideshow of amateur generals and citizen soldiers whose tactics yielded few innovations or lasting lessons. Acclaimed military historian Brent Nosworthy takes on this great controversy and, for the first time in any book, covers the methods of Civil War warfare in their entirety. This work presents the most thorough study of Civil War military practices ever written. With diagrams, photos, and maps throughout, Nosworthy weaves together the story of newly emerging weapons, the resulting changes in military doctrine, and the combatants' experiences as these innovations were applied to the battlefield. Detailing the four-year evolution of warfare from General Irvin McDowell's first tentative efforts to Lee's and Grant's final exertions at Petersburg, the author examines tactical variation due to regional differences and the distinctive circumstances of each campaign: the methods used in the eastern theater versus those in the west; the confused fighting in the wilderness; the "trench" warfare at Vicksburg; and the techniques used in other famous battles, like Gettysburg and Antietam.
This massive study of Civil War weaponry, tactics and combat practices covers so much so well that it's indispensable; it's also so densely written that even series students of the conflict may find it slow going. The author, a distinguished independent scholar, has written similar studies of the 18th century's wars (The Anatomy of Victory) and Napoleonic ground combat (With Musket, Sword and Cannon), and here, as in those books, is politely revisionist. Civil War generals were not ignoramuses who mindlessly pitted mass infantry formations against rifled muskets, but men who had studied the revolution in both tactics and weaponry in more detail than is usually allowed in conventional Civil War historiography, of which the author has no high opinion. (It also neglects the prewar roots of the ironclad ship, which Nosworthy does not.) The need for a revolution had not been proven in 1861, and the outstanding merit of the book is the way it pulls into a single narrative how that revolution was completed-or in some cases not completed. Competent officers soon learned that the rifle was potent but not invincible, until it became a repeater (which it should have been in the Union Army by 1863) and the riflemen were snug behind field fortifications, supported by rifled artillery. But the smoothbore Napoleon (for Napoleon III, be it noted) saw out the war because of its greater mobility, and the much derided bayonet retained a psychological impact and the cavalry saber a physical one, both at close quarters. With its first-hand accounts, diagrams and all-in-all exhaustive coverage, this volume is an exceptional reference.
Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information, Inc.
