Examining deterrence theory through a multidisciplinary search for evidence on its validity, this collection of essays explore the conditions under which a strong threat of punishment produces restraint in an adversary, as classic deterrence theory predicts, or else leads to undesired military escalation. Contributors include Richard Ned Lebow, George H. Quester, Paul W. Schroeder, Michael G. Fry, Jack S. Levy, Barry O'Neill, Robert Wilson, John A. C. Conybeare, David B. Yoffie, Jack A. Goldstone, Harold Kelly and Greg Schmidt, and Dean G. Pruitt.
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About the Author:
Paul C. Stern is at National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. Robert Axelrod is at University of Michigan.
Review:
"A most unusual and certainly useful effort to broaden the understanding of deterrence as an instrument of foreign policy by reaching into other disciplines and approaches for insights and findings that may contribute to a reconsideration or reinforcement of the conventional wisdom on this
subject. This pioneering work is certain to attract the attention of specialists in many different disciplines who are interested in conflict processes."--Alexander L. George, Stanford University
"The main argument of the book is that deterrence theory is faulted, complicated, and deserving of much more critical examination from every possibly relevant discipline and subject specialty. The individual contributions are of high order by recognized authorities. The scholarship is
superior and the organization of the book is sound."--Paul Y. Hammond, University of Pittsburgh
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