Combinatorial Auctions - Softcover

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0262514133 ISBN 13: 9780262514132

Publisher: The MIT Press, 2010

Synopsis

A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.

With a foreword by Vernon L. Smith, recipient of the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics.

The study of combinatorial auctions―auctions in which bidders can bid on combinations of items or "packages"―draws on the disciplines of economics, operations research, and computer science. This landmark collection integrates these three perspectives, offering a state-of-the art survey of developments in combinatorial auction theory and practice by leaders in the field.

Combinatorial auctions (CAs), by allowing bidders to express their preferences more fully, can lead to improved economic efficiency and greater auction revenues. However, challenges arise in both design and implementation. Combinatorial Auctions addresses each of these challenges. After describing and analyzing various CA mechanisms, the book addresses bidding languages and questions of efficiency. Possible strategies for solving the computationally intractable problem of how to compute the objective-maximizing allocation (known as the winner determination problem) are considered, as are questions of how to test alternative algorithms. The book discusses five important applications of CAs: spectrum auctions, airport takeoff and landing slots, procurement of freight transportation services, the London bus routes market, and industrial procurement. This unique collection makes recent work in CAs available to a broad audience of researchers and practitioners. The integration of work from the three disciplines underlying CAs, using a common language throughout, serves to advance the field in theory and practice.

About this title

About the Author:

Peter Cramton is Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland.

Review:

Combinatorial auctions is an important interdisciplinary field combining issues from economics, game theory, optimization, and computer science. The book presents a great collection of state-of-the-art surveys with a well-balanced view integrating all aspects. A very impressive accomplishment! It will help us all appreciate the full range of issues, and will be a great reference for years to come.

―Éva Tardos, Cornell University

This important volume addresses many of the crucial issues in modern auction design. Containing insightful contributions from many of the world's leading market designers and auction theorists, it will be an essential reference for scholars and practitioners alike.

―Paul Klemperer, Oxford University

'Smart' markets, which allow participants to bid for packages of items, are now an attractive option for sales and procurements in a variety of settings. This book provides a comprehensive overview of both theoretical considerations and practical details. It is remarkable for combining economics, game theory, optimization, and computer science in a unified perspective. Combinatorial Auctions is a major advance in the theory and practice of market design.

―Robert Wilson, Stanford University

The study of combinatorial auctions has importance both practical and theoretical. In combinatorial auctions, our elegant models of resource allocation confront the true complexity of markets, where potential traders compete to buy or sell many different but related goods. Combinatorial auctions are the great frontier of auction theory today, and this book provides a state-of-the-art survey of this exciting field.

―Roger Myerson, University of Chicago, Nobel Prize in Economics 2007

About this edition

• Publisher: The MIT Press
• Publication date: 2010
• ISBN 10: 0262514133
• ISBN 13: 9780262514132
• Binding: Paperback
• Number of pages: 649
• Editor: Cramton Peter, Shoham Yoav, Steinberg Richard