This book discusses the main topics of the public-social choice literature of the past 40 years. Separate chapters discuss various applied public choice questions such as rent seeking, the growth of government, the rise and decline of nations, political business cycles, why people vote, and the nature and extent of redistribution. The book details normative issues in public choice, including Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, the work of John Rawls, John Harsanyi, James Buchanan, and Gordon Tullock. This book is a major revision of Public Choice, containing eleven new chapters in addition to substantial revision and expansion. Separate sections containing proofs of the most important theorems have been added. It is appropriate for both graduate and undergraduate courses in public choice economics and political theory, or as a supplement in courses dealing with related questions such as public finance.
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Review:
."..this Handbook is likely to be the standard reference on public choice for some years. All in all, the Handbook is a very good summary of the current state of public choice analysis." William A. Niskanen, Public Choice
"About this title" may belong to another edition of this title.
- PublisherCambridge University Press
- Publication date1989
- ISBN 10 0521379520
- ISBN 13 9780521379526
- BindingPaperback
- Edition number2
- Number of pages544
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Rating