The Critique of Practical Reason - Softcover

Kant, Immanuel

3.94

11,073 ratings by Goodreads

9781542619455: The Critique of Practical Reason

Softcover

ISBN 10: 1542619459 ISBN 13: 9781542619455

Publisher: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017

View all copies of this ISBN edition:

The Critique of Practical Reason (German: Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, KpV) is the second of Immanuel Kant's three critiques, first published in 1788. It follows on from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and deals with his moral philosophy. The second Critique exercised a decisive influence over the subsequent development of the field of ethics and moral philosophy, beginning with Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Doctrine of Science and becoming, during the 20th century, the principal reference point for deontological moral philosophy.

"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.

About the Author:

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was a German philosopher, researching, lecturing and writing on philosophy and anthropology during and at the end of the 18th Century Enlightenment. At the time, there were major successes and advances in physical science (for example, Isaac Newton, Robert Boyle) using reason and logic. But this stood in sharp contrast to the skepticism and lack of agreement or progress in empiricist philosophy. Kant’s magnum opus, the Critique of Pure Reason, aimed to unite reason with experience to move beyond what he took to be failures of traditional philosophy and metaphysics. He hoped to end an age of speculation where objects outside experience were used to support what he saw as futile theories, while opposing the skepticism and idealism of thinkers such as Descartes, Berkeley and Hume. He said that ‘it always remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason that the existence of things outside us ... should have to be assumed merely on faith, and that if it occurs to anyone to doubt it, we should be unable to answer him with a satisfactory proof’. Kant proposed a ‘Copernican Revolution’, saying that 'Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but ...let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition'.

"About this title" may belong to another edition of this title.