From Kirkus Reviews:
A dense and well-detailed history of army surveillance that throws light on a shadowed aspect of our past. Jensen (History/New Mexico State Univ.) focuses on the interplay between the shifting tides of American political ideology and the Constitution itself, which dictates a ``minimal internal security apparatus.'' The author documents incidents of the US military using spies and ad hoc security forces from the Benedict Arnold case through the Civil War, when Allan Pinkerton was hired to form a secret service to keep watch on ``disloyal Americans.'' Jensen notes, however, that prior to the 1920's, ``no systematic plan existed to guide the army's response in case of a domestic rebellion.'' Then, after WW I, a plan was formulated by the War Department to transform ``a system to protect the government from enemy agents [into] a vast surveillance system to watch civilians who violated no law but who objected to wartime policies or to the war itself.'' Labor struggles and fear of Bolshevism led to the government spying on a ``vast number of workers,'' including members of the International Workers of the World, a precedent that constituted the army's ``first extensive internal security experience with American civilians.'' Jensen goes on to examine ``War Plans White,'' the military's ``contingency plans for a war at home''; FDR's concern ``about Russian attempts to influence domestic affairs''; the later fears of an alliance between religious pacifists and American Communists; and, during the Vietnam era, the ``massive army surveillance of dissenters.'' Jensen's contention that government spying has always been ``curtailed by public outcry'' seems a bit optimistic, and it is arguable that our ``internal security policy'' has evolved ``to become one that maintained restraint.'' Still, the author capably reveals the conflict between politics, security, and policy. -- Copyright ©1991, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.
From Library Journal:
In many ways these two penetrating works are complementary. Both authors are academic historians who have written extensively on the perplexing and disturbing question of domestic surveillance by the army and its relationship to cherished American constitutional freedoms. Both are very critical of the army and those who used the army for domestic political purposes. Jensen's book is the first scholarly attempt to analyze in a historical context how the executive branch for over 200 years frequently has used the army to maintain internal security over the civilian population. One major theme that emerges from both studies is the dynamic balance between expansion and constraint of the army. At various times necessity, bureaucratic competitiveness, a willingness to ignore legal restrictions, and ideological persuasion combined to promote expansion. At other times these forces promoted constraint. Domestic social crises fed each tendency in turn. Talbert concentrates on the development of the Negative Branch of Military Intelligence (MI), created by Major General Ralph H. Van Deman in 1917 to observe and harrass the left. After the Red Scare of the early 1920s, MI lost strength, but the social upheavals of the Great Depression and the coming of World War II rekindled it. Both works are illuminating and well written. Talbert's bibliographical essay is especially useful. Jensen's work is more scholarly and focused than Nathan Miller's Spying for America: The Hidden History of the U.S. Intelligence ( LJ 3/15/89), and Talbert's research is more thorough and utilizes much better sources than William R. Corson's The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire ( LJ 1/1/78). Both are highly recommended for academic libraries and large public libraries.
-Charles C. Hay III, Eastern Kentucky Univ. Archives, Richmond
Copyright 1991 Reed Business Information, Inc.
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