Granville perceptively examines the statements and actions of Soviet Presidium members, the Hungarian leadership, U.S. policy makers, and even Yugoslav and Polish leaders. According to Granville, Soviet first secretary Nikita Khrushchev zigzagged ineptly between policy options with apparently little or no analysis of costs and risks, permitting Moscow’s Eastern European satellites at times to subtly manipulate the Kremlin's decision making. Granville’s discussions of Polish policy, Yugoslav actions, and the arduous process of normalization after the uprising show that the Soviets were preoccupied with stemming what many of them construed as a Western-encouraged attempt to undermine Eastern Europe’s communist regimes.
Granville concludes that the United States bears some responsibility for the events of 1956, as ill-advised U.S. covert actions may have convinced the Soviet leaders that the United States was attempting to weaken Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, although the Eisenhower administration actually intended only to sow confusion and dissatisfaction.
This masterful study leads to the conclusion that the Hungarian Crisis in 1956 was most likely sustained by self-perpetuating misperceptions and suspicions among key countries. In short, Granville's multi-archival research tends to confirm the post-revisionists' theory about the cold war: it was everyone's fault and no one's fault. It resulted from the emerging bipolar structure of the international system, the power vacuum in Europe's center, and spiraling misconceptions.
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Book Description Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 1st edition. 352 pages. 9.25x6.25x1.25 inches. In Stock. Seller Inventory # __1585442984
Book Description Hardback. Condition: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days. In the spring and summer of 1956 the Soviet Union invaded Hungary to reassert control of the country. This text is a full analysis, drawing on archival collections from the Eastern bloc countries to reinterpret decision making during this Cold War crisis. Seller Inventory # B9781585442980
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Book Description Condition: New. In the spring and summer of 1956 the Soviet Union invaded Hungary to reassert control of the country. This text is a full analysis, drawing on archival collections from the Eastern bloc countries to reinterpret decision making during this Cold War crisis. Series: Eastern European Studies. Num Pages: 352 pages, index, bibliography. BIC Classification: 1DVH; 1DVUA; 1KBB; 3JJPG; HBJD; HBLW3; JPS. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 235 x 155 x 32. Weight in Grams: 680. . 2003. 1st Edition. Hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. Seller Inventory # V9781585442980
Book Description Condition: New. In the spring and summer of 1956 the Soviet Union invaded Hungary to reassert control of the country. This text is a full analysis, drawing on archival collections from the Eastern bloc countries to reinterpret decision making during this Cold War crisis. Series: Eastern European Studies. Num Pages: 352 pages, index, bibliography. BIC Classification: 1DVH; 1DVUA; 1KBB; 3JJPG; HBJD; HBLW3; JPS. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 235 x 155 x 32. Weight in Grams: 680. . 2003. 1st Edition. Hardcover. . . . . Seller Inventory # V9781585442980