Product Type
Condition
Binding
Collectible Attributes
Free Shipping
Seller Location
Seller Rating
Published by Marquette University Press, 1961
Seller: Redux Books, Grand Rapids, MI, U.S.A.
Book
Hardcover. Condition: Good. Hardcover. No DJ. Pages clean and unmarked. Covers show minor shelf wear with a slightly faded spine. Binding tight, hinges strong. Previous owners name on inside front cover.; 100% Satisfaction Guaranteed! Ships same or next business day!.
Published by Marquette University Press, 1961
Seller: Epilonian Books, Manhattan Beach, CA, U.S.A.
Book
Hardcover. Condition: Acceptable. Marquette University Press, 1961. Hardcover, 100 pp. First Edition. A lecture given by Fackenheim on March 5, 1961 under the Auspices of the Aristotelian Society of Marquette University. In acceptable+ condition. Red cloth covered boards with gold lettering on front and spine. Light bumping, scuffing and fading to edges of covers and spine. Binding tight. Previous owner's name and date in pencil on front free end paper. Neat underlining and margin notes in pencil throughout. Pages lightly aged as well. NOT Ex-Library. NO remainder marks. A good reading copy. [From review in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 11, 1951/62 by T. Blakeley] Prof. Fackenheim presents us with a well thought out and clearly presented analysis of what might be called the dogmatic bases of historicism in an effort to post out that far from rendering metaphysics relative - as it is often supposed - historicism actually is untenable without a metaphysical justification. The author situates the problem by describing what he calls 'three typically contemporary attitudes' (p.4) which are the results of modern man's dilemma in the presence of several Weltanschauungen of seemingly equal validity or to use the author's words 'with no criterion for choice between them anywhere in sight' (p.3). These attitudes are: skeptical paralysis involving 'the los of capacity for commitment to such as faith;' (p.3); pragmatic make-believe which is pretending to believe; and, ideological fanaticism which is absolute adherence to what one knows is not absolute. The heart of Professor Fackenheim's speculation is contained in the following passage: the doctrine of historicity 'cannot, for example, be regarded as obviously true because proved by empirical history. History may show that man is subject to historical change; it does not prove that his very being is involved in this change. The doctrine of historicity is not an empirical generalization but a metaphysical these. Nor can this metaphysical these be regarded as obviously false. One cannot, for example, fall straightway to refuting it, interns of such traditional concepts as substance and nature. For the doctrine of historicity is unintelligible in these terms and indeed implies their falsehood' (p15). . .