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Published by Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Book
Condition: New.
Published by Oxford University Press, USA, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, U.S.A.
Book Print on Demand
HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.
Published by OUP UK, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, United Kingdom
Book Print on Demand
Condition: New. PRINT ON DEMAND Book; New; Fast Shipping from the UK. No. book.
Published by Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: GreatBookPricesUK, Castle Donington, DERBY, United Kingdom
Book
Condition: New.
Published by Oxford Uni Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: Asano Bookshop, Nagoya, AICHI, Japan
Book
Condition: Brand New. Richard Swinburne presents a powerful case for substance dualism and libertarian free will. He argues that pure mental and physical events are distinct, and defends an account of agent causation in which the soul can act independently of bodily causes. We are responsible for our actions, and the findings of neuroscience cannot prove otherwise.
Published by Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, United Kingdom
Book Print on Demand
Hardback. Condition: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.
Published by Oxford University Press, USA, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, United Kingdom
Book Print on Demand
HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.
Published by Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: AussieBookSeller, Truganina, VIC, Australia
Book
Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Mind, Brain, and Free Will presents a powerful new case for substance dualism (the theory that humans consist of two parts body and soul) and for libertarian free will (that humans have some freedom to choose between alternatives, independently of the causes which influence them). Richard Swinburne begins by analysing the criteria for one event or substance being the same event or substance as another one, and the criteria for an event beingmetaphysically possible; and then goes on to analyse the criteria for beliefs about these issues being rational or justified. Given these criteria, he then proceeds to argue that pure mental events (including consciousevents) are distinct from physical events and interact with them. He claims that no result from neuroscience or any other science could show that there is no such interaction, and illustrates this claim by showing that recent scientific work (such as Libet's experiments) has no tendency whatever to show that our intentions do not cause brain events. Swinburne goes on to argue for agent causation, that-to speak precisely-it is we, and not our intentions, that cause our brain events. It ismetaphysically possible that each of us could acquire a new brain or continue to exist without a brain; and so we are essentially souls. Brain events and conscious events are so different from each otherthat it would not be possible to establish a scientific theory which would predict what each of us would do in situations of moral conflict. Hence given a crucial epistemological principle (the Principle of Credulity), we should believe that things are as they seem to be: that we make choices independently of the causes which influence us. According to Swinburne's lucid and ambitious account, it follows that we are morally responsible for our actions. Richard Swinburne presents a powerful case for substance dualism and libertarian free will. He argues that pure mental and physical events are distinct, and defends an account of agent causation in which the soul can act independently of bodily causes. We are responsible for our actions, and the findings of neuroscience cannot prove otherwise. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.
Published by Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, U.S.A.
Book
Condition: New.
Published by OUP UK, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: Brook Bookstore On Demand, Napoli, NA, Italy
Book Print on Demand
Condition: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.
Published by Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: Grand Eagle Retail, Wilmington, DE, U.S.A.
Book
Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Mind, Brain, and Free Will presents a powerful new case for substance dualism (the theory that humans consist of two parts body and soul) and for libertarian free will (that humans have some freedom to choose between alternatives, independently of the causes which influence them). Richard Swinburne begins by analysing the criteria for one event or substance being the same event or substance as another one, and the criteria for an event beingmetaphysically possible; and then goes on to analyse the criteria for beliefs about these issues being rational or justified. Given these criteria, he then proceeds to argue that pure mental events (including consciousevents) are distinct from physical events and interact with them. He claims that no result from neuroscience or any other science could show that there is no such interaction, and illustrates this claim by showing that recent scientific work (such as Libet's experiments) has no tendency whatever to show that our intentions do not cause brain events. Swinburne goes on to argue for agent causation, that-to speak precisely-it is we, and not our intentions, that cause our brain events. It ismetaphysically possible that each of us could acquire a new brain or continue to exist without a brain; and so we are essentially souls. Brain events and conscious events are so different from each otherthat it would not be possible to establish a scientific theory which would predict what each of us would do in situations of moral conflict. Hence given a crucial epistemological principle (the Principle of Credulity), we should believe that things are as they seem to be: that we make choices independently of the causes which influence us. According to Swinburne's lucid and ambitious account, it follows that we are morally responsible for our actions. Richard Swinburne presents a powerful case for substance dualism and libertarian free will. He argues that pure mental and physical events are distinct, and defends an account of agent causation in which the soul can act independently of bodily causes. We are responsible for our actions, and the findings of neuroscience cannot prove otherwise. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.
Published by Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: GreatBookPricesUK, Castle Donington, DERBY, United Kingdom
Book
Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Published by Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Book
Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Published by Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: Mispah books, Redhill, SURRE, United Kingdom
Book
Hardcover. Condition: Like New. Like New. book.
Published by Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: Iridium_Books, DH, SE, Spain
Book
Condition: Used - Good.
Published by Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662568ISBN 13: 9780199662562
Seller: Iridium_Books, DH, SE, Spain
Book
Hardback. Condition: Muy Bueno / Very Good.