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Published by Texas A&m University Press, College Station, 1992
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Seller: James & Mary Laurie, Booksellers A.B.A.A, Minneapolis, MN, U.S.A.
Book
Hardcover. Condition: Book fine, Dust jacket fine.
Published by Texas A&M University Press, 1992
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Seller: Transition Living, Asheville, NC, U.S.A.
Book
Hardcover. Condition: As New. Hardback with dust jacket.Not a library copy.
Published by Texas A&M University Press, 1992
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Seller: Big River Books, Powder Springs, GA, U.S.A.
Book
Condition: VeryGood. The cover may have some normal wear. The text has no notes or markings.
Published by Texas A&M University Press, 1992
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Seller: A Book By Its Cover, Louisville, KY, U.S.A.
Book First Edition
Hardcover. Condition: New. Dust Jacket Condition: New. 1st Edition. Still in publisher's shrinkwrap.
Published by College Station, TX, U.S.A.: Texas A & M University Press, 1992, College Station, TX, U.S.A., 1992
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Seller: Priceless Books, Urbana, IL, U.S.A.
Book First Edition
Hb. Condition: VG+. Dust Jacket Condition: VG+. 1st. Hb. VG+/VG+. 1st. 201pp. Index, Biblio., Notes. Corners bumped, DJ: wear corners.
Published by Texas A & M University Press, College Station, 1992
Seller: Cher Bibler, Tiffin, OH, U.S.A.
Book First Edition
Hardcover. Condition: Near Fine. Dust Jacket Condition: Near Fine. 1st Edition. 1st printing. Very slight shelfwear, near fine in near fine dust jacket.
Published by Texas A&M University Press, 1992
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Seller: Ergodebooks, Houston, TX, U.S.A.
Book First Edition
Hardcover. Condition: Good. First Edition. George W. Goethals successfully engineered the Panama Canal, but he could not engineer a modern, rational organization for the U.S. Army, even in the face of the crisis of World War I. Despite his best efforts at centralization of the General Staff, American military logistics remained painfully chaotic, and the heads of bureaus--the so-called chiefs--proved adept at preserving their authority. At war's end, Goethals found himself with a largely paper organization, which dissolved during the confusion of demobilization.Goethals was recruited to manage the military mess that existed in 1917. He has been credited by historians with producing a virtual managerial revolution by his dramatic and drastic reorganization of the War Department's supply apparatus and combining of bureaus into a single division for purchase, storage, and traffic. But while this evaluation is not totally wrong, Phyllis A. Zimmerman concludes in this first large-scale study of his efforts, it has overestimated Goethal's contribution to order and efficiency. She demonstrates that the U.S. Army's attempt to reorganize to face the requirements of twentieth-century warfare came to virtually nothing.Military historians, political scientists, and students of public administration will find this revisionist look at Goethals and his work a significant contribution to the understanding of the course of World War I, the problems of reforming military structure, the politics of the Wilson administration, and the inertia and power of resistance of bureaucracies generally. Satirists have been known to squib the Army for supplying soldiers with the wrong things at the wrong time. In a new book, The Neck of the Bottle: George W. Goethals and the Reorganization of the U.S. Army Supply System, 1917-1918, Phyllis A. Zimmerman describes the efforts of one man to bring modern and rational order to the U.S. Army's supply system.George W. Goethals, a West Point graduate who led the Corps of Engineers in the Panama Canal construction, was recalled from retirement to deal with the bottleneck in mobilizing the army for world war. Goethals was a hero for his Panama Canal feat, but Theodore Roosevelt had given him sole authority over the project. President Wilson, however, had various committees working under separate authority. Assigned initially to the Emergency Fleet Corporation, Goethals clashed with other committee heads over the issue of wooden versus steel ships. Politics, divided authority, and utter chaos marked the World War I mobilization efforts, and Goethals was forced out of the EFC. He was soon invited back to reorganize the Army supply system.Army supplies were obtained by five bureaus, headed by five fiercely independent chiefs. Goethals had had success with central control of the Panama Canal project, so his plan for Army supply was to centralize, coordinate, and modernize. The bureaus were entrenched in old traditions, however, and resented the impending loss of power. Historians have regarded Goethals as the man who revolutionized Army supply, but as Zimmerman argues here in the first large-scale study of his efforts, the war ended abruptly, with Goethals's grand scheme still mostly on paper, untested in the field and abandoned in the rush to demobilize.
Published by Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 1992
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Book First Edition
Hardcover. First Edition; First Printing. Book condition is Very Good+; with a Very Good+ dust jacket. A few small bumps to jacket. Text is clean and unmarked. ; Williams-Ford Texas a & M University Military History Series; 9.32 X 6.30 X 0.92 inches; 216 pages.
Published by Texas A&M University Press, 1992
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Seller: GF Books, Inc., Hawthorne, CA, U.S.A.
Book
Condition: New. Book is in NEW condition. 1.21.
Published by Texas A&M University Press, 1992
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Seller: Book Deals, Tucson, AZ, U.S.A.
Book
Condition: New. New! This book is in the same immaculate condition as when it was published 1.21.
Published by Texas A&M University Press, 1992
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Seller: Ergodebooks, Houston, TX, U.S.A.
Book First Edition
Hardcover. Condition: New. First Edition. George W. Goethals successfully engineered the Panama Canal, but he could not engineer a modern, rational organization for the U.S. Army, even in the face of the crisis of World War I. Despite his best efforts at centralization of the General Staff, American military logistics remained painfully chaotic, and the heads of bureaus--the so-called chiefs--proved adept at preserving their authority. At war's end, Goethals found himself with a largely paper organization, which dissolved during the confusion of demobilization.Goethals was recruited to manage the military mess that existed in 1917. He has been credited by historians with producing a virtual managerial revolution by his dramatic and drastic reorganization of the War Department's supply apparatus and combining of bureaus into a single division for purchase, storage, and traffic. But while this evaluation is not totally wrong, Phyllis A. Zimmerman concludes in this first large-scale study of his efforts, it has overestimated Goethal's contribution to order and efficiency. She demonstrates that the U.S. Army's attempt to reorganize to face the requirements of twentieth-century warfare came to virtually nothing.Military historians, political scientists, and students of public administration will find this revisionist look at Goethals and his work a significant contribution to the understanding of the course of World War I, the problems of reforming military structure, the politics of the Wilson administration, and the inertia and power of resistance of bureaucracies generally. Satirists have been known to squib the Army for supplying soldiers with the wrong things at the wrong time. In a new book, The Neck of the Bottle: George W. Goethals and the Reorganization of the U.S. Army Supply System, 1917-1918, Phyllis A. Zimmerman describes the efforts of one man to bring modern and rational order to the U.S. Army's supply system.George W. Goethals, a West Point graduate who led the Corps of Engineers in the Panama Canal construction, was recalled from retirement to deal with the bottleneck in mobilizing the army for world war. Goethals was a hero for his Panama Canal feat, but Theodore Roosevelt had given him sole authority over the project. President Wilson, however, had various committees working under separate authority. Assigned initially to the Emergency Fleet Corporation, Goethals clashed with other committee heads over the issue of wooden versus steel ships. Politics, divided authority, and utter chaos marked the World War I mobilization efforts, and Goethals was forced out of the EFC. He was soon invited back to reorganize the Army supply system.Army supplies were obtained by five bureaus, headed by five fiercely independent chiefs. Goethals had had success with central control of the Panama Canal project, so his plan for Army supply was to centralize, coordinate, and modernize. The bureaus were entrenched in old traditions, however, and resented the impending loss of power. Historians have regarded Goethals as the man who revolutionized Army supply, but as Zimmerman argues here in the first large-scale study of his efforts, the war ended abruptly, with Goethals's grand scheme still mostly on paper, untested in the field and abandoned in the rush to demobilize.
Published by Texas A&M University Press, 1992
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Seller: Books Unplugged, Amherst, NY, U.S.A.
Book
Condition: Good. Buy with confidence! Book is in good condition with minor wear to the pages, binding, and minor marks within 1.21.
Published by Texas AandM University Press, 2006
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Seller: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, U.S.A.
Book
HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.
Published by Texas A & M University Press, 1992
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Seller: THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, United Kingdom
Book
Hardback. Condition: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.
Published by Texas A & M Univ Pr, 1992
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Seller: Revaluation Books, Exeter, United Kingdom
Book
Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 201 pages. 9.25x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.
Published by Texas AandM University Press, 2006
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Seller: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, United Kingdom
Book
HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.
Published by Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX, 1992
ISBN 10: 0890965153ISBN 13: 9780890965153
Seller: Ground Zero Books, Ltd., Silver Spring, MD, U.S.A.
Book First Edition
Hardcover. Condition: Very good. Dust Jacket Condition: Very good. ix, [1], 201, [5] pages. Includes Acknowledgments, Introduction, Conclusion, Notes, Bibliography, and Index. Chapters cover The Emergency Fleet Corporation; Military Mobilization; Winter Crisis; Reorganization of the Quartermaster Corps; The Storage and Traffic Division; The Procurement Issue; Procurement Reform; Supply Crisis in the Summer of 1918; and Accomplishment of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Reorganization. Dr. Phyllis A. Zimmerman eared her Ph.D. from Indiana University. She was recipient of the 1978-79 Dissertation Year Research Fellowship from the Center of Military History, Department of the Army. She had previously published an entry on George W. Goethals in The Dictionary of American Military Biography. She later joined the faculty at Ball State University and continued with a distinguished career in academia. In a new book, The Neck of the Bottle: George W. Goethals and the Reorganization of the U.S. Army Supply System, 1917-1918, Phyllis A. Zimmerman describes the efforts of one man to bring modern and rational order to the U.S. Army's supply system. George W. Goethals successfully engineered the Panama Canal, but he could not engineer a modern, rational organization for the U.S. Army, even in the face of the crisis of World War I. Despite his best efforts at centralization of the General Staff, American military logistics remained painfully chaotic, and the heads of bureaus--the so-called chiefs--proved adept at preserving their authority. At war's end, Goethals found himself with a largely paper organization, which dissolved during the confusion of demobilization. Goethals was recruited to manage the military mess that existed in 1917. He has been credited by historians with producing a virtual managerial revolution by his dramatic and drastic reorganization of the War Department's supply apparatus and combining of bureaus into a single division for purchase, storage, and traffic. But while this evaluation is not totally wrong, Phyllis A. Zimmerman concludes in this first large-scale study of his efforts, it has overestimated Goethal's contribution to order and efficiency. Military historians, political scientists, and students of public administration will find this look at Goethals and his work a significant contribution to the understanding of the course of World War I, the problems of reforming military structure, the politics of the Wilson administration, and the power of resistance of bureaucracies generally. George W. Goethals, a West Point graduate who led the Corps of Engineers in the Panama Canal construction, was recalled from retirement to deal with the bottleneck in mobilizing the army for world war. Goethals was a hero for his Panama Canal feat, but Theodore Roosevelt had given him sole authority over the project. President Wilson, however, had various committees working under separate authority. Assigned initially to the Emergency Fleet Corporation, Goethals clashed with other committee heads over the issue of wooden versus steel ships. Politics, divided authority, and utter chaos marked the World War I mobilization efforts, and Goethals was forced out of the EFC. He was soon invited back to reorganize the Army supply system. Army supplies were obtained by five bureaus, headed by five fiercely independent chiefs. Goethals had had success with central control of the Panama Canal project, so his plan for Army supply was to centralize, coordinate, and modernize. The bureaus were entrenched in old traditions, however, and resented the impending loss of power. Historians have regarded Goethals as the man who revolutionized Army supply, but as Zimmerman argues here in the first large-scale study of his efforts, the war ended abruptly, with Goethals's plan untested in the field. It perhaps fell to Army Chief of Staff Peyton C. March to advance Goethals vision in the immediate post-WWI period. First Edition [stated], presumed first printing.