The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. This book discusses two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets.Rather than surveying the field, the authors present a select number of models, each of which illustrates a key point. In addition, they give detailed proofs throughout the book.
n Uses a small number of models, rather than a survey of the field, to illustrate key points
n Detailed proofs are given as explanations for the models
n Text has been class-tested in a semester-long graduate course
"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.
This is the only book that presents the modern strategic theory of bargaining in detail and describes, in a consistent framework, a number of recent applications of this theory to the study of markets. Bargaining and Marketsdiscusses two recent developments: the use of the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly and the application of this theory to the study of decentralized markets. Written by two of today's leading economic game theorists, this book will serve as a textbook for courses in bargaining and markets and as a supplemental text for graduate-level courses in game theory or bargaining.Review:
"This is a well written book on an important topic. Everyone should run out and buy a copy."--GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
"Osborne and Rubenstein's authoritative book represents a landmark in the evolution of bargaining theory. Future research in the field will undoubtedly take the ideas presented in this book as a starting point. Accordingly, it should be read and digested by anyone with a serious interest in formal models of the bargaining process."
--CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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Book Description Academic Press, 1990. Hardcover. Book Condition: New. book. Bookseller Inventory # 125286317