In the nuclear era, the concept of deterrence by threat or retaliation is the foundation of the security policies of the superpowers. Yet there are many unevaluated claims about how, when, why, and whether deterrence works. Under what conditions do deterrent threats succeed or fail in international crises? This important book addresses this central practical question about deterrence. Experts from a range of fields review evidence bearing on threats and responses to threats in situations of conflict that are similar in some important respects to competition between superpowers. They analyze qualitative and quantitative studies of international military crises, game theoretical models, and studies of insurgencies, revolutions, oligopolistic competition, and interpersonal conflict in an informative review of the kinds of empirical evidence and theoretical analysis. The editors conclude that deterrence theory is not uniformly valid or invalid, and suggest a number of factors political leaders should consider, along with those emphasized by classical deterrence theory, in evaluating policy alternatives.
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Paul C. Stern is at National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. Robert Axelrod is at University of Michigan.
"A most unusual and certainly useful effort to broaden the understanding of deterrence as an instrument of foreign policy by reaching into other disciplines and approaches for insights and findings that may contribute to a reconsideration or reinforcement of the conventional wisdom on this
subject. This pioneering work is certain to attract the attention of specialists in many different disciplines who are interested in conflict processes."--Alexander L. George, Stanford University
"The main argument of the book is that deterrence theory is faulted, complicated, and deserving of much more critical examination from every possibly relevant discipline and subject specialty. The individual contributions are of high order by recognized authorities. The scholarship is
superior and the organization of the book is sound."--Paul Y. Hammond, University of Pittsburgh
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Seller: Boobooks, ARMIDALE, NSW, Australia
Paperback. Examining deterrence theory through a multidisciplinary search for evidence on its validity, this collection of essays explore the conditions under which a strong threat of punishment produces restraint in an adversary, as classic deterrence theory predicts, or else leads to undesired military escalation. Contributors include Richard Ned Lebow, George H. Quester, Paul W. Schroeder, Michael G. Fry, Jack S. Levy, Barry O'Neill, Robert Wilson, John A. C. Conybeare, David B. Yoffie, Jack A. Goldstone, Harold Kelly and Greg Schmidt, and Dean G. Pruitt. Good condition. Many small dotted stains on edges. Seller Inventory # 24593943
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