When the term `rational' is used in formal economic theory, a strict definition is implicit. This strict definition cannot accommodate the complexities of our everyday ideas of what is rational. The concept of rationality that is embedded in our language is not a morally neutral one. It has always been believed possible to argue rationally about the worthiness of goals, the legitimacy of claim to rights, the existence of obligations or duties. Outside the discussions of the social sciences, argument concerning the rationality of a choice or action is never a purely technical, value-free discourse.
This book is devoted to an examination of the limitations of the various formulations and interpretations of the concept of rationality which has been developed by economic theorists. It presents a series of challenges to the formal (axiomatic) concept of rationality. This concept has spread from economics and decision theory through the social sciences and policy studies. It forms the implicit foundation for the pronouncement of policy-makers, whose recommendations can seriously affect the society and environment in which we live.
The book begins with the claim of neoclassical economics that a rational agent maximizes utility. Next it considers the later, more austere construction of rationality where a rational agent was simply one whose choices or actions were consistent. The discussion then turns to who, dissatisfied with this bare notion of consistency, claimed that a rational agent was one whose choices or actions were directed towards maximization of the agent's self-interested aims - a view they attributed (misleadingly?) to Adam Smith. Once the character of the individual agent has been established, neoclassical theory has always regarded the analysis of allocation among these agents as its supreme task. This is the subject of chapters 6 and 7.
Vivian Walsh examines the philosophical implications of the replacement of the ordinary concept of rationality by the formal concepts constructed to fit the requirements of general equilibrium theory, decision theory, and game theory. He argues that the current intellectual climate, which has moved away from formalism, necessitates the reexamination of the concepts of rationality which scholars and policy-makers, many of whom were not economists, were ready to adopt directly or indirectly from economic theory in the recent past.
The final two chapters are intended to contrast sharply with the rest of the book. They offer a readable and minimally technical account of the much smaller role played by the concept of rational choice in the work of a present-day school which derives from the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century classical economists.
"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.
Vivian Walsh lectured for some years at the London School of Economics before moving to America. He has held appointments at a number of American and Canadian universities, including the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research in New York and the University of Denver, Colorado.
`Thought-provoking volume'
ASLIB Book Guide, vol. 62, no. 2, February 1997
`It provides a retrospective and integrated account of his career-long interest in the idea of rationality and its evolution and use in both neo-classical and classical economics ... The fact that the book may be viewed as a success ... is testimony to both Walsh's clarity of vision and to his
skill in presenting a relatively detailed and complex web of argument in a style that should prove approachable and engaging to both economists and philosophers ... it is no criticism to suggest that this book will leave many readers wanting more.'
Economic Journal
`This is a book bristling with references in which Walsh traces the history of neo-classical welfare economic theory, presents a variety of criticisms of it, and contrasts it with the classical framework.'
Economics and Philosophy
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Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. When the term `rational' is used in formal economic theory, a strict definition is implicit. This strict definition cannot accommodate the complexities of our everyday ideas of what is rational. The concept of rationality that is embedded in our language is not a morally neutral one. It has always been believed possible to argue rationally about the worthiness of goals, the legitimacy of claim to rights, the existence of obligations or duties. Outside thediscussions of the social sciences, argument concerning the rationality of a choice or action is never a purely technical, value-free discourse.This book is devoted to an examination of thelimitations of the various formulations and interpretations of the concept of rationality which has been developed by economic theorists. It presents a series of challenges to the formal (axiomatic) concept of rationality. This conecept has spread from economics and decision theory through the social sciences and policy studies. It forms the implicit foundation for the pronouncement of policy-makers, whose recommendations can seriously affect the society and environment in which welive.The book begins with the claim of neoclassical economics that a rational agent maximizes utility. Next it considers the later, more austere construction of rationality where a rationalagent was simply one whose choices or actions were consistent. The discussion then turns to who, dissatisfied with this bare notion of consistency, claimed that a rational agent was one whose choices or actions were directed towards maximization of the agent's self-interested aims - a view they attributed (misleadingly?) to Adam Smith. Once the character of the individual agent has been established, neoclassical theory has always regarded the analysis of allocation among these agents as itssupreme task. This is the subject of chapters 6 and 7.Vivian Walsh examines the philosophical implications of the replacement of the ordinary concept of rationality by the formalconcepts constructed to fit the requirements of general equilibrium theory, decision theory, and game theory. He argues that the current intellectual climate, which has moved away from formalism, necessitates the reexamination of the concepts of rationality which scholars and policy-makers, many of whom were not economists, were ready to adopt directly or indirectly from economic theory in the recent past.The final two chapters are intended to contrast sharply with therest of the book. They offer a readable and minimally technical account of the much smaller role played by the concept of rational choice in the work of a present-day school which derives from theeighteenth- and nineteenth-century classical economists. A critical assessment of the foundations of microeconomic theory, especially rationality, but also welfare resource allocation, and capital reproduction. It examines the various concepts of rationality that have been constructed by twentieth-century economists and the analysis of the allocation of resources among rational agents. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9780198287728
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Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. When the term `rational' is used in formal economic theory, a strict definition is implicit. This strict definition cannot accommodate the complexities of our everyday ideas of what is rational. The concept of rationality that is embedded in our language is not a morally neutral one. It has always been believed possible to argue rationally about the worthiness of goals, the legitimacy of claim to rights, the existence of obligations or duties. Outside thediscussions of the social sciences, argument concerning the rationality of a choice or action is never a purely technical, value-free discourse.This book is devoted to an examination of thelimitations of the various formulations and interpretations of the concept of rationality which has been developed by economic theorists. It presents a series of challenges to the formal (axiomatic) concept of rationality. This conecept has spread from economics and decision theory through the social sciences and policy studies. It forms the implicit foundation for the pronouncement of policy-makers, whose recommendations can seriously affect the society and environment in which welive.The book begins with the claim of neoclassical economics that a rational agent maximizes utility. Next it considers the later, more austere construction of rationality where a rationalagent was simply one whose choices or actions were consistent. The discussion then turns to who, dissatisfied with this bare notion of consistency, claimed that a rational agent was one whose choices or actions were directed towards maximization of the agent's self-interested aims - a view they attributed (misleadingly?) to Adam Smith. Once the character of the individual agent has been established, neoclassical theory has always regarded the analysis of allocation among these agents as itssupreme task. This is the subject of chapters 6 and 7.Vivian Walsh examines the philosophical implications of the replacement of the ordinary concept of rationality by the formalconcepts constructed to fit the requirements of general equilibrium theory, decision theory, and game theory. He argues that the current intellectual climate, which has moved away from formalism, necessitates the reexamination of the concepts of rationality which scholars and policy-makers, many of whom were not economists, were ready to adopt directly or indirectly from economic theory in the recent past.The final two chapters are intended to contrast sharply with therest of the book. They offer a readable and minimally technical account of the much smaller role played by the concept of rational choice in the work of a present-day school which derives from theeighteenth- and nineteenth-century classical economists. A critical assessment of the foundations of microeconomic theory, especially rationality, but also welfare resource allocation, and capital reproduction. It examines the various concepts of rationality that have been constructed by twentieth-century economists and the analysis of the allocation of resources among rational agents. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9780198287728
Quantity: 1 available