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Book Description HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. Seller Inventory # L1-9780199662586
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Book Description Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore and extend the Second-Person Standpoints argument that central moral concepts are irreducibly second personal, entailing mutual accountability and the authority to address demands to one another (and ourselves). He illustrates the second-personal frameworks power to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy. Section I concerns morality: its distinctiveness amongnormative concepts, the metaethics of bipolar obligations (owed to someone); the relation between moral obligations form and the substance of our obligations; whether the fact that an action is wrong is itself areason against action (as opposed to simply entailing that sufficient moral reasons independently exist); and whether morality requires general principles or might be irreducibly particularistic. Section II consists of two essays on autonomy: one discussing the relation between Kants autonomy of the will and the right to autonomy, and another arguing that what makes an agents desires and will reason-giving is not the basis of internal practical reasons in desire, but the dignity of persons andshared second-personal authority. Section III focuses on the nature of authority and the law. Two essays take up Joseph Razs influential normal justification thesis and argue that it fails to captureauthoritys second-personal nature, without which authority cannot create exclusionaryand preemptivereasons.The final two essays concern law.The first sketches the insights that a second-personal approach can provide into the nature of law and the grounds of distinctions between different parts of law.The second shows how a second-personal framework can be used to develop the civil recourse theory in the law of torts. Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore the view that morality is second-personal, entailing mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He illustrates the power of the second-personal framework to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9780199662586
Book Description Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore and extend the Second-Person Standpoints argument that central moral concepts are irreducibly second personal, entailing mutual accountability and the authority to address demands to one another (and ourselves). He illustrates the second-personal frameworks power to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy. Section I concerns morality: its distinctiveness amongnormative concepts, the metaethics of bipolar obligations (owed to someone); the relation between moral obligations form and the substance of our obligations; whether the fact that an action is wrong is itself areason against action (as opposed to simply entailing that sufficient moral reasons independently exist); and whether morality requires general principles or might be irreducibly particularistic. Section II consists of two essays on autonomy: one discussing the relation between Kants autonomy of the will and the right to autonomy, and another arguing that what makes an agents desires and will reason-giving is not the basis of internal practical reasons in desire, but the dignity of persons andshared second-personal authority. Section III focuses on the nature of authority and the law. Two essays take up Joseph Razs influential normal justification thesis and argue that it fails to captureauthoritys second-personal nature, without which authority cannot create exclusionaryand preemptivereasons.The final two essays concern law.The first sketches the insights that a second-personal approach can provide into the nature of law and the grounds of distinctions between different parts of law.The second shows how a second-personal framework can be used to develop the civil recourse theory in the law of torts. Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore the view that morality is second-personal, entailing mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He illustrates the power of the second-personal framework to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9780199662586