A thoroughly documented account of the 1967 guerrilla challenge in Bolivia, this volume reconstructs events leading up to, during, and after the defeat of the insurgency. Against the background of the 1960s' attempt to extend Cuban influence throughout Latin America, the book offers an analysis of trends in Bolivian politics from 1952 to 1967. General Prado then evaluates the geographical setting of the insurgency, guerrilla preparations, and the Bolivian response. Prado identifies key strategic errors, including Che Guevara's failure to capture peasant support, and analyzes Che's own theories. Military historians will find no sensational revelations here but, instead, previously unknown details that form a concise reconstruction of The Defeat of Che Guevara.
Recently retired from the Bolivian Army, Prado avoids partisan tones and provides an unusually balanced account of the 1967 guerrilla insurgency in Bolivia. A four-part volume, Part I presents a thorough discussion of the international, national, and military climate. Part II assesses the geographical setting. Part III details operations from preparations to defeat. The volume concludes with a thorough evaluation of the insurgency--causes for its failure, an analysis of Che Guevara's theories, and the Bolivian army's mistakes.
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This volume documents the events leading up to, during, and after the defeat of the 1967 guerrilla insurgency in Bolivia. General Prado evaluates the insurgency's geographical setting, guerrilla preparations, and the Bolivian response. He identifies key errors, including Che Guevara's failure to capture peasant support and anayzes Che's own theories.
GARY PRADO SALMON is a recently retired General in the Bolivian Army. He has spent two decades accumulating materials and preparing charts in his efforts to reconstruct accurately the events of 1967--an important part of contemporary Bolivian history.
JOHN DEREDITA is a critic and translator. He has taught Latin American literature at Bryn Mawr College, Columbia University, and other institutions.
LAWRENCE H. HALL is a retired U.S. Army officer who taught in the Department of Foreign Languages at the United States Military Academy. He took a doctorate in Latin American history from New York University and has been teaching in that field at Connecticut College.
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Book Description Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. A thoroughly documented account of the 1967 guerrilla challenge in Bolivia, this volume reconstructs events leading up to, during, and after the defeat of the insurgency. Against the background of the 1960s' attempt to extend Cuban influence throughout Latin America, the book offers an analysis of trends in Bolivian politics from 1952 to 1967. General Prado then evaluates the geographical setting of the insurgency, guerrilla preparations, and the Bolivian response. Prado identifies key strategic errors, including Che Guevara's failure to capture peasant support, and analyzes Che's own theories. Military historians will find no sensational revelations here but, instead, previously unknown details that form a concise reconstruction of The Defeat of Che Guevara.Recently retired from the Bolivian Army, Prado avoids partisan tones and provides an unusually balanced account of the 1967 guerrilla insurgency in Bolivia. A four-part volume, Part I presents a thorough discussion of the international, national, and military climate. Part II assesses the geographical setting. Part III details operations from preparations to defeat. The volume concludes with a thorough evaluation of the insurgency--causes for its failure, an analysis of Che Guevara's theories, and the Bolivian army's mistakes. Military historians will find no sensational revelations here but, instead, previously unknown details that form a concise reconstruction of The Defeat of Che Guevara.Recently retired from the Bolivian Army, Prado avoids partisan tones and provides an unusually balanced account of the 1967 guerrilla insurgency in Bolivia. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9780275932114