Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law (Revised) - Softcover

Mashaw, Jerry L.

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0300078706 ISBN 13: 9780300078701

Publisher: Yale University Press, 1999

Synopsis

Public choice theory should be taken seriously―but not too seriously. In this thought-provoking book, Jerry Mashaw stakes out a middle ground between those who champion public choice theory (the application of the conventional methodology of economics to political science matters, also known as rational choice theory) and those who disparage it. He argues that in many cases public choice theory's reach has exceeded its grasp. In others, public choice insights have not been pursued far enough by those who are concerned with the operation and improvement of legal institutions.

While Mashaw addresses perennial questions of constitutional law, legislative interpretation, administrative law, and the design of public institutions, he arrives at innovative conclusions. Countering the positions of key public choice theorists, Mashaw finds public choice approaches virtually useless as an aid to the interpretation of statutes, and he finds public choice arguments against delegating political decisions to administrators incoherent. But, using the tools of public choice analysts, he reverses the lawyers' conventional wisdom by arguing that substantive rationality review is not only legitimate but a lesser invasion of legislative prerogatives than much judicial interpretation of statutes. And, criticizing three decades of "law reform," Mashaw contends that pre-enforcement judicial review of agency rules has seriously undermined both governmental capacity and the rule of law.

About this title

Review

Greed, Chaos and Governance is a curious book in light of the present political climate. All over the country, politicians and private citizens alike are clamoring for an end to big government; meanwhile, author Jerry L. Mashaw, a professor of law at Yale University, advocates turning even more of the business of governing over to federal agencies. To make his point, Mashaw uses the economic field called public choice theory to explicate why only the federal bureaucracy is in a position to resist the siren call of special interests. Basically, public choice theory posits that all people, including elected officials, are motivated by selfish interests, and that only by enforcing the checks and balances inherent in our current form of government can a nation hope to counteract the worst of its citizens' impulses. Mashaw goes one step further, claiming that even the individuals in the three branches of government are subject to undue influence from special interests.

Mashaw's solution is to give the people who staff federal agencies real power to make political decisions. To those who argue that Congress already gives too much power to these bureaucracies, he answers that most agencies are controlled by the White House--the one branch of government most accountable to the public. Whether or not you agree with Mashaw's conclusions, his arguments are well worth reading and considering.

About the Author

Jerry L. Mashaw is Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law School. He is the author of Due Process in the Administrative State and Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims, both published by Yale University Press.

About this edition

• Publisher: Yale University Press
• Publication date: 1999
• ISBN 10: 0300078706
• ISBN 13: 9780300078701
• Binding: Paperback
• Edition number: 1
• Number of pages: 241