Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility - Softcover

Powell, Robert

Softcover

ISBN 10: 052106399X ISBN 13: 9780521063999

Publisher: Cambridge University Press, 2008

Synopsis

Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, the author examines some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to model the effects on deterrence strategies of first-strike advantages, of limited retaliation, and of the number of nuclear superpowers involved in the international system. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrence strategies that have evolved in response to the superpower arms buildup; the strategy that leaves something to chance and the strategy of limited retaliation.

About this title

Book Description

Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation.

Review

"...the most serious and most productive application of the formal game theory to the study of deterrence and the outbreak of war...this is the first book-length treatment I have seen that makes successful use of game theory in exploring the most elusive aspects of this subject." Thomas Schelling, author of The Strategy of Conflict

Edition details

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Publication date: 2008
• ISBN 10: 052106399X
• ISBN 13: 9780521063999
• Binding: Paperback
• Language: English
• Edition number: 1
• Number of pages: 240