Items related to Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Every form of behavior is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realized how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centered not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioral programs. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behavior, and of the closely related interactions among species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions that can alter the basis of their success, i.e., to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions that punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms.
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Book Description:
Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realised how game theory can model natural selection. Evolutionary game theory replaces the concept of rational players with the population dynamics of behavioural programs and can be used to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions which punctuate evolution. In short, it describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms.
Review:
"...something for anyone interested in game models in organismal biology." Nature
"The book under review is a very nice further development of its ten-year-old predecessor...by the authors. Not only has the title been modified, but also the contents have been thoroughly reworked and thus adapted to today's topics of interest in the field of biomathematics. The book is totally restructured and contains much new material, mainly in game theory, especially in its evolutionary and dynamical aspects...the book is written in the well-known authors' usual clear, elegant and motivating style." Mathematical Reviews
"For the biologist who is mathematically inclined or the mathematician interested in biology...this volume is rich in results and likely to provoke stimulating thought." The Quarterly Review of Biology
"The book under review is a very nice further development of its ten-year-old predecessor...by the authors. Not only has the title been modified, but also the contents have been thoroughly reworked and thus adapted to today's topics of interest in the field of biomathematics. The book is totally restructured and contains much new material, mainly in game theory, especially in its evolutionary and dynamical aspects...the book is written in the well-known authors' usual clear, elegant and motivating style." Mathematical Reviews
"For the biologist who is mathematically inclined or the mathematician interested in biology...this volume is rich in results and likely to provoke stimulating thought." The Quarterly Review of Biology
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- PublisherCambridge University Press
- Publication date1998
- ISBN 10 0521623650
- ISBN 13 9780521623650
- BindingHardcover
- Number of pages351
- Rating
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Evolutionary Games and Replicator Dynamics
Published by
Cambridge University Press
(1998)
ISBN 10: 0521623650
ISBN 13: 9780521623650
Used
Hardcover
First Edition
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Book Description Hardcover. Condition: Good. No Jacket. 1st Edition. xxvii - 323 pp. 20 fig. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998. First edition. Hardcover. Blue linen covers with silver spine and cover lettering. Back cover slightly stained. Clean and unmarked inside. Ex. library of the Library of the Ghent University: usual labels, stamps and numbers. Otherwise a good/very good copy. Seller Inventory # 011554
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