Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between government and opposition parties influences threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. Compared to their nondemocratic counterparts, democracies make threats more selectively, but those they do make are more likely to be successful--that is, to gain a favorable outcome without war. Schultz uses game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case studies.
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"Schultz has forged a creative argument linking elements of crisis--threat creation, credibility, resolve, and the use of force--to democratic decision making...Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy is particularly insightful on the theoretical side--in argument outline and hypothesis generation--and makes a significant contribution to understanding the democratic peace hypothesis." Perspectives on Politics
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Soft cover. Condition: Very Good. No Jacket. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Schultz, Kenneth A. Published by Cambridge University Press, 2001. 301p. trade paperback, covers lightly bumped/scuffed, binding tight, text clean/unmarked, stained page edges--ISBN 10: 0521796695ISBN 13: 9780521796699 + FORCEFUL PERSUASION, COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR, George, Alexander L. United States Institute of Peace. 1993, 95p, trade paperback, covers bumped/scuffed, binding tight, covers bumped/scuffed, text HIGHLIGHTED 12.00 for both. Seller Inventory # ABE-1688142726192
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Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. Kenneth Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on the use and success of coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between the government and opposition parties influences the decision to use threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. The relative transparency of their political processes means that, while democratic governments cannot easily conceal domestic constraints against using force, they can also credibly demonstrate resolve when their threats enjoy strong domestic support. As a result, compared to their non-democratic counterparts, democracies are more selective about making threats, but those they do make are more likely to be successful - that is, to gain a favorable outcome without resort to war. Schultz develops his argument through a series of game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case studies. Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between government and opposition parties influences threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. Compared to their nondemocratic counterparts, democracies make threats more selectively, but those they do make are more likely to be successful—that is, to gain a favorable outcome without war. Schultz uses game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case studies. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9780521796699
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