Eminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information.
Game Theory will be useful for students at the graduate level in economics, political science, operations research, and applied mathematics. Everyone who uses game theory in research will find this book essential.
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Roger B. Myerson is Harold L. Stuart Professor of Decision Sciences at the J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University. He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society.Review:
In a clear, Myersonian writing style, this book systematically describes our state-of-the-art knowledge of game theory. Written as an introductory text, it looks at the subject from the viewpoint of a newcomer to the field, beginning with utility theory and arriving at the most sophisticated ideas discussed today. Myerson not only gives complete mathematical statements and proofs, but also supplies the intuitive arguments that motivate them...Because of its comprehensiveness, researchers and users of game theory can find descriptions of almost all special game theoretic topics and issues presented in "user friendly" style...It is very likely that Myerson's Game Theory will remain the main introductory text for many years to come.
--Ehud Kalai (Games and Economic Behavior)
Exposing an applied mathematics field on a basic level poses a challenge to an author, namely, to find the proper mix of displaying the models, providing the motivation and presenting the mathematical results and derivations. This is even more true in a field like game theory, where the models are not universally acceptable as adequately depicting real applications. The author, in the text under review, is doing remarkably well. The models are displayed with enough details and explanations to generate motivation even in newcomers to the field...All in all, it is a very good elaborate introduction to game theory.
--Zvi Artstein (Mathematical Reviews)
Myerson provides a good introduction to game theory, focusing on the 'generality and unity of game theory' rather than on its extensive applications. After a brief overview of Bayesian decision theory, noncooperative and cooperative models of games are explored in the context of their solutions, results, and guiding methodological principles. The relative merits of the extensive form and the strategic form of a game are illustrated, which lead naturally into an analysis of equilibria for each representation. Special extensions are discussed, including games with communication, repeated games, and noncooperative games that introduce the elements of bargaining and coalitions...The book has interesting and challenging problem sets for each chapter as well as a bibliography for students who want to study in more depth specific topics in game theory. (Choice)
A very well-written introduction to game theory. (American Mathematical Monthly)
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Book Description Harvard University Press, 1991. Hardcover. Book Condition: New. Bookseller Inventory # P110674341155
Book Description Harvard University Press. Hardcover. Book Condition: New. 0674341155 New Condition. Bookseller Inventory # NEW6.1227798
Book Description Harvard University Press, 1991. Hardcover. Book Condition: New. Bookseller Inventory # DADAX0674341155