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Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes (Harvard Economic Studies) - Hardcover
Synopsis
Market signaling, a phrase formulated by A. Michael Spence, means the activities and characteristics of individuals which are visible to somebody else and convey information in a market, such as the job market. This study attempts to explain the informational content of market signals.
In many markets, people are screened. Employers screen job applicants. Banks screen loan applicants. In screening processes like these, the attributes of individuals, such as education, previous experience, personal appearance, sex, and race may be read as signals. Thus education may be a signal of an ability to do a certain kind of job. Spence finds that when education is regarded as a job-market signal there is a systematic tendency to overinvest in it.
The author also extends the concept of “market equilibrium” to include signaling. A signaling equilibrium, when applied to a job market, is defined as a situation in which employers’ beliefs about the relationship between (1) applicants’ signals and (2) their productivity are confirmed by their performance after they are hired. Spence uses this concept to derive insights into the efficiency of a market system for allocating jobs to people and people to jobs. His approach gives economists and policy makers a way of looking at the welfare properties of various signals and of studying the informational structures of particular markets.
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About the Author
A. Michael Spence is William R. Berkley Professor in Economics & Business at NYU's Leonard N. Stern School of Business and recipient of the 2001 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, along with George Akerlof and Joseph E. Stiglitz, for their work on the dynamics of information flows and market development.
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Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes
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Harvard University Press, 1974
ISBN 10: 0674549902
ISBN 13: 9780674549906
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Hardcover
Seller: ThriftBooks-Dallas, Dallas, TX, U.S.A.
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Hardcover. Condition: Good. No Jacket. Missing dust jacket; Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less. Seller Inventory # G0674549902I3N01
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Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes (Harvard Economic Studies)
Published by
Harvard University Press, 1974
ISBN 10: 0674549902
ISBN 13: 9780674549906
Used
Hardcover
Seller: -OnTimeBooks-, Phoenix, AZ, U.S.A.
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
Condition: good. A copy that has been read, remains in good condition. All pages are intact, and the cover is intact. The spine and cover show signs of wear. Pages can include notes and highlighting and show signs of wear, and the copy can include "From the library of" labels or previous owner inscriptions. 100% GUARANTEE! Shipped with delivery confirmation, if you're not satisfied with purchase please return item! Ships via media mail. Seller Inventory # OTV.0674549902.G
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Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes
Published by
Harvard University Press, 1974
ISBN 10: 0674549902
ISBN 13: 9780674549906
Used
Hardcover
Seller: Solr Books, Lincolnwood, IL, U.S.A.
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
Condition: good. This book is in Good condition. There may be some notes and highligting but otherwise the book is in overall good condition. Seller Inventory # BCV.0674549902.G