Completing the Revolution: A Vision for Victory in 2000 - Hardcover

Novak, Robert D.

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0684827468 ISBN 13: 9780684827469

Publisher: Free Press, 2000

Synopsis

Twice in the past generation, the Republican party has proclaimed a "revolution" in American politics. In 1980, Ronald Reagan won a landslide victory on a platform of tax cuts, smaller government, and a stronger defense. And in 1994, Newt Gingrich took up the revolutionary mantle, tossing out the Democratic Congress and proclaiming the end of "business as usual" in Washington. As the 2000 presidential election draws near, the optimism of those heady days seems like ancient history. The Reagan years are a dim memory, and the Republican leadership on Capitol Hill after five years in power has failed to enact the Contract with America. In 2000, the GOP faces not only the possibility of a third consecutive presidential defeat but the prospect of losing its House majority as well. The time for dithering is over, and the time for action is now. Completing the Revolution is Robert Novak's manifesto for a Republican victory in November and for implementing a conservative vision for government in the years to come. He brings to his analysis the combativeness familiar to those who watch him on CNN's Crossfire, and the insight and perspective that have helped to make him one of America's leading political columnists. He is not afraid to criticize the various presidential candidates or the Republican leaders in Congress, especially those who fail to stand up for the party's principles -- whom he calls "Clintonized Republicans." At the center of Completing the Revolution is Novak's bold proposal for a new Republican agenda, one that remains true to the party's core values and can command a majority in the country. He offers surprising and original perspectives on taxes, Social Security, abortion, campaign finance, race and gender politics, and term limits, among other issues. He also lays bare the fault lines that have emerged in the 2000 presidential race and shows how they offer the party a stark choice: division and defeat, or principled victory. The road to the White House, Novak admonishes, requires one thing above all, from candidates and supporters alike: the courage to stick to real Republican principles. For any conservative who cares about the direction of public life in America, Robert Novak has provided the essential guide to our nation's millennial election.

About this title

About the Author

Robert D. Novak, a co-host of CNN's Crossfire and of Evans & Novak, Hunt & Shields, writes "Inside Report," the nation's longest-running syndicated column. He is a regular panelist on CNN's Capital Gang and is a contributing editor of The Reader's Digest. He is the author or co-author of four previous books on the presidency and national politics. He lives in Washington, D.C.

Reviews

Novak strives for an ideological extreme that few but political pundits could embrace. The well-known columnist and television commentator identifies himself as "a conservative who has been on a steady trip to the right" and the Republican Party as the only available vehicle to pursue his agenda. Naturally, he approves when the party veers to the right and is critical of moderate tendencies. After excoriating perceived retreats from the Gingrich agenda of 1994, Novak lays out his prescription for conservative purity and victory with supreme confidence that the former will lead to the latter. Key points include cutting taxes and replacing the income tax with a sales tax, privatizing Social Security, considering campaign finance reform, embracing global free markets and religious conservatives, affirming the right to life, reaching out to women and minorities without compromising policy positions, pursuing a strong foreign policy and term limits. Although Novak believes that capturing the presidency is crucial, his discussion of the upcoming nomination is restrained. He recognizes that George W. Bush meets certain criteria, but he does not look too closely (perhaps to avoid glimpsing that Bush is a pragmatic rather than ideological conservative). The normally highly opinionated Novak suggests only that a Bush nomination would be a "gamble" that may or may not pay off. Despite the tension between Novak's policy rhetoric and his lukewarm endorsement of Bush, his fans will enjoy what is otherwise a strident performance.
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Novak declaims right-wing politics on TV's soapboxes. Republicans consequently think he's one of theirs, but Novak demurs, writing he's pro-Republican to the extent that the party is a vehicle for conservatism, which it isn't much in his view. This tract outlines Novak's 10 policies to make it so and to make it victorious in this year's elections. Whatever one's ideological leaning, Novak's outlook merits attention as being independent and experienced (however abrasive some might consider his TV persona). The essence of his criticism is that the Contract with America crew, following numerous tactical missteps that returned the political initiative to President Clinton, developed a safety-first, risk-averse mentality in order to preserve their slim congressional majority. Novak despises that as politics without convictions and exhorts the Republicans to instead bash the IMF, advocate term limits, reform the political money machine, hug Christian evangelicals, appeal for the votes of blacks, and more. A pithy primer for those sympathetic to Novak's agenda and attentive to the primary elections. Gilbert Taylor

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

From Part One: The Republicans in Retreat

The Surrender of '98

Was it really a "revolution" in 1994 when Republicans gained control of Congress for the first time in forty years? It certainly was more than a mere changing of the guard, with one political party taking power from another. Rather, this was a conscious attempt to change the way America had been governed for the past sixty years and, indeed, the way Americans lived. And the Republican takeover did have revolutionary characteristics: a wave of excitement, a fervent belief and hope that the world will be transformed.

But the true test of a revolution is what happens after the revolutionaries storm the gates of the palace and seize power. Do they live up to their ideals, or do they succumb to the trappings of the old regime? Do they remain united, or do they form factions and turn their weapons on one another? And if the revolution collapses, does it go out with a bang or a whimper?

The "Gingrich revolution" has all too quickly reached that critical point where these questions must be answered. The revolutionary spirit of 1994, symbolized by the Contract with America, is but a faint memory as the Republicans face the 2000 election in danger of losing their third consecutive presidential election and of losing their majorities in Congress as well. If the Republicans are to regain the upper hand in politics and are to create a political environment in which their most cherished principles can flourish, the time to act is now.

For the past five years, I have waited for the Republican party to use its congressional majority to institute a true conservative program in line with the promises made in the election campaigns of 1994, 1996, and 1998. But time after time I have been disappointed. Some conservatives -- mostly at the grass-roots level but a few in positions of power -- have taken their disappointment so much to heart that they have begun talking about abandoning the GOP itself and starting a new political party. Others are following Pat Buchanan into the Reform Party to advocate protectionist and anti-immigration policies.

This surely is a road to oblivion. First, it is an admission of defeat, and I am not yet ready to concede the battle is lost. Second, it presumes that ideological purity is more important than electoral success, whereas I think that a strong Republican party that embraces conservatism can still command a majority in the country in a way that a third party never could. And third, it does not really address the overriding problem: It is impossible to govern the country effectively from Capitol Hill. To make a true mark on the country's political culture, a party has to control the White House, as the Republicans did from 1981 to 1993, under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush and as the Democrats have done under President Bill Clinton.

If the Republican party is to reach its potential as an engine of conservative reform, it must embrace its own principles -- despite the discomfort this may bring the congressional leadership -- and it needs to articulate a true vision for victory in 2000. Otherwise, conservatives should brace themselves for four more years of Democratic rule and significant changes in the way Americans live.

The Republican revolution truly ran out of steam in October 1998. In the first two weeks of that month, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott decided to accept President Clinton's version of a catchall spending bill rather than risk a confrontation that might shut down the government just three weeks before the November midterm elections.

On the surface, it might seem that the president held the weaker cards. Facing the humiliation of impeachment proceedings in the House Judiciary Committee, Clinton did not command a majority in either house of Congress. Actually, Gingrich and Lott were the desperate ones.

The congressional leaders had one overarching desire: to adjourn the Congress as quickly as possible, so that the members could campaign for reelection and thereby stave off humiliating defeat at the polls. For the first time in the nation's history, it seemed possible that the party in control of the White House might regain control of at least one house of Congress from the opposition through a midterm election victory in the sixth year of a presidency.

These leaders remembered well the experience of the winter of 1995-1996, when the Republican Congress let the government be shut down, only to see the president turn this principled stand on its head, portraying the GOP as callous villains and creating a landmark political victory for himself. Three years later, the Republicans had yet to recover from this massive body blow and were skittish about provoking the president again.

And so, in the fall of 1998, with the president riding high in the public opinion polls, Gingrich and Lott chose surrender over principle. During the course of the congressional session, the two leaders made no effort to pass individual appropriations bills (any of which might have been vetoed by the president), choosing instead to pack everything into a single 3,000-page omnibus bill, in the hope that they could sneak all of their spending provisions past the president. They refused to recognize that Clinton would not hesitate to wield his veto pen. When the president challenged them point-blank in October, the specter of a government shutdown was too much for them.

Rather than force the point, they backed down. First went any hope of tax cuts. Then Congress agreed to spend $29 billion out of the first budget surplus in a generation to cover "emergency" spending, which in reality covered spending that was anticipated far in advance (for the military occupation of Bosnia) and was required by statute (mandatory veterans' benefits). Clinton got much of the funding he wanted for additional school spending, while the Republicans dropped their call to permit people to use tax-free savings for private and parochial schools below the college level.

Even worse, tucked away in those 3,000 pages were hidden goodies, intended to help the president and his party in the election only three weeks away. Seeking to firm up Democratic support against impeachment in the House, Clinton made sure that any compromise budget would appeal to his minority and feminist constituencies. Black farmers were subsidized for their anti-discrimination lawsuits against the Agriculture Department. A contraceptive program for health insurance companies contained no "conscience clause" for doctors who opposed abortion. Worst of all, these clauses were included without a peep of protest from Gingrich or Lott.

Indeed, the two congressional leaders were not even permitted the dignity of negotiating directly with the president. While Bill Clinton spent September and early October helping to raise money for Democratic congressional candidates, he delegated four senior staffers to deal with the Speaker of the House and the Senate majority leader. "I don't think the president is anxious to see the Republicans after all they've said about him," said one Clinton adviser. Although Gingrich and Lott fumed over this flagrant show of disrespect, it didn't seem to have stiffened their spines. The president knew that they would do anything to get out of town. And they did.

The capitulation of the Republican congressional leadership did not go unnoticed by others in the party. Jack Kemp, the former congressman, cabinet secretary, and vice-presidential candidate, had grown increasingly critical of the leadership shown by his friend and ally, Newt Gingrich. On October 8, on the eve of the budget surrender, Kemp issued an extraordinarily harsh statement about the congressional leadership, most of them his longtime political allies and former colleagues. "Today, the Republican Party

Edition details

• Publisher: Free Press
• Publication date: 2000
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0684827468
• ISBN 13: 9780684827469
• Binding: Hardcover
• Edition number: 1
• Number of pages: 256