Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command, Vol. 2 - Cedar Mountain to Chancellorsville - Hardcover

Freeman, Douglas Southall

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0684837846 ISBN 13: 9780684837840

Publisher: Scribner, 1997

Synopsis

An unquestioned masterpiece of the historian's art, and a towering landmark in the literature of the American Civil War. Volume one of this magnificent three-volume narrative closed with the Confederate reorganization that followed the Seven Days' battles. In volume two, Cedar Mountain to Chancellorsville, Douglas Southall Freeman recounts the succession of battles that are among the most celebrated in the history of American warfare. The Confederacy won resounding victories in 1862-63, but they were seldom won easily or at light cost. Death was always on the heels of fame, but the men who survived -- among them Jackson, Longstreet, and Ewell -- would continue to develop as commanders and as men. In these chapters, a new type of officer arises. He is still learning, still rounding to the full stature of a leader, and combat is still his glory. At second Manassas he is John Hood; at South Mountain he is Robert Rodes; at Sharpsburg he is John Cook, and at Chancellorsville there is a goodly fellowship: Rodes and Ramseur and Pender and Wilcox. But it is Jackson who is the central figure in this volume. The history of the Confederate Army from Cedar Mountain to Sharpsburg and back again to the Rappahannock is, in its finest lines, his military biography. By the spring of 1863, "Old Jack" personifies the mobility, the resolution, and the offensive daring of the Army, and his death is a defeat that cancels all the gains at Chancellorsville.

About this title

About the Author

Douglas Southall Freeman was born in Lynchburg, Virginia, in 1886, the son of a Confederate soldier. After receiving a Ph.D. in history from Johns Hopkins University at the age of twenty-two, he embarked on a newspaper career. He was named the editor of the Richmond News Leader at the age of twenty-nine, a post he would hold for thirty-four years. In 1915, Freeman was commissioned by Scribner's to write a one-volume biography of Robert E. Lee; twenty years of work later, his four-volume R. E. Lee won the Pulitzer Prize. The three volumes of Lee's Lieutenants took him a relatively modest eight years to complete. He won another Pulitzer Prize for his six-volume biography of George Washington, which he finished only hours before his death in 1953.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Chapter 1

New Troubles for "Old Jack"

Was it a major change of Federal strategy with which "Stone wall" Jackson had to deal in mid-July, 1862? Had the enemy opened a "second front"? At the time of Jackson's departure from the Richmond line, after the Seven Days' Battles, the new Federal Army of Virginia appeared to be making ready for an advance to the "Gordonsville Loop" of the Virginia Central Railroad. The commander of this Army, Maj. Gen. John Pope, was intent on assuming and holding the offensive. Another Federal force of unknown strength was at Fredericksburg. This column, uniting with Pope, might overwhelm Jackson. Either one of the Union armies might push forward, cut the railway and sever communications between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley.

Against the possibility of such a drive, Jackson had, first of all, to protect the long stretch of rail from Hanover Junction to Charlottesville. He had, also, to watch for an opening and, if he found it, to strike at once. The Southern cause could not wait on the leisured convergence of superior force. In this spirit, Jackson's first counter-move was to place his Army at Beaver Dam, whence he marched a little westward to Frederickshall. When Jackson had satisfied himself that the greater part of the Union troops under Pope were North and West of Culpeper, the Confederate Army of the Valley advanced on the 19th of July to Gordonsville.

Upon the arrival of Jackson at the town where he had halted a month previously it was observed that both he and his troops looked the worse for their adventures in the defense of the capital. Jackson may not have been aware of this, but he was conscious that his men needed a renewal of stiff discipline. Before he had left the scene of the battles around Richmond, he had prescribed for his troops the tonic of three drills a day and the prophylaxis of abstention from visits to the Confederate capital. Now, as Jackson awaited developments, he sought vigorously to restore whatever might have been lost in soldierly qualities. It was an exacting task. Nine days after he reached Gordonsville, the General wrote Mrs. Jackson briskly: "My darling wife, I am just overburdened with work, and I hope you will not think hard at receiving only very short letters from your loving husband. A number of officers are with me, but people keep coming to my tent -- though let me say no more. A Christian should never complain. The apostle Paul says, 'I glory in tribulations? What a bright example for others!" Among the "tribulations" he may have counted that of having no time to read a copy that Jeb Stuart had sent him of a new, Confederate edition of the strategist's bible, Napoleon's Maxims of War. Jackson put the volume carefully with his personal baggage, but neither then nor thereafter, so far as the pages indicate, did he ever read it. If he had time for Holy Writ, that was all. Newspapers he still declined to peruse lest they destroy his Christian humility. They spoke too well of him.

For a few days, the General's personal hard work meant ease for his subordinates. Maj. Franklin Paxton, who was then acting as a voluntary aide to Jackson, wrote cheerfully home: "Everything here seems so quiet. The troops are drilling, and there is every indication that [they] will rest here for sometime. Considering the severe hardships through which they have passed since the war began, it is very much needed. Everything has a happy, quiet appearance, such as I have not seen in the army since we were in camp this time last year after the battle of Manassas."

The arrival of A. P. Hill's Division did not disturb this calm or add to Jackson's troubles. Quietly and in good order, though perhaps with more transportation than regulations allowed, the Light Division reached Jackson on July 29 and the days immediately following. In dispatching Hill from Richmond Lee had written the commander of the Army of the Valley: "A. P. Hill you will, I think, find a good officer with whom you can consult, and by advising with your division commanders as to their movements much trouble can be saved you in arranging details, as they can act more intelligently. I wish to save you trouble from increasing your command." This was as pointed as it was tactful and it would be particularly apropos of the projected movement, which involved a large force for one man to handle unless he was willing to trust his subordinates and to reveal to them enough of his plans to assure swift, co-ordinated action. The event was to show that Lee's counsel was lost on Jackson. If "Stonewall" was willing, as he had told Boteler, to follow Lee blindfolded, he required no less of his subordinates. Hill said nothing and asked nothing. Doubtless he was glad enough to be away from Longstreet.

If Hill kept the peace that Paxton had praised, others did not. Col. John F. Neff of the Thirty-third Virginia was involved in some unexplained clash with General Winder and was placed under arrest. Some of Winder's privates of the Stonewall Brigade had straggled badly on the march to Gordonsville and had wandered far in search of food at private homes. Winder decided that the one way of stopping this was to punish it severely. Thirty offenders were marched into the woods and were "bucked" for a day. Their resentment was worse than their straggling. About half of them deserted that night. Others were so embittered that their officers went to Jackson and acquainted him with the incident. He thought it politic to direct that men be not bucked again. This ended that humiliating form of punishment, but it did not cool the wrath of the sufferers. John Casler reported: "[General Winder] was a good general and a brave man, and knew how to handle troops in battle; but he was very severe, and very tyrannical, so much so that he was 'spotted' by some of the Brigade; and we could hear it remarked by some one nearly every day that the next fight we got into would be the last for Winder." That in the Southern Cromwell's own Brigade of the Model Army!

Simultaneously with this unhappy affair in the Stonewall Brigade, Jackson's cavalry was in the turmoil of reorganization. Following the death of Ashby, the Secretary of War had asked Lee, not Jackson, to suggest a possible successor, who would have the rank of Brigadier General. Lee had not been able to recommend a competent, available cavalryman. He had thought of Robert Ransom, but he did not feel he could spare that officer, nor did he believe the North Carolinian would care to exchange command of a strong infantry Brigade for the direction of Jackson's horse. The name of Fitz Lee, which was urged by Stuart, was rejected by Lee on the ground that he did not know whether his nephew could win the support of Ashby's men. Col. T. T. Munford had been mentioned by Lee as a possibility, as had been George H. Steuart. Instead of Munford, who had shown much promise, and of "Maryland" Steuart, who had failed definitely in cavalry command, the President chose Col. Beverley H. Robertson and promoted him to the grade of Brigadier General.

Colonel Robertson was a Midland Virginian, 36 years of age, a graduate of West Point in the Class of 1849, a veteran of much Indian service and in person the embodiment of the fashionable French cavalry officer of the time. Somewhat bald, with unsmiling eyes, Robertson wore long, flowing mustaches and whiskers in the mode of Louis Napoleon. The month before the outbreak of war, while he was on duty in Utah, Robertson was promoted Captain of the Second Dragoons. After the attack on Sumter, he sent word to his friends that he would be in Virginia and ready to serve in her behalf as soon as he could get home; but he was not able to reach Richmond until Aug. 18, 1861. Ten days before his arrival there, he had been dismissed officially from the United States Army on the ground that he had "given proof of his disloyalty." By the time the order to this effect was published, he was a Captain in Confederate service and soon he was Colonel of the Fourth Virginia Cavalry. In command of that regiment he had gone with Stuart to the Peninsula, but because of sickness he had been denied any part in the skirmishing at Williamsburg. His only engagement had been a brisk exchange at New Bridge on May 23-24.

Because Robertson adhered sternly to the rigorous discipline of the regular Army, he was defeated for election as Colonel in the reorganization of his command. That cancelled his commission, but it made him available for other service. The President's hope, in promoting him in June, was that Robertson's admitted abilities as a drill master could be well employed in the training of Ashby's men. Col. William E. ("Grumble") Jones, of the First Virginia, had shared Robertson's fate in the election and had lost both his troops and his rank. For him, too, the War Department at length found a place. The loose, cumbersome organization of the cavalry in the Shenandoah area was conformed to army regulations. Ashby's troopers were regimented as the Seventh and Twelfth Virginia, and the Seventeenth Virginia Battalion. With Munford's Second and Flournoy's Sixth, they constituted Robertson's "Laurel Brigade," in which Jones was given the Seventh Virginia.

These regiments from the Valley, moving via Mechum River and Charlottesville, joined Jackson at Gordonsville. Upon Munford's arrival from the Richmond front with the Second, he was ordered to report to Robertson. The organization thus was completed but it was not popular. Boys who had been accustomed to the easy-going, if adventuresome life under Ashby could not be reconciled overnight to "old army" Colonels and methods. The Valley troopers, moreover, had held an unofficial election of their own for the choice of officers and felt much resentment because their action had been disregarded.

Had this been all, Jackson readily could have dealt with it. He Who had made teamsters of the Dunkards and had laid an iron hand on mutineers and hiding conscripts would not have hesitated to curb the cavalry. Now that Ashby's influence no longer could have been exerted against him, Jackson could have assured support for Robertson had he himself had faith in that officer. There was the barrier. Despite the devotion of Robertson to Jackson's ideals of endless drill, "Stonewall" seems from an early date to have disliked his new chief of cavalry. It is impossible to say whether this was because Jackson may not have been consulted about the appointment or because he did not believe Robertson was qualified for the command. In either event, Jackson quickly concluded that Robertson lacked vigor in reconnaissance and outpost duty. On the 2nd of August, "Grumble" Jones had a brush with Federal cavalry in the streets of the town of Orange. Ten men were wounded, fifty were captured. Jackson seemed to think the fault was Robertson's, rather than Jones's, and, on August 7, he forwarded a request that he be rid of Robertson and that Jones be put in command. "That subject," answered Lee, "is not so easily arranged, and without knowing any of the circumstances attending it except as related by you, I fear the judgment passed upon [Robertson] may be hasty." With the frankness he always displayed in dealing with Jackson, the commanding General continued: "Neither am I sufficiently informed of the qualifications of Col. W. E. Jones, though having for him high esteem, to say whether he is better qualified." To Mr. Davis, prior to this episode, Lee had written: "Probably Jackson may expect too much, and Robertson may be preparing his men for service, which I have understood they much needed. With uninstructed officers, an undisciplined brigade of cavalry is no trifling undertaking and requires time to regulate." There, uncertainly and unpleasantly, the matter had to rest.

If Jackson could not have his way with the cavalry, he could do his full duty, as he saw it, in disciplining his infantry. Now that he had a respite from battles he could take up again the always unfinished business of courts martial. The case of Col. Z. T. Conner, who had fled from Front Royal on May 30, had never been decided. Jackson was determined that it should be. Before leaving Richmond, he had sent G. H. Q. the charges and specifications and, when no attention was paid them, he dispatched another copy. This he followed with a list of officers for the court. Forthrightly he observed that he had so many courts martial under way that he had been compelled to assign all his general officers to that duty, though it was desirable that only one General at a time be detailed.

Of all the courts martial, the one that involved the largest issue of justice was that of Brig. Gen. Richard B. Garnett for withdrawing the Stonewall Brigade from the front of action at Kernstown. The accused officer had seen the letter in which Jackson had expressed the opinion that "General Garnett is incompetent to command a Brigade, and if he is given charge of a good Brigade, it would become a bad one." Intimation also had reached Garnett that during the winter of 1861-62 Jackson, without apprising him, had filed with Lee some complaint of his conduct. As Garnett was satisfied that his action at Kernstown was proper, he was determined to have vindication and, no less, to renew in some capacity his military service in defense of the South. On May 6, Garnett had written the Adjutant General that he would waive all consideration of rank in the composition of a court to try him. If, said he, it was impracticable to organize a court even of officers of subordinate grade, he appealed to the War Department to defer a hearing of the charges and to give him active duty anywhere.

General Lee had regretfully to endorse this request with the statement that he saw no possibility at that time of hearing the charges. He explained: "If General Jackson had closed his letter with the expression of his wish not to press the matter further I should recommend it be dropped. But his closing remarks make it necessary as an act of justice to General Garnett and the service to bring it to trial." On the eve of the Battle of Mechanicsville, when Lee had needed every officer of experience, he had suspended the arrest of Garnett and had ordered that officer to join D. H. Hill for temporary duty, but by the time Garnett had reported, the Seven Days' Campaign had closed. The decision then had been reached to proceed with the court martial and to dispose of the charges. "In [that] decision," Garnett subsequently wrote, "I most heartily concurred." At length a court was named. On the very day it was to convene, Jackson was ordered to the Rapidan. Lee arranged that another court, one that could move with Jackson's troops, was named promptly.

About August 6, this court assembled at Ewell's headquarters near Liberty Mills and began to take testimony. Jackson had drawn with much care broad charges of neglect of duty under seven specifications, and he had covered virtually all Garnett's disputable movements on March 23. The allegation was that Garnett had divided his command at Kernstown, had separated himself from his troops, had permitted them to become confused, and had "given the order to fall back, when he should have encouraged his command to hold its ground." To all of this, Garnett had prepared a detailed answer.

On the stand, Jackson gave coldly his story of what he had sought to do at Kernstown and of what he believed to be Garnett's derelictions. Garnett himself cross-examined his former chief.

"What," said the defendant, "was your plan of the battle fought near Kernstown...?"

"First," Jackson answered, "to defeat the enemy by gaining heights on his right, which commanded his position, pressing on towards Winchester, then turning his right and getting in his rear."

"Did you," said Garnett, "communicate this plan to me before or during the action?"

Jackson's reply was uncompromising: "I did not to my recollection."

The examination then turned to the tactical details of the advance. Jackson's memory of the circumstances was completely at variance with that of Garnett. So far were they apart that at three points on his transcript of the testimony, Garnett wrote opposite Jackson's answer, "Lie."

When Garnett opened his defense, he prefaced it with the assertion that, at Kernstown, "Gen'l Jackson did not communicate to me any plan of battle, if he had decided on one" and that consequently, when entering action, "I was...entirely ignorant of his schemes and intentions...Had he conferred freely with me on that occasion, I am confident all cause of complaint, as far as this specification [of not advancing the regiments in proper order] is concerned, would have been avoided." More in detail, Garnett entered denial of each of the specifications and asserted that his various movements had been demanded by proper management of the field. He supplemented his own statement by reports, personal letters and affidavits from several of his Colonels and from other officers who had fought at Kernstown. In his summing-up he said: "General Jackson not content with arresting me and depriving me of my command, was determined that I should not be restored to active duty as far as it was in his power to prevent it." Garnett cited Jackson's letter alleging unfitness for command and also referred to the complaint that he understood Jackson earlier had made against him. "Such covert attacks," said he, "are inconsistent with honor and justice, and should arouse grave doubts as to the motives and truthfulness of these secret allegations."

He went on: "It is bare justice to the First Brigade to say that they were the most orderly and best behaved troops in General Jackson's army whilst I served with it, and it is a well known fact that fewer complaints were made of depredations committed by it than by any body of men who served in the Valley of Virginia. I have every reason to believe when I was with my command, and after I left it, that I enjoyed its confidence, affection and respect; which could scarcely be the case with an incompetent officer."

Garnett recalled the duration of his service with Jackson, from December, 1861, to April 1, 1862, and he proceeded: "...Much the greater portion of this time I was second in command, yet General Jackson never conferred or advised with me in any important matter, except on a single occasion, when he called me to a council with the regimental commanders of my Brigade. I was thus kept in [as] profound ignorance of his plans, instructions, and intentions as the humblest private in his army. It is almost unnecessary to say that it was extremely embarrassing and disspiriting for my superior officer thus to withhold from me his confidence, and the requisite information to guide and direct me in the intelligent discharge of my duties, and whose position even, I might by many accidents of service have been called on suddenly to fill."

This defense probably was being presented when the spies who had been sent to ascertain the position of Pope's force's arrived and made their report. Jackson had been convinced that Pope was preparing to concentrate at Culpeper. The spies had established the interesting fact that a part only of the new Army of Virginia actually had reached the town. Stirred by this intelligence, which he considered accurate, Jackson believed that precisely such an opportunity as he had hoped to find now was offered him. Pope apparently had made a mistake. By a swift march, Jackson might destroy the Federal van ere the whole army could be concentrated.

If full advantage was to be taken of Pope's incautious exposure of his advanced units, no time must be lost. Jackson must move at once. The court was suspended. Orders were snapped. On August 7, the columns were in motion from the camps around Gordonsville. Their route was over plantation roads where Jackson hoped they would not be observed by the enemy. The day's objective was Orange Court House. Thence Jackson intended to drive straight on Culpeper, which was twenty miles up the wagon road that paralleled the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.

To reach Orange was an easy matter, because Jed Hotchkiss had gene over the roads and had chosen those that scarcely would be under the observation of the enemy. The one immediate trouble, a minor one, concerned Charles Winder. When he received his orders on the torrid afternoon of August 7, he had been sick for several days. His surgeon insisted that he should not attempt to assume active field command. Winder was willing to obey the surgeon if the march did not involve a battle, but if there was to be a fight, he was determined to have a hand in it. To that end, he told Lt. McHenry Howard to ride to Jackson's headquarters, to report him sick, and to inquire confidentially whither the army was moving and whether Jackson expected an action. Howard was to explain that Winder made the unusual request for information because, if a battle was in prospect, he wished to be at any point designated by Jackson and in time to assume command. The Lieutenant did not like the idea of putting such questions to the taciturn Jackson and he said so. Winder answered sharply, "Go to General Jackson and ask him what I told you." Obediently, Howard rode to headquarters. There he found Jackson on his knees and busily packing a carpet-bag.

"General," began Howard, "General Winder sent me to say that he is too sick to go with the command."

"General Winder sick? I am sorry for that."

"Yes, sir, and the medical director has told him he must not go with the Brigade. But he sent me to ask you if there will be a battle, and if so, when and he would be up, and which way the army is going."

Howard spoke it all in a mouthful and expected to be met with a sharp retort. Instead, Jackson remained on his knees, turned his head away for a few minutes, reflected and then indulged in a diffident smile at the manifest confusion of the young man "Say to General Winder I am truly sorry he is sick" -- a pause and then: "that there will be a battle, but not tomorrow, and I hope he will be up; tell him the army will march to Barnett's Ford, and he can learn its further direction there." It was an exhibition of considerate candor for which Howard was grateful. Without more ado he hurried away and reported to Winder, who resolved to follow the column.

The troops started promptly. Arriving at the Court House, part of the Army bivouacked around the village. Jackson himself went to sleep on the stile in the street, but when his presence became known, he was asked to the Willis home. There, some time during the night, Jackson issued written orders for the three Divisions to march at dawn. Ewell was to lead; Hill was to follow; Jackson's own Division under Winder was to close the rear. These orders duly were delivered to Hill, but before he started, perhaps even before orders reached him, the plan was changed. Jackson decided to send Ewell's Division by roads to the left of the main line of march. The route of Ewell was to be via Liberty Mills, which were located on the Rapidan, where the road to Madison Court House crosses the river. Thence, Ewell's men were to move down roads on both sides of the Rapidan to the Orange-Culpeper highway and were to reunite with the other Divisions in the vicinity of Barnett's Ford. This modification of plan was made for one or more of three reasons: Jackson may have hoped to deceive the enemy into thinking Ewell was heading for Madison Court House, where part of Pope's forces was supposed to be; a second reason for the new orders to Ewell may have been a belief that the wagon train needed protection against possible attack from the West; the third explanation would be the natural desire to spread the march and not to crowd three Divisions and all the trains on one road.

Of this change in plan, whatever the reason, A. P. Hill was not informed. At the appointed hour, on the morning of the 8th, he had his leading Brigade near the street in Orange up which he expected Ewell to move. Shortly after sunrise, troops began to pass. Not unnaturally, Hill assumed that they were Ewell's men. A Brigade or more had tramped northward before Hill learned that the troops were of Jackson's Division. Upon inquiry, he heard for the first time that Ewell had marched via Liberty Mills.

What was Hill to do? Was he to halt Jackson's Division and place his own troops between two of the commanding General's own Brigades? That would mix the units in a most unsoldierly manner. Should he attempt to get ahead of the troops who already had passed? That would be difficult. Would it not be better to keep the Light Division where it was until all of Jackson's men had passed? Hill so concluded.

After a time, up rode Jackson. From the Willis House, "Stonewall" had seen loitering men of A. P. Hill's command. Why, he asked, were not they on the march? Hill explained, perhaps too briefly, that he was waiting for Jackson's Division to pass. Jackson looked down the street, saw the head of a halted column of his men and apparently assumed that it was the leading Brigade of his Division. Tersely he told a staff officer to ride to the Division and to order it to move on. Then he turned his horse and rode off.

Hill remained where he was and presently saw a wagon train come up the street. It was following Jackson's Division, and apparently was under orders to do so. Should Hill wait on it, too? His written instructions had contained no reference to the trains; but if Jackson had placed the wagons where they were, in rear of the Division to which they belonged, it was proper to let them pass and to fall in behind them. This Hill did, and, later, when he found the progress of the column almost stopped on the Culpeper Road, he went up to Barnett's Ford to ascertain the reason. At the ford he saw part of Jackson's Division waiting on some of Ewell's troops whose route converged at that point. Thereupon, Hill sent word to Jackson that the march was delayed and he inquired whether Jackson intended that each train should follow its Division. No answer came, according to Hill, until between 4 and 5 P.M. At that time, he subsequently reported, Jackson sent him a verbal order to return to Orange Court House and to encamp there. Jackson denied that any such order had been dispatched. On the contrary, he maintained, he twice urged Hill to press on.

A feeble, a farcical performance the advance had been! On a day when sound strategy demanded maximum speed, "Jackson's foot cavalry" had crawled. Instead of reaching Culpeper, Jackson had been able to do no more than eight miles with Ewell's Division, which was renowned for its swift, long marches. Hill had carried his Division only one mile North of Orange Court House.

What had gone awry? Why had the fast moving Army of the Valley dragged along at a rate that would have humiliated a Quartermaster in charge of a reserve wagon train? Excessively hot weather on the 8th was in a measure responsible, but the prime reason was a combination of poor planning, bad staff work and unnecessary reticence on Jackson's part. Barnett's Ford was a bottleneck. The crossing itself was not particularly difficult, but when part of Ewell's Division filed into the road at that point, where wagons were entangled with troops, delay was inevitable. Sound logistics would have brought none of Ewell's troops back to the Culpeper Road South of the ford. Neither Jackson nor any of his staff seems to have realized that A. P. Hill's Division was much larger and therefore required more road space than did any Division that Jackson had commanded in the Valley. In addition, during the day the enemy's cavalry repeatedly threatened the trains and probably unnerved the teamsters. Worst of all was Jackson's failure to notify A. P. Hill of the change of orders on the night of August 7-8, or to acquaint him with even the essentials of the general plan. Lee's admonition to Jackson to advise with Hill had violated something deep, something almost instinctive in "Stonewall." Caution, distrust, jealousy, inborn reticence -- whatever it was, it cost Jackson a day's march by his largest Division.

For the failure of the day's advance, Jackson blamed himself, but he blamed Hill for not preceding Jackson's Division from Orange Court House. He did not arrest the commander of the Light Division, but he became doubtful of Hill's ability to conduct a march. Seeds were sown that August day for animosities that might have a grim harvest.

Copyright © 1971 by Inez Goddin Freeman

Edition details

• Publisher: Scribner
• Publication date: 1997
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0684837846
• ISBN 13: 9780684837840
• Binding: Hardcover
• Number of pages: 800