Controlling Laughter (Princeton Legacy Library) - Hardcover

Corbeill, Anthony

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0691027390 ISBN 13: 9780691027395

Publisher: Princeton University Press, 1996

Synopsis

Although numerous scholars have studied Late Republican humor, this is the first book to examine its social and political context. Anthony Corbeill maintains that political abuse exercised real powers of persuasion over Roman audiences and he demonstrates how public humor both creates and enforces a society's norms.

Previous scholarship has offered two explanations for why abusive language proliferated in Roman oratory. The first asserts that public rhetoric, filled with extravagant lies, was unconstrained by strictures of propriety. The second contends that invective represents an artifice borrowed from the Greeks. After a fresh reading of all extant literary works from the period, Corbeill concludes that the topics exploited in political invective arise from biases already present in Roman society. The author assesses evidence outside political discourse―from prayer ritual to philosophical speculation to physiognomic texts―in order to locate independently the biases in Roman society that enabled an orator's jokes to persuade. Within each instance of abusive humor―a name pun, for example, or the mockery of a physical deformity―resided values and preconceptions that were essential to the way a Roman citizen of the Late Republic defined himself in relation to his community.

Originally published in 1996.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

About this title

About the Author

Anthony Corbeill is Assistant Professor of Classics at the University of Kansas.

From the Back Cover

"Well written, amusing, and instructive. This is a welcome contribution to Roman cultural history and to the culture of Roman politics. There does not exist any other work in English that covers such a vast field, and covers it with erudition and elegance."--Jerzy Linderski, Paddison Professor of Latin, University of North Carolina

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Controlling Laughter

Political Humor in the Late Roman Republic

By Anthony Corbeill

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 1996 Princeton University Press
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-691-02739-5

Contents

Acknowledgment, ix, 
Abbreviations, xi, 
Introduction, 3, 
Chapter 1 Physical Peculiarities, 14, 
Chapter 2 Names and Cognomina, 57, 
Chapter 3 Moral Appearance in Action: Mouths, 99, 
Chapter 4 Moral Appearance in Action: Effeminacy, 128, 
Chapter 5 A Political History of Wit, 174, 
Works Cited, 219, 
Index Locorum et Iocorum, 233, 
General Index, 247, 

CHAPTER 1

PHYSICAL PECULIARITIES

The skin, after all, is extremely personal, is it not? The temptation is to believe that the ills and the poisons of the mind or the personality have somehow or other erupted straight out on to the skin. "Unclean! Unclean!" you shout, ringing the bell, warning us to keep off, to keep clear. The leper in the Bible, yes? But that is nonsense, you know. Do you know? Well — one part of you does, I'm sure. — D. Potter, The Singing Detective 56

sit ... inscription in fronte unius cuiusque quid de re publica sentiat.

(Let it be inscribed on each individual's forehead what that person thinks about the republic.) — Cicero, First Speech against Catiline 32

The dichotomy of "nature" and "culture" has long oriented discussions about the origins of ethical behavior. This division represents a conflict over the extent to which human action is determined either by natural causes or by socially constructed norms. From its ancient Greek formulation of phusis versus nomos ("nature" vs. "custom"), the opposition finds its modern expression in the notions of essentialism and constructionism. As in most dichotomies, however, the distinctions between the two halves are more formal than real. Few so-called essentialists would say that they believe social context exerts no influence on human behavior. Similarly, it would be difficult (although perhaps less so) to find a constructionist who would be willing to deny that there exist among human beings certain constants that are not culture specific. In this book I adopt an approach clearly sympathetic with constructionism. At least since Nietzsche it has been commonly argued that ethical systems consist not of stable entities but of socially constructed notions that the changing needs of society are constantly shaping. My object then is to explore how the dominant, elite culture at Rome during the period of the late Republic created and reinforced its own concept of "Romanness" through the use of public invective. I shall begin in this first chapter with a phenomenon common in humorous abuse, one often noted but seldom confronted by later admirers of Roman oratory: the public mockery of physical peculiarities. It would seem easy to cite this mode of humor as simply another example of constructed notions of the physical self: for example, that the Romans had valorized Greek aesthetics of form and proportion to such an extent that violation of these strictures became a permissible subject of abuse. Yet labeling this practice as simply cruel or unenlightened would be misguided. The Romans certainly recognized in this case a distinction between nature and custom, between natural law and human practice. It was, in fact, precisely this dichotomy that they attempt to mediate in their discussion of physical appearance.

Natura — "nature" — was a slippery term. In a public context, it could denote the character peculiar to an individual, a character that determines one's actions ("that's in his nature"). According to this conception of nature, human behavior is not fixed- Hence any person's inborn qualities, when represented in the courtroom, could vary from positive to negative, depending on whether a speaker wished to attach praise or blame to his subject. In the closing sentences of his defense of Sextus Roscius, for example, Cicero asserts how he and his audience are "naturally very gentle" (natura mitissimi; S. Rose. 154); a passage from a speech against Verres, in contrast, finds the word natura bearing responsibility for continual wrongdoing ("this natura, which has committed so great a crime" — ea natura quae tantum facinus commiserit; Verr. 2.1.40). In public depictions of personal responsibility, natura is fickle and capricious, its activities ranging from humanitarian sympathy to wicked crime.

When occurring in a philosophical and moral context, however, natura usually denotes a divine agent. This version of nature as fixed and constant creates standards of appearance and behavior —" for what is natura other than god and divine reason?" As a result of nature's preeminence, there arises the common practice of appealing to nature to make moral distinctions. Any deviation from the rules of nature is "unnatural" in the strictest sense of the word. From a moral standpoint, then, the Roman conception of physical appearance can be viewed as very much a conscious construction, predicated on the desire to fuse natural law and cultural practice. Nature, endowed by philosophers with complete perfection, becomes the touchstone for determining deviance. In the case of the Roman practice against physical peculiarities, therefore, one can recognize the workings of a "constructed essentialism." To justify the attendant ethical construct — that physical appearance provided indications of moral character — appeals were made to essentializing notions of the theoretical perfection of nature. A naturally beautiful physique bespoke a morally sound interior. This fusion of nature and custom, of physical beauty and ethical norms, provides a necessary foundation for rhetorical invective. For the existence of a human community, as constructed by public figures at Rome, depended on the identification of soul with body, on the ability to recognize the workings of nature in the very face of the citizen.

The Nature of Roman Oratorical Invective

Before I examine the particular case of the mockery of physical peculiarities, it will be useful to outline how speakers at Rome defined for themselves the basic character of humorous invective. There is no question that the audience's admiration of a clever turn of phrase or of a particularly witty comeback constituted a part of the orator's success. I shall not, however, be concerned with the strictly rhetorical aspect of these moves, maneuvers to which rhetoricians and scholars have directed their attention from Greek antiquity to the present. Rather, I shall concentrate on the assumptions that the extant texts never explicitly address, the unstated biases to which invective makes its appeal and by which it is justified. Even those attacks that seem most cruel and unprovoked find their origin in the ethical considerations that a skillful speaker was able to compel his Roman audience to recognize.

The modern reader of Roman oratory cannot fail to be struck by both the omnipresence and caustic character of Roman invective. In his rhetorical treatises, Cicero does not equivocate in recommending attacks on character. In On the Orator, the abuse of an opponent ranks equally with the favorable representation of a speaker and his client:

valet igitur multum ad vincendum probari mores et instituta et facta et vitam eorum, qui agent causas, et eorum, pro quibus, et item improbari adversariorum. (De orat. 2.182)

In persuading successfully, it is very important that the character, principles, actions, and way of life be approved of both those who will plead the case as well as those on behalf of whom [the case will be spoken], and that likewise [the corresponding traits] of one's opponents be exposed to disapproval.

To point up the faults of the opposition constitutes legitimate oratorical practice. The principle applies here to speakers for both defense and prosecution (De orat. 2.183). In his speech on behalf of Murena, Cicero concentrates specifically upon how the opposing prosecutor has attacked Murena's character. In referring to the earlier speech of this prosecutor, Cicero provides general remarks on the application of personal invective (reprehensio vitae):

quae gravissima debebat esse ita fuit infirma et levis ut illos lex magis quae-dam accusatoria quam vera male dicendi facultas de vita L. Murenae dicere aliquid coegerit. (Mur. 11)

That which ought to have been the weightiest [part of the charge] was so weak and slight that it was a kind of "rule of the prosecution" (lex accusatoria) rather than any real opportunity for slandering that compelled them to say anything at all about Lucius Murena's life.

Cicero claims that his client Murena stands free from blame and so he attributes any abuse on the prosecution's part to a kind of pro forma exercise. Yet even if one allows for hyperbole here, the force of the word lex ("rule") attests to the frequency and, presumably, efficacy of such tactics. In fact, nowhere in his writings on oratory does Cicero question the relevance an ad hominem attack might have to the case at hand.

Part of the accuser's skill depends upon his ability to expose the faults of a defendant without slipping into slander. In a context similar to that of the passage cited above, Cicero finds himself in his speech On Behalf of Caelius having to refute the accusations of the young prosecutor Atratinus. His remarks show that the Romans observed limitations on how far one could go in reproaching another person's way of life:

sed aliud est male dicere, aliud accusare, accusatio crimen desiderat, rem ut definiat, hominem notet, argumento probet, teste confirmet; maledictio au-tem nihil habet propositi praeter contumeliam; quae si petulantius iactatur, convicium, si facetius, urbanitas nominatur. (Cael. 6)

But it's one thing to slander, another to accuse. Accusation needs a charge so that it may define the matter at hand, censure the person [accused] (hominem notet), make a demonstration through a proof, and confirm through witnesses. Slander on the other hand has no agenda other than insulting language, which, if bandied about rather recklessly, is called abuse, if rather wittily, clever elegance.

Few commentators on this passage fail to note that the facts of Caelius' case compel Cicero to condemn here what he himself often practices elsewhere. But the distinction Cicero describes between slander and a proper accusation has not been entirely fabricated for the occasion. The passages I have cited from On the Orator and On Behalf of Murena, as well as the many examples from the speeches that I shall quote below, all confirm that at least some types of abusive language were expected and even encouraged on the part of counsels for both the prosecution and defense. And in fact Cicero's remarks here do not exclude the possibility of a vehement attack on character. As defined in this passage, a legitimate accusation (accusatio) includes censure of the accused. The phrase ut ... hominem notet ("to censure the person accused") derives from the reproof employed by a magistrate, especially a censor, against citizens leading an illicit lifestyle. Such a formulation provides the orator with a legitimate pretext to reproach an opponent's character vigorously. Hence Cicero's definition of an accusation here makes ample allowance for contumelia — what one might term "abusive language." Only one precondition exists: a charge to justify the abuse (accusatio crimen desiderat). To understand the circumstances informing Roman invective, therefore, it is necessary to concentrate on what constitutes a legitimate charge. It is here, and not simply in the language of abuse, where justification for invective is located.

On those occasions when Cicero chose to take on a role less familiar to himself — that of accuser — he appears on first inspection to have ignored any standards of discretion. Harsh invective flourishes in the speeches against Verres, Piso, Vatinius, and Marcus Antonius. In the vivid conclusion of his scathing invective Against Piso, Cicero describes the effects the speech has had on his opponent. Properly employed, invective disables its target, marking him as unfit for human society.

numquam ego sanguinem expetivi tuum: numquam illud extremum, quod posset esse improbis et probis commune supplicium legis ac iudicii; sed abiectum, contemptum, despectum a ceteris, a te ipso desperatum et relictum, circumspectantem omnia, quidquid increpuisset, pertimiscentem, diffidentem tuis rebus, sine voce, sine libertate, sine auctoritate, sine ulla specie consulari, horrentem, trementem, adulantem omnes, videre te volui; vidi. (Pis. 99)

For my part, I never sought to draw your blood: I never sought the ultimate punishment of the law and courtroom, a punishment which can be shared by the good and evil alike; instead I wanted to see you spurned, rejected, and scorned by everyone else while forsaken and abandoned by yourself; I wanted to see you looking around at everything, starting at the slightest noise, having no confidence in your own resources as you lack voice, freedom, authority, and any resemblance to one of consular rank; shivering, trembling, fawning upon all others, that is how I wanted to see you; and this is what I have seen.

Despite its scornful character, this passage reveals that Roman invective has what I would call an ethical basis. The orator reserves his contempt for the evil citizen; invective provides a kind of supplement to normal legal proceedings. The language of Against Piso does more than expose Piso's criminality, however. It makes Piso the object of all Rome's contempt, a man deprived of the attributes proper to a free Roman citizen, a man who virtually becomes a fearful and shivering beast. Invective maintains the distinction between what is proper for a Roman citizen and what is not. Such use of language as an extralegal means of enforcing moral codes can be compared to the archaic Roman practice of flagitium (or flagitatio), in which socially unacceptable — but not strictly illegal — acts were exposed to public defamation. When effectively employed, this form of public exposure could destroy the social position of a citizen. Despite apparent legislation to curtail the employment of flagitium, the practice proved so effective that, as references in Republican authors indicate, some forms survived to Cicero's day. Both oratorical invective and flagitium arise from similar motivations: to regulate types of social behavior that stand outside the purview of formal legislation. Throughout this book I shall be exploring how the aggressive tendencies of Roman humor play a crucial role in effecting moral denigration and, thereby, in maintaining ethical and social distinctions.

If the Romans used invective as an extralegal means of enforcing social codes, how then do conceptions of the body tie in with these discursive practices? Roman rhetorical treatises, the distillation of what was taught to the aspiring orator, provide the first step toward understanding the relationship between natural law and oratorical practice.

Physical Peculiarities: On the Orator and Roman Realities

In the year 55 BCE, political circumstances provided Cicero with the opportunity of composing a new rhetorical work to supersede the handbook of his youth, On Rhetorical Invention (De inventione). He intended his new work to go beyond the almost slavish adherence to Hellenistic precedents that typified both this earlier treatise — a work he may never even have wanted published — and similar works such as Rhetorica ad Herennium. On the Orator (De oratore), a dialogue in three books, was to convey Cicero's own mature understanding of the importance of oratory in the Roman world. The author's ideal orator finds a model less in Aristotle's Rhetoric than in Plato's philosopher-king: "no one can be an orator equipped with every praiseworthy attainment unless he has first acquired a knowledge of all important affairs and skills" (nemo poterit esse omni laude cumulatus orator, nisi erit omnium rerum magnarum atque artium scientiam consecutus; De orat. 1.20). In keeping with the Roman conception of the dialogue, Cicero posits as its chief interlocutors the three greatest orators of the previous generation: Lucius Licinius Crassus and Marcus Antonius, between whom Cicero was unable to decide who possessed greater eloquence (Brut. 143, 186), and Julius Caesar Strabo, a speaker whose reputation was exceeded only by these two more experienced orators (Brut. 207). Cicero attributes to these men an authority in rhetorical matters that surpasses even the most learned Greek teachers (De orat. 1.23). The author, the subject, and the interlocutors of Cicero's dialogue On the Orator all promise a work that will be the consummate expression of the Roman orator's role in his society.

It is Caesar Strabo to whom Cicero assigns the task of discussing the role of wit in Roman oratory. He reluctantly agrees: "But I do think that a man who is the slightest bit charming can discourse more wittily on any other topic than wit itself (ego vero ... omni de re facetius puto posse ab homine non inurbano, quam de ipsis facetiis disputari; De orat. 2.217). The topic of wit does not in itself represent a novelty; humor had long been employed by orators and prescribed by handbooks as a means of obtaining the favor of an audience and of thereby satisfying the traditional threefold injunction that oratory should not only persuade and instruct (movere, docere) but also entertain (delectare). Yet Strabo's lengthy discussion, covering more than thirty pages in our modern texts, contains two important innovations over previous treatises on rhetorical wit. First, Strabo stresses the applicability of his remarks to everyday speech:

et hercule omnia haec, quae a me de facetiis disputantur, non maiora forensium actionum quam omnium sermonum condimenta sunt. (De orat. 2.271)

(Continues...)

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Edition details

• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Publication date: 1996
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0691027390
• ISBN 13: 9780691027395
• Binding: Hardcover
• Number of pages: 280