Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon (Translation/Transnation) - Hardcover

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0691138702 ISBN 13: 9780691138701

Publisher: Princeton University Press, 2014

Synopsis

A one-of-a-kind reference to the international vocabulary of the humanities

This is an encyclopedic dictionary of close to 400 important philosophical, literary, and political terms and concepts that defy easy―or any―translation from one language and culture to another. Drawn from more than a dozen languages, terms such as Dasein (German), pravda (Russian), saudade (Portuguese), and stato (Italian) are thoroughly examined in all their cross-linguistic and cross-cultural complexities. Spanning the classical, medieval, early modern, modern, and contemporary periods, these are terms that influence thinking across the humanities. The entries, written by more than 150 distinguished scholars, describe the origins and meanings of each term, the history and context of its usage, its translations into other languages, and its use in notable texts. The dictionary also includes essays on the special characteristics of particular languages―English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish.

Originally published in French, this one-of-a-kind reference work is now available in English for the first time, with new contributions from Judith Butler, Daniel Heller-Roazen, Ben Kafka, Kevin McLaughlin, Kenneth Reinhard, Stella Sandford, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Jane Tylus, Anthony Vidler, Susan Wolfson, Robert J. C. Young, and many more.The result is an invaluable reference for students, scholars, and general readers interested in the multilingual lives of some of our most influential words and ideas.

• Covers close to 400 important philosophical, literary, and political terms that defy easy translation between languages and cultures
• Includes terms from more than a dozen languages
• Entries written by more than 150 distinguished thinkers
• Available in English for the first time, with new contributions by Judith Butler, Daniel Heller-Roazen, Ben Kafka, Kevin McLaughlin, Kenneth Reinhard, Stella Sandford, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Jane Tylus, Anthony Vidler, Susan Wolfson, Robert J. C. Young, and many more
• Contains extensive cross-references and bibliographies
• An invaluable resource for students and scholars across the humanities

About this title

About the Author

Barbara Cassin is director of research at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris. Emily Apter is professor of comparative literature and French at New York University. Jacques Lezra is professor of Spanish, Portuguese and comparative literature at NYU. Michael Wood is the Charles Barnwell Straut Class of 1923 Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Princeton University.

From the Back Cover

"This is an absolutely astonishing book. There is really nothing else like it. Brimming with excited discovery on every page, it allows readers to re-experience all the freshness and energy of the original Enlightenment attempts to sum up knowledge. If other works of reference read like this, they'd give novels a run for their money. It is dazzling."--Bruce Robbins, Columbia University

Praise for the French edition:"[A] comparatist's bonanza. . . . [F]rom abstraction andphronesis to saudade and Wunsch, across hundreds of carefully researched lexical histories, this exceptionally rich and useful [book] also makes a forceful argument for doing philosophy in dialogue with other philosophical traditions, with their original languages and texts."--Christian Moraru, The Comparatist

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Dictionary of Untranslatables

A Philosophical Lexicon

By Barbara Cassin, Steven Rendall, Christian Hubert, Jeffrey Mehlman, Nathanael Stein, Michael Syrotinski

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2004 Éditions de Seuil / Dictionnaires Le Robert
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-691-13870-1

Contents

Preface....................................................................
vii
Introduction...............................................................
xvii
How to Use This Work.......................................................
xxi
Principal Collaborators....................................................
xxiii
Contributors...............................................................
xxv
Translators................................................................
xxxiii
Entries A to Z.............................................................
1
Reference Tools............................................................
1269
Index......................................................................
1275

CHAPTER 1

A

ABSTRACTION, ABSTRACTA,ABSTRACT ENTITIES

FRENCH abstraction, abstrait

GERMAN Abstraktion, Entbildung

GREEK aphairesis [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]

LATIN abstractio, ablatio, absolutio, abnegatio; separata,abstracta

CATEGORY, EPOCHÊ, ESSENCE, FICTION, IMAGINATION, INTELLECTUS,INTENTION, NEGATION, NOTHING, REALITY, RES, SEIN, SUBJECT, UNIVERSALS

While the meaning of the term "abstraction" is not a problem in formallogic, where it refers to the operation that makes it possible toconstruct, using an "abstractor," a so-called "abstract" expression onthe basis of another expression containing one or more free variables,the term's semantic field in philosophy and the theory of knowledgeis more difficult to organize. When Condillac (L'Art de penser I.viii) denounces"the abuse of constructed abstract notions," and "in order toavoid this problem" asks that we look back to "the generation of all ourabstract notions, ... a method that has been unknown to philosophers, ...who have sought to make up for it by means of definitions," his aim is differentfrom that of Aristotle when the latter mentions, under therubric "abstract entities" or "things that exist in the abstract [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII],"the forms that mathematical science deals with "byabstracting from their inherent matter" (Aristotle, De anima, 431b.13–17),and from that of Dionysius the Areopagite when he asks to be raised bythought to the superessential "through the aphairesis [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] of allbeings." Thus when speaking of "abstraction" we must distinguish theproblem of the generation of abstract ideas insofar as it involves that ofuniversals, that of the existence or nonexistence of general objects, andthat of the practice of abstractive negation in the diverse fields—loglcal,epistemological, theological—where it occurs. The broad range of theterm "abstraction" is well illustrated by the modern English usage of theterms "abstracta" and "abstract entities," which are more or less synonymouswith "universals," and whose extension includes mathematicalobjects (numbers, classes, sets), geometrical figures, propositions, properties,and relations. Although English-language historiography has atendency to regard Plato's Ideas or Forms as the first occurrence of real,non-spatio-temporal "abstract" entities, instantiated or participatedin by spatio-temporal objects, it seems more precise to reserve thisterm for "Aristotelian" ontology by distinguishing, as was done duringthe Middle Ages, separate entities (separata) from abstract entities(abstracta).

I. Epagôgê and Aphairesis, Two Models ofAbstraction according to Aristotle

There are two models of abstraction in Aristotelianism. Thefirst is that of "abstractive induction" (epagôgê [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]),which Aristotle describes this way:

So out of sense-perception comes to be what we callmemory, and out of frequently repeated memories ofthe same thing develops experience; for a number ofmemories constitute a single experience. From experienceagain—i.e. from the universal now stabilized in itsentirety within the soul, the one beside the many whichis a single identity within them all—originate the skill ofthe craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science,skill in the sphere of coming to be and science in thesphere of being.

(trans. G.R.G. Mure, Posterior Analytics, II.§19)

The second model is that of mathematical (chieflygeometrical) abstraction, which consists not in "bringingtogether" (epagein [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) similar elements andgrouping them under a single concept, but in "stripping"(aphaireisthai [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) the image or representationof a thing of its individualizing characteristics (essentiallymaterial).

The conflict between these two models is a structuralgiven, a major tendency in Aristotelianism, whose effectsmade themselves felt throughout the Middle Ages. Philosophershave never ceased to vacillate between the registrationof resemblances (the basis of "resemblance nominalism")and the neutralization of individualizing characteristics thatare not pertinent for the type, though some have sought tofind unlikely compromises between these poles.

See Box 1.

II. The Peripatetic Theory of Aphairesis and ItsMedieval Extensions: "Abstractionism"

A. The classification of the sciences

In his treatise De caelo (III.§1.299a 15–17), Aristotle uses theterm "abstraction" to distinguish between "mathematicalobjects" (ta ex aphaireseôs [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], lit. "proceedingfrom a subtraction") and "physical objects" (ta ek prostheseôs[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], lit. "proceeding from an addition"). Nonetheless,it is only in De anima (III.§7.431b.12–16) that Aristotleexplains how the intellect conceives abstractions:

As for so-called "abstractions" (ta en aphairesei legomena[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), the intellect thinksof them as one would think of the snub-nosed (simon[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]): qua snub-nosed, one would think of it not asseparate (ou kechôrismenôs [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) but asconcave (koilon [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), if one thought of it in action(energeiai [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), one would think of it withoutthe flesh in which the concavity is realized (aneu têssarkos an enoei en hêi to koilon [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]):so is it when the intellect thinks ofabstract terms, it thinks of mathematical things as ifthey were separate, even though they are not separate(ou kechôrismena hôs kechôrismena [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]).

In Michael Scot's Latin translation of Averroës's longcommentary on De anima, the expressions used in De animaIII.§4.429b.18–22 and III.§7.431b.12–16 are rendered respectivelyby "things that exist in mathesis" and "things thatare said negatively." Averroës notes that by "things that aresaid negatively" Aristotle "means mathematical things," theword negation meaning "separation from matter." Negationbeing, along with separation, ablation, suppression, andabstraction, one of the possible meanings of the Greekaphairesis, Averroës's exegesis shows that he sees Aristotle'sthought as characterized by a kind of equation: things saidnegatively = beings separated from matter = mathematicalentities.

However, mathematical entities are not the only abstractentities. There are also universals, especially the universalsof genus, species, and difference. How should we distinguish,from the point of view of abstraction, mathematical entitiesfrom universals? This problem occupied Aristotle's commentatorsand interpreters from antiquity to the Middle Ages.

As they are defined in the Metaphysics (VI.§1.1026a.10–16),the theoretical sciences can be classified in a combinatorymanner, depending on whether the entities they concernare "movable" or "immovable," on the one hand, and "separable"or "inseparable" from matter, on the other hand.

But if there is something which is eternal and immovableand separable, clearly the knowledge of it belongsto a theoretical science—not, however, to physics (forphysics deals with certain movable things) nor tomathematics, but to a science prior to both. For physicsdeals with things which exist separately (achôrista[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) but are not immovable, and some parts ofmathematics deal with things which are immovable butpresumably do not exist separately, but as embodied inmatter (hôs en hulêi [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]); while the first sciencedeals with things which both exist separately and areimmovable (chôrista kai akinêta [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]).

(trans. W. D. Ross, Metaphysics,in The Basic Works of Aristotle)

In the eighteenth century, an anonymous work providingan introduction to philosophy, Philosophica disciplina,presents the same tripartite classification in an order thatlater became standard, an order of increasing "separation"determined by the "ontological value" of its objects: physics,mathematics, metaphysics.

The things ... dealt with by speculative philosophy areeither connected with (conjuncte) movement and matterin accord with being and knowledge, or are completely(omnino) separate. If they are considered in the firstway, then we have natural philosophy; if in the secondway, mathematics; if in the third way, metaphysics. Andthat is why there are only three speculative sciences ofthings.

(C. Lafleur, ed., Philosophica disciplina, in QuatreIntroductions à la philosophie au XIIIe siècle)

Whatever the classification adopted, one fact emerges:metaphysics deals with "separate" entities (separate substancesor "intelligences," God, "thought about thought," evenintellects traditionally called "poietic" or "active" and "hylic"or "possible"); mathematics deals with "abstract" entities.Where should universals be located in such a scheme? The answeris given, in an epoch-making manner, by Alexander ofAphrodisias, who formulated a doctrine that was to becomepart of the common Peripatetic language, and that moderninterpreters designate by the term "abstractionism."

B. Abstractionism

Abstractionism's starting point is a thesis (extrapolated fromDe anima III.§7.431b.12–16) stipulating that abstraction is amental operation that consists in conceiving as separatefrom matter things that are nonetheless not separate frommatter. Two of Alexander's texts, Peri psuchês [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII](De anima liber cum mantissa) and Quaestiones naturales et morales,give a precise elaboration of this thesis in the frameworkof an opposition between "incorporeal forms that areby themselves immaterial" (for Alexander, the separate Intellect,the unmoved First Mover) and "forms embodied inmatter." The latter, not being "by themselves" intelligible,become intelligible because an intellect "makes them intelligibleby separating them from matter through thought, byapprehending them as if they were [separate] by themselves."Alexander's thesis does not bear prima facie on mathematicalobjects, but rather on all sorts of so-called "material" forms(that is, those that are embodied in matter). This is a generalizationof the theory in De anima III.§.7, outside the contextof mathematics, or rather geometry. This generalization,"abstractionism," is made possible not only because geometricalpossibilities are among abstract intelligibles in general,but also because geometrical intelligibles usually function asexamples of abstract intelligibles.

Regarding abstract universals' mode of existence, Alexanderof Aphrodisias formulates the main theorem of "abstractionism"this way: "The universal [that is] in all [particulars]does not exist in the same way that it is conceived." The universalhas two modes of being: one in things, the other asconceived. This distinction corresponds to that establishedby Scholasticism between the universal in re and the universalpost rem. It seems to be based on a difference between "being"and "existing," whose significance and scope remain to be historicallydetermined, and which Alexander expresses, generally,by saying that universals have "being" (einai [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) inthought, while hupostasis [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] /huparxis [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] hasbeing in particulars (for hupostasis, see Quaestiones naturales etmorales, 59, 7–8, and his In Aristotelis Topicorum libros octo commentaria,II.2, and for huparxis, see De anima liber cum mantissa,90; see also SUBJECT and ESSENCE).

At the dawn of the Middle Ages, Boethius, a Latin translatorand commentator on Aristotle, formulated the secondthesis on which abstractionism is based, explaining that"all concepts derived from things that are not conceivedas they are arranged are not necessarily empty and false"(RT: PG, t. 64, col. 84B11–14). The problem assumed here isthe one that thirteenth-century Aristotelians would laterformulate in the Scholastic adage "Abtrahentium non estmendacium" (Abstraction is not a lie). In the context withwhich Boethius's thesis is concerned, the opposition is theNeoplatonic one between authentic concepts (which havea basic reality) and empty or false concepts. The respectivepaths of abstraction and fiction thus intersect, in accordwith an argumentative schema that continues down tothe modern period. For Boethius, there is "false opinion" ifand only if things are "composed by thought" that cannotexist "naturally joined." That is the case, for example, whenone combines in imagination a man and a horse to producea Centaur (a traditional example of phantasia [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]among Greek commentators).

Si enim quis componat atque conjungat intellectu idquod natura jungi non patiatur, illud falsum esse nullusignorat: ut si quis equum atque hominem jungat imaginatione,atque effigiet Centaurum.

(If in fact something is composed or combined bythought whose junction nature would not allow, everyoneknows that it is false: for example, if the imaginationcombines a horse and a man, a centaur would beobtained [that is, something false = something that doesnot exist].)

(RT: PG, t. 64, col. 84)

But for all that, every concept of a thing "conceived differentlyfrom the way it is composed" is not a false concept.Therefore we must distinguish between a false conceptand a concept derived from things by abstraction. A falseconcept, like that of the centaur, does not proceed from athing conceived in a way different from that in which it iscomposed. It is not, strictly speaking, a derived concept. Onthe contrary, resulting from a mental combination of what"cannot" exist combined in nature, one can and must saythat it is not derived from any "thing." In contrast, in thecase of a concept derived from things by abstraction, weare dealing with a derived concept that proceeds from a"division" or "abstraction" carried out on an authenticallyexisting thing. Boethius's abstraction is thus, as in Alexanderof Aphrodisias, a separation or dissociation bearingon "incorporeals" (a Stoic term characteristic of Alexander'ssyncretic Peripateticism): it is the act carried out bythought when, "receiving the incorporeals mixed withbodies, it divides the former from the latter in order toconsider and contemplate them in themselves" (Boethius,ibid.).

C. Discriminating attention: Intentio/attentio

In the twelfth century, PeterAbelard introduced a theme thatwas to become central in modern empiricist and nominalisttheories of abstraction: attention (intentio, attentio). For Abelard,the role of attention is determined on the basis of thehylemorphic ontology inherited from Aristotle, Porphyry,and Boethius. Matter and form never exist in isolation:they are always "mixed" with one another (Abelard, Logica,Super Porphyrium). However, the mind, or rather the reason,can consider them in three ways. It can "consider matter initself," "focus its attention on the form alone," or "conceivethe two as united." The first two types of intellection are carriedout "through abstraction," the latter "through junction."

In Abelard, Boethius's "abstractionist" thesis is reformulated:intellection through abstraction is not empty. Twonew arguments are advanced: (1) this type of intellectiondoes not attribute to a thing properties other than its own;(2) it limits itself to abstracting from some of them.

Such understandings by "abstraction" perhaps seemedto be "false" or "empty" because they perceive the thingotherwise than as it subsists.... But that is not so. Ifsomeone understands a thing otherwise than as it is inthe sense that he attends to it in terms of a nature orcharacteristic that it does not have, that understanding issurely empty. But this does not happen with abstraction.

(P. Abelard, Logica, Super Porphyrium, 25.5-22;trans. P. Spade, "Glosses on Porphyry")

Thus here abstraire means "abstract from, set aside"; or inordinary language, "ignore" or "not take into account." Thiscommon acceptation of an act that is elsewhere described interms of the extraction of "incorporeals" from the matter inwhich they are entangled makes Abelard's descriptions of theact of abstraction look like anticipations of John Stuart Mill's.

(Continues...)

Excerpted from Dictionary of Untranslatables by Barbara Cassin, Steven Rendall, Christian Hubert, Jeffrey Mehlman, Nathanael Stein, Michael Syrotinski. Copyright © 2004 Éditions de Seuil / Dictionnaires Le Robert. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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Edition details

• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Publication date: 2014
• ISBN 10: 0691138702
• ISBN 13: 9780691138701
• Binding: Hardcover
• Language: English
• Number of pages: 1344
• Editor: Cassin Barbara, Apter Emily, Lezra Jacques, Wood Michael