The Next American Century: How the U.S. Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise - Softcover

Hachigian, Nina

Softcover

ISBN 10: 074329100X ISBN 13: 9780743291002

Publisher: Simon & Schuster, 2010

Synopsis

“Finally, a thoughtful (and thought-provoking) book that tells us the positive strategic news about the rise of China, India, and other emerging global powers, without glossing over the challenges.”

—Dan Burstein, venture capitalist and author of Secrets of 24

“The Next American Century provides a strong, practical, optimistic lesson that Americans should take to heart.”

—Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser ?to Presidents Gerald R. Ford and George H.W. Bush

“The Next American Century describes brilliantly why the world’s rising powers are not only necessary competitors but essential partners. The main challenge is to accept challenge. This positive, down-to-earth reminder should be essential reading.”

—Matt Miller, Fortune magazine columnist ?and author of The 2 Percent Solution

“The authors of The Next American Century offer a refreshing alternative to the customary prophesies of doom and the obsessive search for a new arch-enemy.”

—Brian Urquhart, former Under Secretary-General of the UN

About this title

About the Author:

Nina Hachigian is a Senior Vice President at the Center for American Progress and a Visiting Scholar of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Earlier, she was the Director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Policy and a Senior Political Scientist at RAND. From 1998 to 1999, she was on the staff of the National Security Council. She lives in Los Angeles.

Mona Sutphen is the current Deputy White House Chief of Staff and a former Managing Director at Stonebridge International LLC, a Washington-based international business strategy firm. A former diplomat, she served in Bangkok and Sarajevo. Later, she servedv as Special Assistant to U.S. National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger and as an advisor to United Nations Ambassador Bill Richardson. She lives in New York.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.:

Chapter 3. The Battle of Ideas?

In the last two chapters, we focused on the ways in which pivotal powers affect American security. Here we focus on the principles of individual rights, rule of law, capitalism, and democracy that together form America's unique "creed." How do the pivotal powers affect America's way of life at home and its ability to spread its ideals abroad?

Values at Home

The answer to the first half of the question is simple. Pivotal powers do not affect Americans' ability to live by their ideals at home. They cannot conquer America, and do not threaten to do so. None aspires to dismantle America's ideology, as we will see below, and they do not have much of an impact on how America's values are realized in America. That could change if, for example, elected officials became overly anxious about possible technology transfers to China and began a wide-ranging campaign to prosecute Chinese-American scientists over their research. For now, though, there is no measurable impact.

Contrast the impact of big powers with terrorists. The actions of terrorists, past and potentially future, have greatly affected the degree to which America lives by its ideals. In the wake of 9/11, the federal government has taken a slew of steps that many argue play fast and loose with Americans' constitutional rights -- from provisions of the Patriot Act that allow expanded surveillance of Americans without judicial review, to cases involving the legal rights of detainees held as "enemy combatants," among others.

Beyond Borders

We turn now to the harder question. Will other pivotal powers undermine America's ability to extend its ideas abroad? In all likelihood, yes -- but at the margins.

America is not unique in its passion to see its system reflected around the world. Throughout history, the world's greatest powers have all wanted to spread their ideology. Says political scientist Robert Art, none has been "content merely to stand as a shining example" of a certain form of government; they have been vigorous missionaries, to a one. Some ideas, like Roman concepts of the republic or Great Britain's adherence to laissez-faire economics, were adopted and propelled further by subsequent dominant powers like the U.S.

In the case of capitalism, U.S. promotion efforts have achieved stunning success. Every pivotal power has embraced this economic model. All want and need relatively free trade and open markets. Except for Russia, which is on its way, they are all members of the WTO. And even the Russians, according to prominent scholar Dmitri Trenin, see their "bigger is better" approach to capitalism as akin to America's. Of course, each pivotal power implements capitalism in its own way. The state still has its hands in many industries in China, and the Russian government is busily reinserting its fingers in the oil and media sectors. Most European governments spend a significantly higher percentage of GDP on social programs (23.3 percent of GDP versus 16.2 percent in the U.S. as of 2003) and there often is a stronger regulatory impulse there than in the U.S. Yet none of the pivotal powers would dispute the fundamental importance of competition and private industry.

Liberty for All

The export of liberal democracy, on the other hand, while a permanent fixture in American foreign policy, has a mixed track record. (Here we use "liberal democracy" as shorthand for the complex set of principles and values the U.S. promotes abroad, including the rule of law, individual rights, and an independent media, to name a few.) How will the pivotal powers affect this American practice?

The question for U.S. policymakers has long been how best to encourage liberal democracy abroad, not whether to do so. U.S. policies to this end have fallen somewhere on the spectrum from "exemplarism" to "evangelist and missionary." In America's earliest days, the concerns about "entangling alliances" constrained a more activist stance abroad, although the expansionist impulse was arguably in full view at home. By the eve of World War I, however, President Woodrow Wilson's declaration that the U.S. should make the world "safe for democracy" marked a turning point. Since the end of World War II, every presidential inaugural speech has included a reference to America's need or wish to promote liberty and democracy around the world. Over the years, the United States has moved along the spectrum toward more active proselytizing, as America's national identity, power, and sense of purpose have evolved. "If Americans know one thing for certain," writes senior Newsweek editor Michael Hirsh, "it is that their values are not just right for them, but for the world."

During the Cold War, America sought to shore up European democracies as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism (while at the same time Washington supported numerous anti-communist dictators). New institutions like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) -- the club for industrialized democracies -- and initiatives like the Fulbright Educational Exchange Program were founded to spread liberal democratic principles. Later, Jimmy Carter focused on promoting the universality of human rights, and Ronald Reagan founded the National Endowment for Democracy, the first institution that overtly funded pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations in foreign countries. At the end of the Cold War, Bill Clinton brought American attention to bear on dozens of electoral transitions around the world and used the threat of military force to uphold democracy in Haiti. Seen through this lens, President Bush's disastrous decision to invade Iraq was not unusual in its goal, just in its method.

Why is America so devoted to seeing its system replicated? A cottage industry explains the reasons for America's drive. Some analysts concentrate on the purported security benefits. As President Bush put it in his second Inaugural Address, "the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands." Advocates of the "democratic peace" theory suggest that mature democracies will not go to war with each other and that conflict between them is necessarily bounded. Others believe that liberalism is an antidote to extremism (a 2006 National Intelligence Estimate predicts that greater pluralism in Middle East governance will reduce the growth of jihadists); or that expanding the number of democracies will make American leadership more palatable by aligning their ideals with ours.

Yet others focus on more philosophical motivations, arguing that the American penchant for proselytizing can be traced back to America's religious founders. Alternatively, Georgetown University scholar Charles Kupchan argues that "unlike most other nations that define themselves via cultural symbols, America's identity is inexorably linked to its political system," and thus its democracy promotion efforts validate that national identity.

Average Americans are of two minds. On the one hand, bringing democracy to other countries ranked dead last in a fourteen-item list of U.S. foreign policy goals in a 2006 survey. On the other, Americans clearly seek to do good, and a large majority see democracy promotion as at least a "somewhat important" goal. For the most part, Americans, including us, believe that liberal democracy, with all its flaws, is better than any other form of government around in delivering "ordered liberty" to its people.

The debate about why America does it is the subject of many volumes and need not be settled here. What is clear is that like dominant nations in the past, the U.S. will attempt to spread its ideology while it has the power and resources to do so. Democracy promotion efforts have been a staple of American foreign policy for a long time and will doubtless continue, even after the predictable backlash against them that Iraq will generate. We can only hope that the debate about whether democracy can be induced through military force is now firmly settled.

A Helping Hand

As the pivotal powers gain power and influence, how will their goals, interests, and ideals intersect with America's values promotion? Some pivotal powers will help. Of the five, three -- Japan, Europe, and India -- are thriving liberal democracies. Already, the expansion of the European Union has roped much of Eastern Europe into a system in which liberal democracy and open markets are literally required by law and expected by culture. The EU is a staunch promoter of shared values, declaring, for example, that "the EU will ensure that the issue of human rights, democracy and the rule of law will be included in all future meetings and discussions with third countries and at all levels."

While Japan and India are not as active as they could be in promoting democracy beyond their borders, both are crucial demonstrations of how democracy can thrive in a non-Western context. India is especially important in this regard. As the largest democracy on the planet, India represents, observes leading analyst C. Raja Mohan, "the most enduring example of the pursuit of the enlightenment project outside Europe and North America." Delhi may take a lower-key approach than Washington to promoting liberal ideals, but it does do it, and India is warming to the idea of playing a more active role in democracy promotion. Recently, Delhi and Washington worked together to bring about a peaceful democratic transition in Nepal, for example. Another positive trend is the work of Japanese NGOs in places like Afghanistan, where they assist in sectors like education and health.

America's ideals do not map exactly with these pivotal powers. All three may permit commercial dealings with oppressive regimes that Washington would rather they did not. Nevertheless, as we suggest in Chapter 7, it is only logical that America work harder with these like-minded democracies to further liberal norms.

A Mixed Bag

As China and Russia gain ground, their impact on America's ideology promotion efforts is less certain. Thus far, the energies of Russia and China have largely been ...

About this edition

• Publisher: Simon & Schuster
• Publication date: 2010
• ISBN 10: 074329100X
• ISBN 13: 9780743291002
• Binding: Paperback
• Number of pages: 384