New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan (Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center) - Softcover

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0804789185 ISBN 13: 9780804789189

Publisher: Stanford University Press, 2014

Synopsis

New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan takes a creative and comparative view of the new challenges and dynamics confronting these maturing democracies.

Numerous works deal with political change in the two societies individually, but few adopt a comparative approach―and most focus mainly on the emergence of democracy or the politics of the democratization processes. This book, utilizing a broad, interdisciplinary approach, pays careful attention to post-democratization phenomena and the key issues that arise in maturing democracies.

What emerges is a picture of two evolving democracies, now secure, but still imperfect and at times disappointing to their citizens―a common feature and challenge of democratic maturation. The book demonstrates that it will fall to the elected political leaders of these two countries to rise above narrow and immediate party interests to mobilize consensus and craft policies that will guide the structural adaptation and reinvigoration of the society and economy in an era that clearly presents for both countries not only steep challenges but also new opportunities.

About this title

About the Author

Larry Diamond is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford. He is also Director of Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. Gi-Wook Shin is Director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies, and Professor of Sociology at Stanford.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan

By Larry Diamond, Gi-Wook Shin

Stanford University Press

Copyright © 2014 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-8047-8918-9

Contents

Figures and Tables, ix, 
Acknowledgments, xv, 
Acronyms, xvii, 
Contributors, xix, 
Introduction – Korea and Taiwan: New Challenges for Maturing Democracies Larry Diamond and Gi-Wook Shin, 1, 
PART ONE: POLITICAL CULTURE, 
Chapter 1 – Trends in Attitudes Toward Democracy in Korea and Taiwan Chong-Min Park and Yun-han Chu, 27, 
PART TWO: POLITICAL PARTIES AND IDENTITY POLITICS, 
Chapter 2 – The Party System in Korea and Identity Politics Jiyoon Kim, 71, 
Chapter 3 – Political Parties and Identity Politics in Taiwan Shelley Rigger, 106, 
PART THREE: NEW MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICS, 
Chapter 4 – Digital Media and the Transformation of Politics in Korea Minjeong Kim and Han Woo Park, 135, 
Chapter 5 – Digital Media and the Transformation of Politics in Taiwan Chen-Dong Tso, 160, 
PART FOUR: ECONOMIC ADAPTATION TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 
Chapter 6 – Global Ascendance, Domestic Fracture: Korea's Economic Transformation Since 1997 Yoonkyung Lee, 191, 
Chapter 7 – Challenges for the Maturing Taiwan Economy Wan-wen Chu, 216, 
PART FIVE: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY, 
Chapter 8 – Democratization and Health Care: The Case of Korea in Financing and Equity Sangho Moon, 253, 
Chapter 9 – The Aging Society and Social Policy in Taiwan Wan-I Lin, 284, 
PART SIX: NATIONALISM, REGIONALISM, AND GLOBAL TRENDS, 
Chapter 10 – Influencing South Korea's Democracy: China, North Korea, and Defectors Katharine H. S. Moon, 319, 
Chapter 11 – China's Rise and Other Global Trends: Implications for Taiwan Democracy Richard Bush, 340, 
Index, 365, 

CHAPTER 1

Trends in Attitudes Toward Democracy inKorea and Taiwan

Chong-Min Park and Yun-han Chu

Introduction

In East Asia, new democracies began to emerge immediately after thepeople's power revolution in the Philippines overthrew the long-standingdictatorship in 1986. First, South Korea (Korea hereafter) embarked ondemocratic transition by adopting a democratic constitution and holdinga free and open election for president in 1987. Then Taiwan started itsdemocratic transition by lifting martial law in 1987 and then successivelyholding its first parliamentary election in 1992 and its first popular electionfor president in 1996. In 1990, following the collapse of the Soviet Union,Mongolia made a quick transition to democracy by abolishing its one-partyCommunist rule and holding its first multiparty parliamentary election inmore than sixty years. With the emergence of these three new democracies,Japan was no longer the only democracy in East Asia.

Korea and Taiwan are widely recognized as the two most successful third-wavedemocracies in Asia. For nearly two decades, these young democracieshave regularly held free and competitive elections at all levels of government.Both nationally and locally, citizens choose the heads of governmentand the members of the parliament and councils through periodic electoralcontests. More important, unlike many of their peers in the region, theyhave peacefully undergone two power rotations, passing "the two-turnovertest" for democratic consolidation. There is little doubt that the politicalregimes in Korea and Taiwan fully meet the minimum requirements of democracy,such as free and fair elections, universal adult suffrage, and multipartycompetition.

Various international assessments of democracy confirm the two Asiantigers' steady institutional progress toward liberal democracy. The Polity IVProject evaluates regime authority characteristics on a 21-point scale rangingfrom -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). In eachof the first ten years after the transition, Korea received a Polity score of+6. In each of twelve years from 1998 to 2010, it received a score of +8, twonotches below the maximum score. Taiwan performs better in democratizingthe authority structure. Before 1992, it received a score of -1; thereafterit was accorded a score of +7 or higher. Since 2005, Taiwan's Polity score hasbeen raised to the maximum, +10. The political regimes in both countriesare rated either consolidated or nearly consolidated democracies.

The political systems in both Korea and Taiwan are judged as havingprogressed beyond electoral democracy. Freedom House assesses the conditionof political rights and civil liberties on a 7-point scale with 1 (most free)to 7 (least free). Korea received an average combined score of 2.5 in eachof the first five years after the transition (1988–1992); a score of 2.0 in eachof the next eleven years (1993–2003); and a score of 1.5 in every year since2004. Taiwan received an average combined score of 3.0 between 1992 and1996. It received a score of 2.0 between 1996 and 2000, and after 2001 itsscore was upgraded to 1.5, the same as that in Korea. These young democraciesnow rank with long-lasting advanced democracies in the West.

The World Bank reports the quality of state governance in six dimensions:voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence,government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control ofcorruption. The values of these Worldwide Governance Indicators rangefrom -2.5 to +2.5. In every year since 1996, Korea received positive ratingsin all six dimensions. Taiwan also has received positive ratings in all thedimensions since 1996. In 2011, Korea received higher percentile rankingon every dimension except for political stability and absence of violence,on which it was a middling performer. In contrast, Taiwan was a highperformer on every dimension. Although the indicators lack comparabilityover time, the pattern of the ratings suggests that political institutionsand practices in both countries have made progress toward high-qualitydemocratic governance.

Do the people's views of democracy in Korea and Taiwan reflect suchexpert-based assessments of democracy? How do ordinary Koreans and Taiwaneseview democracy as an idea? Do they believe in the legitimacy ofdemocracy? How supportive are they of liberal norms and democratic institutions?Meanwhile, how do they evaluate the performance of their regimein-practice?How do they perceive the democratic quality of their prevailingsystem of government? How much confidence do they have in existingpolitical institutions? Has their support for democracy and evaluation ofregime performance changed? If so, does the change reflect the influence ofgenerational replacement or the effects of events that occurred during theperiod surveyed? By addressing these and other related questions, we seek toprovide a comprehensive account of the trends in popular attitudes towarddemocracy in these most successful third-wave democracies in Asia.

For this purpose, we rely on three public opinion survey series—theKorea Democracy Barometer (hereafter KDB), the Asian Barometer Survey(hereafter ABS), and the Taiwan Election and Democracy Survey (hereafterTEDS). For the Korean case, we use five surveys (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999,and 2001) of the KDB series and three surveys (2003, 2006, and 2011) of theABS series. For the Taiwanese case, we employ three surveys (2001, 2005,and 2010) from the ABS series and one survey (1998) from the TEDS series.It should be noted that the earliest survey data analyzed here were collectedseveral years after the democratic transition, and the earliest and the latestsurvey data were more than ten years apart. When comparing the two countries,only equivalent items from the different survey series were used so asto achieve the highest level of comparability.

Structures of Citizen Views of Democracy

We take David Easton's theory of political support as a starting point formapping citizen views of democracy. Easton defines political support as anattitude by which a person orients himself to a political system positively ornegatively. He distinguishes between three levels of a political system: the politicalcommunity, the regime, and the authorities. The political communityrefers to "a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor."The regime refers to the authority structure as well as its legitimating valuesand operating norms. The authorities refer to the present incumbents in authorityroles. Since we are concerned with attitudes toward democracy as apolitical regime, the focus is on types of political support at the regime level.

According to Easton, the regime has three components: values andprinciples, norms and rules, and the structure of authority. Values andprinciples "serve as broad limits with regard to what can be taken forgranted in the guidance of day-to-day policy." Norms and rules refer to"procedures that are expected and acceptable in the processing and implementationof demands." The structure of authority refers to "formal andinformal patterns in which power is distributed and organized with regardto the authoritative making and implementing of decisions." Hence, citizenviews of democracy involve attitudes toward the values of democracy, itsoperating norms, and its institutional arrangements.

Much of empirical research on support for democracy builds upon thisconceptual distinction between different aspects of the regime. For instance,Pippa Norris distinguishes between three objects of regime support:principles, performance, and institutions. Specifically, support forregime principles concerns attitudes toward the core values of a politicalsystem; support for regime performance concerns attitudes toward the functioningof a political system in practice; and support for regime institutionsconcerns attitudes toward actual institutions of government, such as parliament,courts, the police, political parties, and the military. Similarly, RussellDalton distinguishes between three targets of regime support: principles,norms and procedures, and institutions. Furthermore, he differentiates betweentwo modes of orientation: affective and evaluative. The former represents"adherence to a set of values" and the latter reflects "judgments aboutpolitical phenomena."

Despite such conceptual clarifications and theoretical distinctions, researchershave difficulties in distinguishing empirically between differenttypes of regime support. It is admitted that empirical measurement lags farbehind the multidimensional nature of regime support. Nonetheless, themultidimensional conceptualization of regime support is helpful in mappingcitizen views of democracy and unraveling their complexity. By specifyingthe targets of regime support, we should be better able to understandthe implications of changes in attitudes toward democracy.

Following prior theory and research, we distinguish between three aspectsof citizen views of democracy: values, norms and rules, and institutions.Moreover, we differentiate between two modes of orientation:affective orientations to democracy as an idea, and evaluative orientationsto a democracy-in-practice. The former pertains to idealist views of democracy,whereas the latter pertains to realist views of democracy.

Of affective orientations to democracy as an idea, the first aspect focuses onthe values of democracy. Despite little consensus on the values of democracy,freedom and equality are widely viewed as its foundational values. Inpublic opinion surveys, however, this aspect of orientation is often measuredby agreement that democracy is the best form of government or themost preferred political system. In this study we use different expectationsof democracy to ascertain attitudes toward the values of democracy. In addition,we employ four more indicators: preference for democracy, desirefor democracy, perceived suitability of democracy, and perceived efficacy ofdemocracy. The second aspect pertains to the operating norms and rules ofdemocracy. In this study we select three indicators: support for checks andbalances, the rule of law, and social pluralism—key liberal norms associatedwith the idea of limited government. The third aspect concerns democraticinstitutions. In this study we indirectly ascertain support for them by tappingattitudes toward major forms of authoritarian rule: strongman ruleinstead of elections and parliament, one-party rule instead of multipartycompetition, and military rule.

Of evaluative orientations to a democracy-in-practice, the first aspect pertainsto the perceived supply of democracy. In public opinion surveys, satisfactionwith democracy is often used to measure evaluation of generaldemocratic performance. Although its meaning is contested, we use thisstandard measure as well. In addition, we employ two more indicators toascertain the perceived democratic level of the ongoing political order. Thesecond aspect concerns the democratic quality of political institutions andpractices. In this study we focus on five dimensions of democratic governance:control of corruption, electoral competition, both vertical andhorizontal accountability, and freedom. The third aspect deals with performanceof actual political institutions. In this study we select two indicators:trust in both parliament and political parties—key institutions ofrepresentative democracy.

Values of Democracy

The survey series used here included no relevant question directly measuringsupport for the values of democracy such as liberty and equality. Fortunately,however, the 2006 ABS included a single question with which weascertained the values of democracy our respondents emphasized. It asked:"People often differ in their views on the characteristic that is essential todemocracy. Which one would you choose as the most essential to a democracy?"Four response categories were provided: opportunity to change thegovernment through elections, freedom to criticize those in power, a smallincome gap between rich and poor, and basic necessities like food, clothes,and shelter for everyone. The first two options reflect political values of democracywhereas the last two reflect socioeconomic values.

The pattern of responses in both countries shows a strong contrast. Aspresented in Figure 1.1, in Korea more than one-third chose social justice byreplying "a small income gap between rich and poor," and a similar percentagechose popular control by replying "opportunity to change the governmentthrough elections." Less than one-fifth selected political freedom byanswering "freedom to criticize those in power"; and only one-tenth selectedbasic welfare by answering "basic necessities like food, clothes and shelterfor everyone." In Taiwan, by contrast, almost a half chose basic welfare;more than a quarter chose popular control; one-fifth chose social justice;and only a few chose political freedom.

Notable is that in Taiwan nearly a two-thirds majority conceived theessential characteristics of democracy in terms of socioeconomic values,whereas in Korea there was no single dominant value of democracy; politicalvalues and socioeconomic values competed for popular support. Anothernotable finding is that political freedom was least frequently chosen inTaiwan, while less frequently chosen than social justice or popular controlin Korea. This finding suggests that citizens in these new East Asian democracieswere less supportive of liberal democracy than either social orelectoral democracy. That the values of democracy appeared to be morecontested or even polarized in Korea than in Taiwan suggests that a potentialconflict resulting from disagreement over regime values would begreater in the former than in the latter. This finding also suggests that politicaldemocratization itself did not necessarily encourage satisfaction withdemocracy. The expansion of political and civil rights may not matter muchto those who hold the welfare-state conception of democracy. For them,social and welfare policy outcomes would be more likely to encourage approvalof a democracy-in-practice. Perhaps this is why citizen evaluations ofdemocratic performance in these countries often differed from expert-basedassessments, as will be discussed later.

Support for Democracy

To ascertain support for democracy as an idea, we use four indicators:preference for democracy, desire for democracy, perceived suitability of democracy,and perceived efficacy of democracy. The former two tap largelyaffective orientations, whereas the latter two tap cognitive evaluations. Bytargeting democracy as an undifferentiated whole, these indicators reflectthe most general and diffuse support for democracy.

PREFERENCE FOR DEMOCRACY

The KDB series and the ABS series included a widely used question thatasked respondents to choose among three statements: "Democracy is alwayspreferable to any other kind of government," "Under some circumstances,an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one," and"For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic ora non-democratic regime." The first option indicates unconditional acceptanceof democracy. The second option reflects conditional rejection of democracyor conditional acceptance of authoritarian rule. The last optionmanifests apathy or indifference to democracy.

As shown in Figure 1.2, unconditional acceptance of democracy in Koreaexhibited a considerable fluctuation during the period surveyed: Those whoreplied that democracy is always preferable to any other kind of governmentpeaked at 68 percent in 1997. Then it steadily fell from 65 percent of theelectorate in 1996 to 55 percent in 1998, 45 percent in 2001, and 43 percentin 2006, until it sharply rose to 66 percent in 2011. A steady decline for adecade was followed by a recent dramatic reversal, although whether therise marks a turnaround remains to be seen. It is noteworthy that the largestdrop (13 percent) in unconditional acceptance of democracy occurredin the wake of the economic crisis in 1997, indicating that a belief in thelegitimacy of democracy is closely related to economic performance. However,the largest increase (23 percent) occurred after the replacement of anunpopular incumbent through free and fair elections in 2007, suggestingthat the experience of electoral accountability contributed to the growthof democratic legitimacy. It is intriguing that unconditional preference fordemocracy steadily declined under two left-leaning governments (the KimDae-jung government from 1998 to 2003 and the Roh Moo-hyun governmentfrom 2003 to 2008), suggesting that democratically elected governmentswould not necessarily guarantee the growth of democratic legitimacy.Notable is that conditional acceptance of authoritarian rule had graduallygrown until the most recent survey: Those who replied that an authoritariangovernment can be preferable under certain circumstances increased17 percent in 1996 to 31 percent in 1998, 37 percent in 2001, and 36 percentin 2006, and then declined to 20 percent in 2011. More than two decadesafter the democratic transition, at least one in five Koreans still felt nostalgiafor authoritarian rule.

(Continues...)

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Edition details

• Publisher: Stanford University Press
• Publication date: 2014
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0804789185
• ISBN 13: 9780804789189
• Binding: Paperback
• Edition number: 1
• Number of pages: 408
• Editor: Diamond Larry