Items related to Strategic Command and Control
Synopsis
During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decisionmakers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence.
"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.
From the Back Cover
During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it.
"About this title" may belong to another edition of this title.
- PublisherBrookings Institution Press
- Publication date1985
- ISBN 10 0815709811
- ISBN 13 9780815709817
- BindingPaperback
- LanguageEnglish
- Edition number1
- Number of pages355
- Rating
Search results for Strategic Command and Control
Stock Image
Strategic Command and Control
Published by
Brookings Institution Press, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
Used
Softcover
Seller: Wonder Book, Frederick, MD, U.S.A.
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
Condition: Very Good. Very Good condition. A copy that may have a few cosmetic defects. May also contain light spine creasing or a few markings such as an owner's name, short gifter's inscription or light stamp. Seller Inventory # M10D-01265
Quantity: 1 available
Seller Image
Strategic Command and Control : Redefining the Nuclear Threat
Published by
Brookings Institution Press, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
Used
Softcover
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition. Seller Inventory # 213486
Quantity: 1 available
Stock Image
Strategic Command and Control
Published by
Brookings Institution Press, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
Used
Softcover
Seller: Book Deals, Tucson, AZ, U.S.A.
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
Condition: Very Good. Very Good condition. Shows only minor signs of wear, and very minimal markings inside (if any). 1.23. Seller Inventory # 353-0815709811-vrg
Quantity: 1 available
Seller Image
Strategic Command and Control : Redefining the Nuclear Threat
Published by
Brookings Institution Press, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
New
Softcover
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # 213486-n
Quantity: 1 available
Stock Image
Strategic Command and Control
Published by
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
New
PAP
Seller: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, United Kingdom
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Seller Inventory # CW-9780815709817
Quantity: 15 available
Seller Image
Strategic Command and Control (Paperback or Softback)
Published by
Brookings Institution Press 5/1/1985, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
New
Paperback or Softback
Seller: BargainBookStores, Grand Rapids, MI, U.S.A.
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
Paperback or Softback. Condition: New. Strategic Command and Control 1.1. Book. Seller Inventory # BBS-9780815709817
Quantity: 5 available
Stock Image
Strategic Command and Control; Redefining the Nuclear Threat
Published by
The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
Used
Trade paperback
First Edition
Seller: Ground Zero Books, Ltd., Silver Spring, MD, U.S.A.
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
Trade paperback. Condition: Very good. xiv, 341, [13] pages. Illustrations, black & white. Abbreviations and Acronyms. Map. Footnotes. Index. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Bruce G. Blair (born 1947) is a nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He focuses on technical and policy steps on the path toward the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, specifically on deep bilateral nuclear arms reductions, multilateral arms negotiations and de-alerting of nuclear arsenals. In 2011, he was appointed to the U.S. Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board, a small group of experts that provides the Department of State with independent insight and advice on all aspects of international security, disarmament and arms control. In 1999, he was awarded a MacArthur Fellowship Prize for his research, work and leadership on de-alerting nuclear forces. There are several definitions of command and control (C2). According to older versions of U.S. Army FM 3-0, C2 in a military organization is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commanding officer over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The term may also refer to command and control systems within a military system. Strategic Command and Control applies to nuclear weapons. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence. First edition. First paperback edition. First printing [stated]. Seller Inventory # 71926
Quantity: 3 available
Stock Image
Strategic Command and Control (Paperback)
Published by
Rowman & Littlefield, Washington DC, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
New
Paperback
Seller: Grand Eagle Retail, Fairfield, OH, U.S.A.
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decisionmakers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9780815709817
Quantity: 1 available
Seller Image
Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat
Published by
Brookings Institution Press, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
Used
Soft cover
First Edition
Seller: Palimpsest Scholarly Books & Services, Brooktondale, NY, U.S.A.
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
Soft cover. Condition: Fine. 1st Edition. Second printing. Softcover volume, measuring approximately 6.25" x 9.25", displays very light shelfwear. Binding is firm. Interior is clean and bright. Illustrated with tables, graphs and maps. xiv/341 pages. "During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U. S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communication not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike.". Seller Inventory # ABE-1612589900598
Quantity: 1 available
Stock Image
Strategic Command and Control
Published by
Brookings Institution Press, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
New
Softcover
Seller: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, United Kingdom
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
Condition: New. In. Seller Inventory # ria9780815709817_new
Quantity: Over 20 available