FDR & Stalin: A Not So Grand Alliance, 1943–1945 - Hardcover

Perlmutter, Amos

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0826209106 ISBN 13: 9780826209108

Publisher: University of Missouri, 1993

Synopsis

Perlmutter's hard-hitting, revisionist history of Roosevelt's foreign policy explores FDR's not-so-grand alliance with the ruthless Soviet leader. As the first Western scholar granted access to key foreign ministry documents recently declassified in the former Soviet Union, Perlmutter provides a provocative portrait of a popular leader whose failure to comprehend Stalin's long-range goals had devastating results for the postwar world.

About this title

About the Author

Amos Perlmutter is the author of many books including The Life and Times of Menachem Begin, Israel:  The Partitioned State, and Modern Authoritarianism.  The first Western scholar granted access to key documents recently declassified in the former Soviet Union, Perlmutter is Professor of Political Science at the American University in Washington, D.C.

Reviews

In Churchill: The End of Glory (Nonfiction Forecasts, July 19), John Charmley maintains that the British prime minister's political compromises with Stalin constituted appeasement, especially Churchill's role in the surrender of Poland. In the book in hand, Perlmutter ( Against Authoritarianism ) contends that President Franklin Roosevelt was the greater appeaser. In this sometimes strident revisionist study, the author faults FDR for everything , including the Cold War: for failing to "harness" Stalin, for not fulfilling the principles of the Atlantic Charter and for failing to "deter" the Soviet empire. Perlmutter's arguments on how the president could have harnessed and deterred the powerful Soviet dictator in his expansionism are confined for the most part to generalities ; to wit, that FDR might have taken political advantage of U.S. economic, military and atomic superiority.
Copyright 1993 Reed Business Information, Inc.

A harsh and unconvincing look at FDR's foreign policy. The subtle and secretive FDR irritates many historians, but he seems to utterly infuriate Perlmutter (Political Science/American Unversity; The Life and Times of Menachem Begin, 1987, etc.), who decries the ``myth of FDR's far-seeing diplomacy'' that is protected by ``praetorian guards'' (Arthur Schlesinger et al.), and accuses FDR of a ``total absence of statecraft [and of] perverse collaboration'' with and ``appeasement'' of both Hitler and Stalin- -and of preferring ``the partnership of the cunning, machinating, and ruthless Stalin'' over that of Churchill. Perlmutter also charges FDR with isolationism, which most historians see as a cornerstone of US thinking that was displaced largely by FDR's efforts. Still, the author's descriptions of events at Teheran and Yalta are clear and effective. The overriding facts of FDR's desperately failing health and of his Wilsonian devotion to the UN are points well made, but they're not new. Perlmutter adds the notion that FDR's refusal to deal in balances of power and territory proves his lack of a realistic vision, but the author fails to consider the historic grounding for Stalin's fears: the invasion of Soviet territory by Western allies after WW I, and again by Germany in 1941. Condemned here for ignoring Churchill (a notorious Russophobe), FDR, quite aware that Russia was carrying the brunt of the war effort and its casualties, was certainly dealing with the real power. How well did he deal with it? A crucial appended note by Litvinov to Stalin, Malenkov, and others reveals both Russian insight into what Roosevelt would accept (e.g., the fait accompli regarding Poland) and a revisionary line regarding Russian diplomatic isolation, even suggesting ``a body for permanent military-political contact"--possibly with the West. Who knew that Truman would enact Churchill's belligerent anti- Soviet policies? (see Frank Kofsky's Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948, p. 839). Superficial, vituperative treatment of a complex subject. -- Copyright ©1993, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

With the recent dissolution of the USSR, historians are now capable of examining the evolution of U.S.-Russian relations from a Moscow-based perspective. Perlmutter, co-editor of the Journal of Strategic Studies and author of numerous books on foreign policy, the Middle East, and military policy in that area, has combed Soviet documents and drawn heavily on the materials of the Roosevelt Library to produce this fascinating re-interpretation of the roles of Stalin and Roosevelt in creating the strange Russo-American cooperation, which Perlmutter suggests enhanced Soviet power. This painstakingly researched piece of iconoclasm paints Roosevelt not so much as a brilliant diplomat but as a disinterested spectator who cared little about Eastern Europe. His major concern was continued good relations with Russia after the war. This book also provides insightful documentary appendixes and surveys of the literature on the origins of the Cold War. Academic libraries and foreign policy aficianados will find this work invaluable.
- Frank Kessler, Missouri Western St. Coll., St. Joseph
Copyright 1993 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Edition details

• Publisher: University of Missouri
• Publication date: 1993
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0826209106
• ISBN 13: 9780826209108
• Binding: Hardcover
• Edition number: 1
• Number of pages: 352