Chilcot Report: Executive Summary - Softcover

Chilcot, John; Freedman, Lawrence; Prashar, Usha Kumari; Lyne, Roderic; Gilbert, Martin

Softcover

ISBN 10: 099549780X ISBN 13: 9780995497801

Publisher: Canbury Press, 2016

Synopsis

The key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by the British government led by Tony Blair.

Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as there 'Chilcot Report') tackled:

· Saddam Hussein's threat to Britain
· the legal advice for the invasion
· intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and
· planning for a post-conflict Iraq.

This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016. 

Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books:

'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.'

Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of £10 million.

The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document.


Table of Contents

Introduction

Pre-conflict strategy and planning

The UK decision to support US military action. UK policy before 9/11The impact of 9/11Decision to take the UN routeNegotiation of resolution 1441The prospect of military actionThe gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widensThe end of the UN route

Why Iraq? Why now? Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat?The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in Iraq

The UK’s relationship with the US

Decision-making. Collective responsibility

Advice on the legal basis for military action. The timing of Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the interpretation of resolution 1441Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March 2003Goldsmith’s arrival at a “better view”The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003

Weapons of mass destruction. Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003The search for WMD

Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The failure to plan or prepare for known risksThe planning process and decision-making

Occupation. Looting in BasraLooting in BaghdadUK influence on post-invasion strategy: resolution 1483UK influence on the Coalition Provisional AuthorityA decline in securityThe turning point

Transition. UK influence on US strategy post-CPAPlanning for withdrawalThe impact of AfghanistanIraqiisation

Preparation for withdrawal. A major divergence in strategyA possible civil warForce Level ReviewThe beginning of the end

Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq?

· Key Findings 1. Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil” to CrawfordDevelopment of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 Sep 2002
· Key Findings 2. Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003WMD search
· Key Findings 3. Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003Development of the military options for an invasion of IraqMilitary planning for the invasion, January to March 2003Military equipment (pre-conflict)Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein IraqInvasion
· Key Findings 4. The post-conflict periodReconstructionDe-Ba’athificationSecurity Sector ReformResourcesMilitary equipment (post-conflict)Civilian personnelService PersonnelCivilian casualties

Lessons. The decision to go to warWeapons of mass destructionThe invasion of IraqThe post-conflict periodReconstructionDe-Ba’athificationSecurity Sector ReformResourcesMilitary equipment (post-conflict)Civilian personnel

Timeline of events

About this title

About the Author

Sir John Chilcot, GCB PC (born 22 April 1939) is a British Privy Counsellor and former civil servant. His appointment as chairman of the Iraq Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and its aftermath was announced in June 2009.He was educated at Brighton College and Pembroke College, Cambridge, where he read English and languages. A career civil servant until his retirement in 1997, he served as Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Northern Ireland Office, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Home Office in charge of the Police Department, and a variety of posts in the Home Office, the Civil Service Department and the Cabinet Office, including Private Secretary appointments to Home Secretaries Roy Jenkins, Merlyn Rees, and William Whitelaw, and to the Head of the Civil Service, William Armstrong.He is now president of Britain's independent policing think tank, The Police Foundation.His honours include CB (1990), KCB (1994), and GCB (1998). He became a Privy Counsellor in 2004, and was a member of the Butler Review of the use of intelligence in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. He acted as "staff counsellor" to MI5 and MI6 from 1999 to 2004, "dealing with private and personal complaints from members of the intelligence services about their work and conditions".(Sir John Chilcot's Wikipedia)

Review

A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft.

Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times. (Derek B. Miller The Guardian)

Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies.

Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort... (Geoffrey Wheatcroft The New York Review of Books)

The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons.

It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate. (Philippe Sands London Review of Books)

A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft.

Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times.

— Derek B. Miller, The Guardian (Derek B. Miller The Guardian)

Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies.

Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort...

— Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books (Geoffrey Wheatcroft The New York Review of Books)

The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons.

It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.

— Philippe Sands, London Review of Books  (Philippe Sands London Review of Books)

Edition details

• Publisher: Canbury Press
• Publication date: 2016
• ISBN 10: 099549780X
• ISBN 13: 9780995497801
• Binding: Mass Market Paperback
• Language: English
• Number of pages: 220