Evolutionary Games and the Replicator Dynamics (Elements in Evolutionary Economics) - Softcover

Mendoza-Palacios, Saul

 
9781009472326: Evolutionary Games and the Replicator Dynamics (Elements in Evolutionary Economics)

Synopsis

This Element introduces the replicator dynamics for symmetric and asymmetric games where the strategy sets are metric spaces. Under this hypothesis the replicator dynamics evolves in a Banach space of finite signed measures. The authors provide a general framework to study the stability of the replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in this Banach space. This allows them to establish a relation between Nash equilibria and the stability of the replicator for normal a form games applicable to oligopoly models, theory of international trade, public good models, the tragedy of commons, and War of attrition game among others. They also provide conditions to approximate the replicator dynamics on a space of measures by means of a finite-dimensional dynamical system and a sequence of measure-valued Markov processes.

"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.

Other Popular Editions of the Same Title

9781009472302: Evolutionary Games and the Replicator Dynamics (Elements in Evolutionary Economics)

Featured Edition

ISBN 10:  1009472305 ISBN 13:  9781009472302
Publisher: Cambridge University Press, 2024
Hardcover