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Book Description HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Seller Inventory # FM-9781107000674
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Book Description Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Many people have claimed that integrity requires sticking to one's convictions come what may. Greg Scherkoske challenges this claim, arguing that it creates problems in distinguishing integrity from fanaticism, close-mindedness or mere inertia. Rather, integrity requires sticking to one's convictions to the extent that they are justifiable and likely to be correct. In contrast to traditional views of integrity, Scherkoske contends that it is an epistemic virtue intimately connected to what we know and have reason to believe, rather than an essentially moral virtue connected to our values. He situates integrity in the context of shared cognitive and practical agency and shows that the relationship between integrity and impartial morality is not as antagonistic as many have thought - which has important implications for the 'integrity objection' to impartial moral theories. This original and provocative study will be of great interest to advanced students and scholars of ethics. Many claim that integrity requires sticking to one's convictions come what may, but Scherkoske argues that integrity relies on convictions being justifiable and probably correct. His original and surprising argument that integrity is an epistemic rather than a moral virtue is of great interest to scholars and students of ethics. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9781107000674
Book Description Hardback. Condition: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days. Scherkoske situates integrity as an epistemic virtue and moves the debate surrounding impartial moral theories in important new directions. Seller Inventory # B9781107000674
Book Description Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 1st edition. 240 pages. 9.06x6.06x0.94 inches. In Stock. Seller Inventory # __110700067X
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Book Description HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Seller Inventory # FM-9781107000674
Book Description Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Many people have claimed that integrity requires sticking to one's convictions come what may. Greg Scherkoske challenges this claim, arguing that it creates problems in distinguishing integrity from fanaticism, close-mindedness or mere inertia. Rather, integrity requires sticking to one's convictions to the extent that they are justifiable and likely to be correct. In contrast to traditional views of integrity, Scherkoske contends that it is an epistemic virtue intimately connected to what we know and have reason to believe, rather than an essentially moral virtue connected to our values. He situates integrity in the context of shared cognitive and practical agency and shows that the relationship between integrity and impartial morality is not as antagonistic as many have thought - which has important implications for the 'integrity objection' to impartial moral theories. This original and provocative study will be of great interest to advanced students and scholars of ethics. Many claim that integrity requires sticking to one's convictions come what may, but Scherkoske argues that integrity relies on convictions being justifiable and probably correct. His original and surprising argument that integrity is an epistemic rather than a moral virtue is of great interest to scholars and students of ethics. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9781107000674
Book Description Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Many people have claimed that integrity requires sticking to one's convictions come what may. Greg Scherkoske challenges this claim, arguing that it creates problems in distinguishing integrity from fanaticism, close-mindedness or mere inertia. Rather, integrity requires sticking to one's convictions to the extent that they are justifiable and likely to be correct. In contrast to traditional views of integrity, Scherkoske contends that it is an epistemic virtue intimately connected to what we know and have reason to believe, rather than an essentially moral virtue connected to our values. He situates integrity in the context of shared cognitive and practical agency and shows that the relationship between integrity and impartial morality is not as antagonistic as many have thought - which has important implications for the 'integrity objection' to impartial moral theories. This original and provocative study will be of great interest to advanced students and scholars of ethics. Many claim that integrity requires sticking to one's convictions come what may, but Scherkoske argues that integrity relies on convictions being justifiable and probably correct. His original and surprising argument that integrity is an epistemic rather than a moral virtue is of great interest to scholars and students of ethics. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9781107000674
Book Description Condition: New. Scherkoske situates integrity as an epistemic virtue and moves the debate surrounding impartial moral theories in important new directions. Num Pages: 270 pages. BIC Classification: HPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 237 x 151 x 25. Weight in Grams: 558. . 2013. 1st Edition. Hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. Seller Inventory # V9781107000674